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Abstract 
This thesis adopted the law in context methodology after due consideration of 
other legal research methodologies.  To situate child justice within the parameters of 
child rights, this thesis analyzed the normative underpinning of child rights and 
found that its foundation is traceable to the International Bill of Human Rights. It 
also examined the philosophical foundations of child rights and adopted the view 
that it is based on inclusive legal positivism found at the intersection of natural law 
and positive law. This thesis validated the existing claim that child justice is 
predicated on the mitigated culpability of children and that whilst human rights 
extend to children because of their humanity, child-specific rights, including child 
justice accrue to them specifically due to their age and vulnerability. 
Having considered all the principles of child rights, this thesis elevated the 
principles of proportionality and the best interests of the child as twin pillars of child 
justice. As a standard for the humane treatment of children in conflict with the law 
and predicated on the premise that the twin pillars encapsulate all other principles of 
child rights, this thesis examined to what extent the twin pillars are incorporated and 
applied in the Nigerian child justice system.  
This thesis found that although the 2003 Child Rights Act of Nigeria meets 
the minimum international legislative standard, child offenders in Nigeria seldom 
enjoy the protective shield of the twin pillars of child justice. It corroborated the 
strength of the twin pillars of child justice as judicial sentencing tools and found that 
whereas child rights may accommodate relative sensitivities, the twin pillars of child 
justice are immutable and non-derogable principles for the treatment of children in 
conflict with the law. 
To ensure the promotion and protection of the rights of child offenders, this 
thesis recommended the amendment of the Child Rights Act and the immediate 
establishment of all the enablers contemplated therein. Although the review of the 
1999 Constitution of Nigeria was not the main focus of this thesis, it however found 
that certain provisions of the constitution inhibit the enjoyment of child rights. 
Exploring the opportunity presented by the ongoing constitutional reform in Nigeria, 
this thesis recommended the amendment of some sections of the constitution. 
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Chapter One 
General Research Framework 
 
1.1 Research Question 
The overarching framework of this thesis is that child justice is an integral 
component of child rights and that the principles of proportionality and the best 
interests of the child are the twin pillars of child justice. On the foregoing premise, 
this thesis examines to what extent the twin pillars of child justice are incorporated 
into the 2003 Child Rights Act of Nigeria, and to what degree they are applied by 
designated family courts in the treatment of children in conflict with the law.  
 
1.2 Research Methodology 
There are several methodologies for conducting legal research.
1
 Key amongst 
them is the doctrinal methodology which takes an insider view of the law and the 
fact that law could be studied in isolation.
2
  As the benchmark for most legal 
research, doctrinal methodology evaluates the content of law, the critical features of 
legislation and case laws.
3
  The Pearce Committee defined doctrinal methodology as 
‘research which provides a systemic exposition of the rules of a particular legal 
category, analyses the relationship between the rules, explains areas of difficulty and, 
perhaps, predicts future developments.’4  
Despite the inherent appeal of doctrinal research methodology in legal 
research,
5
 it has been criticized as limiting the researcher’s view to the confines of 
strict law without due regard to holistic consideration of external and social factors.
6
 
According to Twining, the central weakness of the doctrinal research methodology is 
that it typically focuses attention on rules of law without systemic or regular 
reference to the context of the problems it purports to resolve.
7
 The inherent 
weaknesses of the doctrinal methodology amongst other things occasioned the 
                                                          
1
 Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Brown 
(eds) Research Methods in Law’ (Routledge 2003) 7 
2
 S. Bartie, ‘The Lingering Core of Legal Scholarship’ (2000) 30 Legal Studies 345 
3
 D. W. Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) 31 Journal of Law and Society 
345 
4
 D. Pearce, E. Campbell and D. Harding, Australian Law School: A Discipline Assessment for the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, (Australian Government Publishing Service 1987) 
5
 Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and the Humanities Research Council of Canada 
(The Arthurs Report) Information Division of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council 
of Canada 1983) 31 
6
 Pauline Westerman, ‘Open and Autonomous? The Debate on Legal Methodology as  a Reflection of 
the Debate on Law’ in Mark Van Hoecke (ed) Methodologies of Legal Research Which Kind of 
Method for What Kind of Discipline (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2011) 91 
7
 William Twining, Taylor Lectures - Academic Law and Legal Development (University of Lagos 
Faculty of Law 1976) 20; See also William Twining, Law in Context: Enlarging A Discipline 
(Clarendon Press 1997) 36 
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emergence of alternative research methodologies.
8
 Amongst the competing 
methodologies that emerged and gained momentum amid legal scholars are 
empirical legal research, critical legal research and the socio-legal methodology 
hereafter called the law in context.  
Bearing in mind that this thesis examines the status and authority of a law 
and the degree to which certain standards are integrated in a law and applied by the 
courts, the doctrinal methodology would have been a feasible methodology. But in 
view of the fact that this thesis goes beyond ‘working the rules’ and intends to 
investigate the underlying factors inhibiting the implementation of the law and how 
it could be improved or reformed, a socio-legal understanding of the context of the 
prevailing law is necessary. To carry out these tasks which go beyond isolated 
analysis of the law, the law in context methodology will be adopted to conduct this 
thesis.  
As a paradigm shift in the study of law, this methodology analyses law as a 
social phenomenon,
9
 and is compatible with resolving the research question of this 
thesis.
10
 This thesis is also mindful of the inherent weaknesses of the law in context 
methodology, particularly the involvement of the researcher in the real social and 
political circumstances of the research.
11
 Furthermore, since law is a reflection of the 
social values of a society, scientific or quantitative methods of inquiry are somewhat 
inappropriate and experimental surveys are equally unsuitable for this research.
12
  
 
1.2.1 Document Analysis 
In gathering data for this thesis and as recommended by Bloomberg, 
emphasis is placed on documentary sources, combined with unstructured interviews 
and observations.
13
 Documents used in this thesis include monographs, journals, 
statutes, constitutions, government policy papers and United Nations treaties. Others 
are covenants and conventions, research papers, official and unofficial reports, 
statistics and web-based materials. Also, relevant documents to be consulted include 
                                                          
8
 F. Cownie, Legal Academics: Culture and Identities (Oxford Hart Publishing 2004) 51 
9
 Atieno Ochieng, ‘An Analysis of the Strengths and Limitation of Qualitative and Quantitative 
Research Paradigms’ in Problems Of Education In The 21st Century  (2008) 18; See also C R Kothari, 
Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques (2
nd
 edn, New Age International Publishers 
2002)13; ESCR, Review of Socio Legal Studies: Final Report (Swindon, ESCR 1994) 1 
10
 Carolyn Boyce and Palena Neale, Conducting In-Depth Interviews: A Guide to Designing and 
Conducting In-Depth Interviews for Evaluation Input (2006) 2 Pathfinder International Tool Series 3 
11
 C.M. Campbell and P. Wiles, ‘The Study of Law in Society in Britain’ (1996) 10 Law and Society 
Review 547 
12
 Victor Jupp, Methods of Criminological Research (Rutledge 1989) 28; See also Sharlene Hasse-
Biber, Mixed Methods Research: Merging Theory with Practice (2
nd
  edn, Gilford Press 2008) 127  
13
 Linda Bloomberg, Completing  Your Qualitative Research Dissertation: A Road Map From 
Beginning to End (SAGE Publications 2012) Ch 4; See also Hennie Boeije, Analysis in Qualitative 
Research (SAGE Publications 2010) Part 4 
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both primary and secondary sources, classified as public or private documents.
14
 
Where the need arises and to complement the dearth of case law, this thesis makes 
recourse to unstructured interviews conducted in consonance appropriate 
frameworks.
15
   
This thesis benefited from access to online and hard-copy resources available 
at the David Wilson Library and Harry Peach Library at the University of Leicester, 
United Kingdom. Likewise, the University of Helsinki Library and the Library of the 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights provided 
extremely useful sources of literature. The National Assembly Library Abuja and the 
High Court Library of several states and judicial divisions in Nigeria equally 
provided useful materials relating to the legislative history of the CRA. 
 
1.2.2 Research Limitation 
The concept of child justice is very broad and ranges from situations where 
children are in conflict with the law to instances where they require care and 
protection. Although this thesis appreciates the emerging diverse theories of 
delinquency and crime, it will neither decode ‘why’ children are in conflict with the 
law, nor delve into the societal effects of their involvement in crime. Rather, it 
examines within the framework of the twin pillars of child justice ‘how’ children in 
conflict with the law in designated states in Nigeria are processed by family courts 
established pursuant to the CRA.  
Similar to the criminal justice system, child justice is based on the interplay 
of several independent and inter-related justice institutions including the police, 
courts, remand institutions and prisons. When children are processed through the 
child justice system, these institutions interface. Regardless of the synergy arising 
from the complementary and interdependent roles of these institutions, this thesis 
will deemphasize the role of police and child correction institutions in the child 
justice system. Despite the extensive scope and the multifarious institutions involved 
in the child justice system, this thesis adopts a narrow interpretation of child justice 
in terms of latitude and institutions to be investigated. It focuses specifically on 
instances where children are in conflict with the law whilst disregarding situations 
where they need care and protection.  
                                                          
14
 Monageng Mogalakwe, ‘The Documentary Research Method: Using Documentary Sources in 
Social Research’ (2009) 25 East Africa Social Science Review 43; See also Monique Hennink, Inge 
Hutter and Ajay Bailey, Qualitative Research Methods (SAGE Publications 2011)  
15
 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Professional Training Series No. 7: 
Training Manual for Monitoring Human Rights (OHCHR 2001); See also Carolyn Boyce and Palena 
Neale, Conducting In-Depth Interviews: A Guide to Designing and Conducting In-Depth Interviews 
for Evaluation Input (Pathfinder International Tool Series 2006) 3  
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In order to critically analyze the role of family courts vis-à-vis the 2003 
CRA, this thesis is constrained by the dearth of case laws emanating from the family 
courts. In addition, academic literature touching on the cardinality and centrality of 
the twin pillars of child justice is similarly scarce. To ameliorate this limitation, this 
thesis relies on unstructured interviews conducted between January and July 2013 
with five court registrars, ten magistrates, ten barristers practicing in Lagos, Ogun, 
Oyo, Enugu, Imo, Abia, Rivers, Plateau, Kaduna, Bauchi, Niger, Kano, Sokoto and 
Adamawa States. These fourteen case study states are divided into two sets. The first 
set comprises seven states that have adopted the CRA into state-specific child rights 
law. The second comprises a set of seven states that have not yet adopted the CRA 
into state law. Where possible, this thesis will extrapolate from other jurisdictions or 
rely on relevant academic literature in a non-Nigerian context. 
 Although the effects of legal pluralism impact the child justice system both 
directly and indirectly in Nigeria, this thesis will focus on calibrating the twin pillars 
of child justice only in the context of statutory law. Consequently, it will not 
consider the impact or otherwise of Islamic or customary laws on the child justice 
system or how they both facilitate or inhibit the enjoyment of child rights.  
 
1.2.3  Motivation for Research 
This thesis arose out of the author’s two decades of experience as a lawyer 
and consultant on justice sector reform in several developing and transition 
countries. During this period, the author was exposed to multifarious drawbacks to 
child rights, particularly those that accrue to children in conflict with the law. In the 
case of Nigeria on which this thesis is focused, the author witnessed institutional 
insensitivity to child rights irrespective of international, regional and national 
mechanisms for the protection of child rights.  
 
1.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
Child justice in Nigeria both during the era of the Children and Young 
Persons Act (CYPA) and since 2003 after the promulgation of the CRA has been 
scrutinized academically by national and international scholars. However, there is a 
dearth of literature examining the principles of proportionality and the best interests 
of the child within the context of the CYPA or within the framework of the CRA 
with the sole aim of classifying them as the twin pillars of child justice. Furthermore, 
while the broad areas of child justice have been given considerable attention in books 
and articles, these books and articles are seldom situated within the context of the 
CRA and were not intended to examine the application of the twin pillars of child 
justice by family courts in Nigeria.  
Consequently, this thesis contributes to knowledge by developing what it 
calls the twin pillars of child justice as a non-derogable standard for the treatment of 
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children in conflict with the law. This thesis fills a gap in scholarly research by 
elucidating the challenges of the practical implementation of the CRA and thereby 
contributes to better understanding of the disconnect of legislative reforms that are 
not matched with political will and institutional restructuring.   
This thesis contributes to discussions on the drawbacks of a non-holistic 
justice sector reform and also corroborates the fact that the aim of child justice is to 
ensure that courts take the best interests of children into consideration to such extent 
that their infraction of the law is not rewarded with disproportionate responses. As an 
advancement of knowledge and a veritable platform to protect child rights, it is 
anticipated that the recommendations of this thesis will contribute to the ongoing 
debate on legislative and constitutional amendment in Nigeria.  
 
1.4 Background on Nigeria 
Since this research focuses on Nigeria, it is essential to set out a contextual 
background of the country’s constitutional developments and legal systems. This 
historical perspective facilitates better understanding of the nature and particulars of 
the child justice system in the context of which the twin pillars of child justice will 
be examined. 
Nigeria is located in West Africa along the shores of the North Atlantic 
Ocean, situated between Benin and Cameroon and shaped through a gradual process 
of British colonial territorial incorporation.
16
 According to Suberu, the delimitation 
of the territory of Nigeria began in 1861 with the annexation of the coastal city of 
Lagos and culminated in the amalgamation of the two British protectorates of 
Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914.
17
  The Federal Republic of Nigeria became 
independent on October 1, 1960 after about 100 years of British colonial rule. It 
attained a republican status within the British Commonwealth in 1963. According to 
the Nigeria National Population Commission, Nigeria is estimated to have over 
162.5 million citizens, with a population growth of 2.6 percent unevenly distributed 
among 350 ethnic groups. Presently, Nigeria is administratively delineated into 35 
states and the Federal Capital Territory.
18
  
Prior to and at independence, Nigeria’s pluralistic and diverse nature among 
other factors necessitated the formal adoption of a federal system of government that 
consisted of Northern, Eastern and the Western regions. The Nigerian federation did 
not emerge through a contract between states nor as a voluntary union of a number of 
originally independent states. Rather, it dates from the middle of the nineteenth 
                                                          
16
 Rotimi Suberu, ‘Reinventing the Architecture of Nigerian Federalism’ (2006) 12 Brown Journal of 
World Affairs. 140 
17
 Ibid 
18
  The states are as follows: Abia, Adamawa, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, 
Cross-River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Enugu, Gombe, Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, 
Kogi, Kwara, Lagos, Nassarawa, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto, Taraba, 
Yobe and Zamfara 
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century when parts of what became known as Nigeria came under the British 
colonial sphere of influence through British conquest in 1903.
19
 Apart from the Mid-
Western Region which was carved out of the western region in 1964 through the 
process laid down in the 1963 Republican Constitution, the other five subsequent 
exercises of state creation that put the current number of states in Nigeria at 36 plus 
the federal capital territory located in Abuja occurred during military regimes. 
 
1.4.1 Overview of Constitutional Developments in Nigeria 
Since the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorate in 1914 
into what is the present-day Nigeria, the country has been governed under 8 
constitutional dispensations. Nigerian constitutional history began with Frederick 
Lugard’s Amalgamation Report of 1914 followed by the Clifford’s’ Constitution in 
1922.
20
  The third constitution in Nigeria was the Richard’s Constitution of 1945 
which was succeeded by the McPherson Constitution adopted in 1951.
21
 In 1954, a 
constitutional arrangement was adopted which led to Oliver Littleton’s Constitution, 
and thereafter the independence Constitution of 1960 and thereafter the Republican 
Constitution of 1963.
22
 The 1963 military coup and the resultant suspension of the 
constitution disrupted the Nigerian constitutional framework for 16 years until the 
promulgation of the 1979 constitution.
23
 In 1984, another coup d’etat suspended the 
1979 constitution until the promulgation and adoption of the 1986 constitution that 
was in force until 1993 when another military government toppled the 
democratically elected government.
24
  
Suberu and Diamond’s view is that Nigeria’s dizzying political odyssey over 
five decades of independent statehood has witnessed restive political activity that 
swung between democratic pluralism and military authoritarianism, and between 
Westminster-style parliamentary government and an American-type presidential 
system.
25
 Similarly, it has been argued that Nigeria’s constitutional development was 
largely shaped and driven by colonial interests based on an exclusionary policy of 
alienation of the citizenry from any form of popular participation.  Omotola argues 
                                                          
19
 Dele Babalola, The Origins of Nigerian Federalism: The Rikerian Theory and Beyond (Federal 
Governance 2013) 43; See also Adiele E. Afigbo, Background to Nigerian Federalism: Federal 
Features in the Colonial State (Publius 1991) 13 
20
  Egbert Udo Udoma, History and the Law of the Constitution of Nigeria  (Malthouse Press 1994) 32 
21
  Toyin Falola and Matthew Heaton, A History of Nigeria, (Cambridge University Press) 53 
22
 Ibid 
23
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24
 Ibid 
25
 Rotimi Suberu and Larry Diamond, ‘Institutional Design, Ethnic Conflict Management, and 
Democracy in Nigeria’ in Andrew Reynolds (ed) The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional 
Design, Conflict Management and Democracy (Oxford University Press 2002) 400; See also Osita 
Agbu, ‘Re-inventing Federalism in Post-transition Nigeria: Problems and Prospects’ (2004) 29 Africa 
Journal Online 7 http://www.ajol.info/index.php/ad/article/view/22192 accessed 23 October 2013 
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that while the agitation of nationalists may have led to the move from the Nigerian 
Council of 1914 to the expanded Legislative Council of the Clifford Constitution of 
1922, the Council turned out to be merely a charade, conceding no powers to the 
subjects.
26
  
The present constitution of Nigeria was adopted by the military provisional 
ruling council and came into force in May 1999. It is the supreme law of the country 
and is a collection of rules and principles on the basis of which Nigeria is 
governed.
27
 It also regulates the distribution of legislative powers between the bi-
cameral National Assembly, which has power to make laws for the federation and 
the unicameral House of Assembly entitled to legislate for each state of the 
federation.
28
  
Bearing in mind that the 1999 constitution like other previous constitutions 
did not expressly authorize states to have state constitutions, it implies that it forbids 
any constitution by federating states and binds all authorities and persons throughout 
the federal republic. It also provides the framework for the administration of both the 
federal and state governments.
29
 The 1999 Constitution has been amended three 
times since promulgation with the first two amendments dealing largely with 
political issues while the third amendment made provisions for the establishment of 
the national industrial court as a superior court of record.
30
 Efforts are currently 
ongoing to further amend the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.
31
  
The current federal system of government in Nigeria is modeled after the 
American system.
32
 The legislative, executive and the judicial functions are divided 
between the federal and state governments. The federal legislature referred to as the 
                                                          
26
 J Shola Omotola, ‘Democracy and Constitutionalism in Nigeria Under the Fourth Republic’ (2008) 
2 Africana 7; See also Simeon Ilesanmi, ‘Constitutional Treatment of Religion and the Politics of 
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27
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28
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29
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30
 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (First Alteration) Act 2010 (An Act to alter the 
provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and for related matters); 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Second Alteration) Act No. 2 of 2010 (An Act to 
alter the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (First Alteration) Act, 2010; and for related matters); Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act 2010 (An Act to alter the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria Cap. C.23, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 for the   
establishment of the National Industrial Court under the Constitution) 
31
 Olusola Fabiyi, Kamarudeen Ogundele and Ihuoma Chiedozie, ‘Constitution Amendment: 
Delegates back plan to empower Jonathan’ http://www.punchng.com/news/constitution-amendment-
delegates-back-plan-to-empower-jonathan/ accessed 28 April 2014 
32
 Kelechi Kalu, ‘A Constitutionalism in Nigeria: A Conceptual Analysis of Ethnicity and Politics’ 
[2009] West Africa Review; 
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National Assembly is bicameral and is made up of the Senate and House of 
Representatives.
33
 Each of the 36 states of the federation is entrusted with its own 
law-making organ known as the House of Assembly. The members elected to the 
Houses of Assembly represent the various state constituencies.  
The executive power of the federation is vested in the President.
34
 These 
powers can be administered directly or through the Vice-President or Ministers or 
officers of the government. Similarly, in the respective states, the executive power of 
a state is vested in the Governor and may be exercised directly by the governor or 
through the Deputy Governor, Commissioners or other public officers.
35
 The 1999 
Nigerian Constitution governs the composition of government, the structure of 
governmental powers among federating states and the process by which such powers 
are exercised.
36
 Except for the constitutions prior to 1946 which were based on a 
unitary form of government, the rest of the constitutional structure of Nigeria was 
characterized by a federal system of government.
37
  
According to Muhammad, in a bid to reconcile diverse ethnic and religious 
sentiments, these post 1946 constitutions progressively guaranteed substantial 
autonomy to the then existing regions and by extension states.
38
 In his view, the 
realities of the country’s historical past and coupled with the perceived economic 
advantage accruable from decentralization, federalism became an attractive option 
for Nigeria. While noting several other reasons why federalism as a form of 
government was attractive and compelling in Nigeria, Muhammad argues that 
federalism was adopted in Nigeria principally as an institutional arrangement that 
was aimed at maintaining unity in diversity.
39
  
Reinforced by growing suspicion and fear of domination by majority ethnic 
groups over minority groups, federalism was considered the system of government 
that would grant federating units considerable freedom and autonomy in the internal 
governance of their people. Alapiki and Odondiri hold a different view that the 
adoption of federalism in Nigeria was an external script meant to advance the 
                                                          
33
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political and administrative convenience of colonial masters.
40
 They argued further 
that contrary to the motive of unity in diversity, federalism was introduced in Nigeria 
as a divide and rule strategy and a divisive colonial heritage that evidences self-
interest.
41
  
Nigerian federalism has rotated between the excessive regionalization that 
characterized the first republic to the excessive centrality of the military and to some 
extent, post-military era.
42
 This transition has been accompanied by structural 
changes, which saw the federation move from its initial three regions at 
independence to its present 36 state structure and 774 local government councils.
43
  
With federalism being one of the constitutional principles of the 1999 
constitution, the distribution of powers across the three-tier federal structure 
consisting of the federal government, the state government and local government is 
guaranteed in the constitution.
44
 Each level of government has under the 1999 
constitution specified legislative autonomy within its area of operation. Part I of the 
1999 Constitution provides for the exclusive legislative list which itemizes issues in 
respect of which the federal government has exclusive competence to legislate upon.  
The subject matter for which the federal government could exclusively 
legislate upon excludes human rights in general and child rights in particular, but 
include issues such as awards of national titles, honours and decorations. Others are 
construction, alteration and maintenance of roads, fishing and fisheries.
45
 While the 
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 H Alapiki and P.G.O Odondiri, ‘Federal State Relations in Nigeria’ in E.A Henry (ed) Human 
Development Issues in Nigeria (Spring Fold Publishers 1992) 22 
41
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42
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43
 Rotimi Suberu, ‘The Nigerian Federal System: Performance, Problems and Prospects’ [2010]  
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 459  
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 Section 2 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 
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passengers and goods by air, awards of national titles of honour, decorations and other dignities, 
bankruptcy and insolvency, banks, banking, bills of exchange and promissory notes, borrowing of 
monies within or outside Nigeria for the purposes of the Federation or of any State, census, including 
the establishment and maintenance of machinery for continuous and universal registration of births 
and deaths throughout Nigeria. Others are citizenship, naturalization and aliens, commercial and 
industrial monopolies, combines and trusts, construction, alteration and maintenance of such roads as 
may be declared by the National Assembly to be Federal trunk roads, control of capital issues, 
copyright, creation of states, currency, coinage and legal tender, customs and excise duties, defense, 
deportation of persons who are not citizens of Nigeria, designation of securities in which trust funds 
may be invested, diplomatic, consular and trade representation, drugs and poisons, election to the 
offices of President and Vice-President or Governor and Deputy Governor and any other office to 
which a person may be elected under the Constitution, excluding election to a local government 
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and fisheries in rivers, lakes, waterways, ponds and other inland waters within Nigeria. Others are 
immigration into and emigration from Nigeria; implementation of treaties relating to matters on this 
10 
 
federal government has the sole competence to legislate on matters on the exclusive 
legislative list, the subject matter on the concurrent legislative list provided for in 
Part II of the constitution could be legislated upon by both the federal and state 
government. However, in the event of conflict between federal and state laws on 
matters on the concurrent legislative list, the federal law prevails and the state law 
will be void to the extent of its inconsistency.
46
 Like the exclusive legislative list, the 
concurrent legislative list omits human rights in general and child rights in 
particular.
47
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
list; incorporation, regulation and winding up of bodies corporate, other than co-operative societies, 
local government councils and bodies corporate established directly by any Law enacted by a House 
of Assembly of a State; insurance; labour, including trade unions, industrial relations; conditions, 
safety and welfare of labour; industrial disputes; prescribing a national minimum wage for the 
Federation or any part thereof; and industrial arbitration etc. Others are legal proceedings between 
Governments of States or between the Government of the Federation and Government of any State or 
any other authority or person; maritime shipping and navigation; meteorology; military (Army, Navy 
and Air Force) including any other branch of the armed forces of the Federation; mines and minerals, 
including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas; national parks being such areas in 
a State as may, with the consent of the Government of that State, be designated by the National 
Assembly as national parks; nuclear energy; passports and visas; patents, trademarks, trade or 
business names, industrial designs and merchandise marks; pensions, gratuities and other-like benefit 
payable out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public funds of the Federation; police and 
other government security services established by law; posts, telegraphs and telephones; powers of the 
National Assembly, and the privileges and immunities of its members; prisons; professional 
occupations as may be designated by the National Assembly; public debt of the Federation; public 
holidays; public relations of the Federation; public service of the Federation including the settlement 
of disputes between the Federation and officers of such service; quarantine; railways; regulations of 
political parties; service and execution in a State of the civil and criminal processes, judgments, 
decrees, orders and other decisions of any court of law outside Nigeria or any court of law in Nigeria 
other than a court of law established by the House of Assembly of that State; stamp duties; taxation of 
incomes, profits and capital gains, except as otherwise prescribed by this Constitution; the formation, 
annulment and dissolution of marriages other than marriages under Islamic law and Customary law 
including matrimonial causes relating thereto; traffic on Federal trunk roads; water from such sources 
as may be declared by the National Assembly to be sources affecting more than one state; weights and 
measures; wireless, broadcasting and television other than broadcasting and television provided by the 
Government of a state; allocation of wave-lengths for wireless, broadcasting and television 
transmission; etc.  
46
 Section 4(5) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 
47
 The federal and state governments have concurrent legislative competence over division of public 
revenue, grants or loans from and the imposition of charges upon any of the public funds; antiquities 
and monuments; archives and public records; tax or duty on; registration of voters and the procedure 
regulating elections; electricity and the establishment of electric power stations, generation and 
transmission of electricity; censorship of cinematograph films and to prohibit or restrict the exhibition 
of such films; health, safety and welfare of persons employed to work in factories; offices or other 
premises or in inter-State transportation and commerce including the training; supervision and 
qualification of such persons;  regulation of ownership and control of business enterprises; 
establishment of research centres for agricultural studies; establishment of institutions and bodies for 
the promotion or financing of industrial, commercial or agricultural projects; trigonometrical, 
cadastral and topographical surveys; technical, vocational, post-primary and primary education or 
other forms of education, including the establishment of institutions for the pursuit of such education; 
and post primary education, university education, technological education or professional education. 
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Bearing in mind the exhaustive list of issues provided under the exclusive 
and concurrent legislative lists, legislating on human rights in general and the setting 
of child rights standards in particular are not included in the catalogue of subjects 
designated for the legislative competence of the National Assembly and the House of 
Assembly of respective states. This situation, by default, allows state houses of 
assembly the jurisdiction to legislate on human rights in general and child rights in 
particular, because they belong to the residual legislative list which is not expressly 
reserved for the National Assembly under the exclusive legislative list and those 
other matters that do not fall under the concurrent legislative list. The implications of 
this state of affairs on human rights and child rights in general and child justice in 
particular are elaborated in subsequent chapters.  
 
1.4.2 Domestic Application of International Treaties in Nigeria 
International treaties are not automatically applicable in Nigeria unless 
domesticated.
48
 This is because the 1999 Constitution draws a clear distinction 
between international law and national law to the extent that while the President can 
enter into international obligations, such obligations are not enforceable nationally 
without domestic legislative procedures.
49
 Section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution 
stipulates that ‘no treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the 
force of law except to the extent to which such a treaty has been enacted into law by 
the National Assembly’.  
By virtue of Section 12(2), ‘the National Assembly may make laws for the 
Federation or any part thereof with respect to matters not included in the Exclusive 
Legislative List for the purpose of implementing a treaty’. Limiting the ambit of the 
legislative authority of the National Assembly on matters not granted under the 
exclusive legislative lists, Section 12(3) provides that a bill for an Act of the National 
Assembly passed pursuant to the provisions of Section 2(2) shall not be presented to 
the President for assent and shall not be enacted unless it is ratified by a majority of 
all the state houses of assembly.  
On the other hand, where the National Assembly intends to adopt a treaty 
assented to by the President and which touches on a matter within the concurrent or 
residual legislative lists, the National Assembly must first adopt the bill 
domesticating the treaty and subject the bill to a similar process by the majority of 
the state houses of assembly before it can be assented to by the President. 
Consequently, international law does not apply directly in Nigeria without 
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congruence of the legislative or executive actions of the government. In other words, 
because of the distinction entrenched in the constitution between international law 
and municipal law, a treaty cannot be self-executing in Nigeria as its implementation 
must be by express legislative accent.
50
  
While the President is the only person authorized to enter into a treaty, for an 
international treaty to have the force of law in Nigeria, it must be passed into law by 
the National Assembly.
51
 In the case of Abacha v Fawehimi, the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria held that an international treaty entered into by the Government of Nigeria 
does not become binding until enacted into law by the National Assembly.
52
  The 
court further held that where the treaty is enacted by the National Assembly, as was 
the case with the African Charter which is incorporated into municipal law by the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Enforcement and Ratification) Act 
of 1983, it becomes binding on Nigerian courts to give effect to it like all other laws 
falling within the judicial powers of the court.  
Supporting the view that treaty, including those dealing with human rights, 
cannot be applied domestically unless incorporated through domestic legislation, and 
the fact that it is the enabling statute enacted pursuant to implementation of a treaty 
rather than the treaty per se which is considered by courts as a source of law, the 
court in Ibidapo v. Lufthansa Airlines held that Nigeria, like any other 
Commonwealth country, inherited the English Common Law rules governing 
municipal application of international law.
53
   
 
1.4.3 The Nigerian Legal System 
Before the introduction of colonial rule with its far-reaching ramifications, 
the regulation of social relations in Nigeria was administered through indigenous 
legal systems mostly customary in nature and type.
54
 After colonization, the 
application of English Common Law in Nigeria was consolidated with the 
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introduction of Ordinances legitimizing statutory law, including English Common 
Law, the doctrines of equity and the statutes of general application which were in 
force in England as at January 1, 1900.
55
  On independence, Nigeria retained its 
inherited English Common Law, alongside home-grown Islamic and customary laws 
that are subject to a repugnancy scrutiny. 
When colonial authorities assumed power in Nigeria, they abrogated certain 
norms of Islamic and customary law that were perceived to be barbaric and enforced 
the remaining norms of Islamic and customary law to the extent that the norms are 
not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience.
56
 Also, for Islamic and 
customary norms to be applicable, they must not be incompatible either directly or 
by necessary implication with any law in force and must not be contrary to public 
policy.
57
  In the case of Eshugbaye v. Government of Nigeria, it was held that the 
court cannot on its own transform a barbarous custom into a milder one. As such, 
any custom that with barbarous character must be rejected as repugnant to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience.
58
   
A further validity test in the post-independence era which has survived to 
date is that the Nigerian Constitution is the supreme law of the land and any other 
law inconsistent with its provisions is null and void to the extent of its 
inconsistency.
59
 Nwauche supports this view when he argues that the pre-
independence validity test should be dispensed with bearing in mind the elaborate 
bill of rights provisions of the 1999 Constitution.
60
  
Judicial precedent is also part of the regime of statutory law and an important 
source of law in Nigeria. In terms of binding precedents, the Supreme Court is the 
highest court in the country, followed by the Court of Appeal which sits in judicial 
divisions spread throughout the country. The Supreme Court replaced the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in 1963 as the final appellate court. The Court of 
Appeal established in 1976 is also the national penultimate court to entertain appeals 
from the High Courts. The Court of Appeal and all lower courts are bound by the 
decisions of the Supreme Court. The Federal High Courts and State High Courts and 
other courts of coordinate and subordinate jurisdiction are equally bound by the 
decisions of the Court of Appeal.
61
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As a country with a plural legal system, the first strand of legal pluralism in 
Nigeria is evident in the multifarious legal traditions and legal cultures derived from 
customary law, Islamic law and English Common Law.
62
 The second strand arises 
from the federal arrangement in the country whereby federal and state governments 
share legislative authority with the possibility of conflict of federal and state laws as 
well as conflict of state laws. The third strand emanates from the colonial policy of 
administering the northern and southern protectorates separately until amalgamation 
in 1914 which was thereafter extended to regionalization in 1954.
63
 
While customary law and Islamic law still exist and are applied in Nigeria, 
the country is predominantly governed by statutory laws in the form of the 
constitution and other laws of the National Assembly, House of Assembly of the 
states or military decrees as the case may be. Legislation is the most important 
source of law in Nigeria after the constitution. On the coming into force of the 1999 
Constitution, all primary and subordinate legislations in force in the country was 
treated as existing laws and deemed to have been made by the appropriate legislative 
body with competence to do so under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.
64
  
 
1.4.4  Customary Law 
Customary law is the law arising from the custom and traditions of the 
people. The distinctive feature of customary law is that it is the rule or body of rules 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Nigeria, the Court of Appeal,  the Federal High Court, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, 
Abuja, the High Court of a State,  the National Industrial Court, the Sharia Court of Appeal of the 
Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, the Sharia Court of Appeal of a State, the Customary Court of 
Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, and the Customary Court of Appeal of a State. In 
Nigeria, the state court structure feeds into the federal court structure at the level of the Court of 
Appeal. The Court of Appeal entertains appeals from the decisions of the Federal and State High 
Courts, the Sharia Courts of Appeal and the Customary Courts of Appeal. Appeals from the decisions 
of the Court of Appeal proceed to the Supreme Court.  Incidentally, the customary courts and the 
Sharia courts occupy the lowest ranking in Nigeria’s judicial system. In terms of administrative 
responsibility, state High Courts play very important roles in each state. Each state of the federation is 
also entitled to establish a Sharia Court of Appeal or a Customary Court of Appeal or other inferior 
courts such as magistrate courts, district courts, area/Sharia courts, and customary courts. The High 
Courts and other specialized courts exercise supervisory and appellate jurisdiction over the inferior 
courts. See Section 6(1) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 
62
 Ladan, Muhammad Tawfiq, ‘Legal Pluralism and the Development of the Rule of Law in Nigeria: 
Issues and Challenges in the Development and Application of the Sharia’ in Jibrin Ibrahim (ed) 
Sharia Penal and Family Laws in Nigeria and in the Muslim World: Rights Based Approach, (Global 
Rights Partners for Justice 2004) 57; See also Gordon Woodman, ‘Customary Law in Common Law 
Systems’ (2001) 32 Introductory Development Studies Bulletin 28 
63
 Ufot B Inamete, ‘Federalism in Nigeria: The Crucial Dynamics’ (1991) 80 The Commonwealth 
Journal of International Affairs 191 
64
 John Boye Ejobowah, ‘Rewriting Nigerian Federal Constitution: A Prescriptive Argument for a 
Self-Sustaining Arrangement’ (2011) 3 Canadian Journal of African Studies 507 
15 
 
of human conduct generally accepted by the people it governs and regulated by 
immemorial practice or usage.
65
 In the case of Oyewumi v Ogunsesan, Obaseki J. 
defined customary law as: 
 [T]he organic or living law of the indigenous people of Nigeria 
regulating their lives and transactions. It is organic in that it is not 
static and it is regulatory in the sense that it controls the lives and 
transactions of the community subject to it. It is a mirror of the 
culture of the people which goes further to import justice to the 
lives of those subject to it.
66
  
Tracing the origin of customary law to native courts, Makeri argues that 
before the introduction of the colonial legal system in 1900 with attendant 
repugnancy screening of native law and custom, customary law was already in 
existence in the colony of Lagos and its protectorates. With the amalgamation of 
Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914, the Native Court Ordinance of 1915 ushered 
in a system which was consistent with and enhanced the amalgamated structure.
67 
Since there is no single uniform set of customs prevailing throughout Nigeria, 
customary law is therefore used as a blanket description covering many different 
legal systems provided it is not contrary to public policy, natural justice, equity and 
good conscience.
68
 According to the Customary Courts Law of Abia State,
69
 
customary law is defined as:  
[A] rule or body of customary rules relating to rights and imposing 
correlative duties being customary rule or body of customary rules 
which obtains and is fortified by established usage and which is 
appropriate and applicable to any particular cause, matter, dispute, 
issue or question. 
Prevalent in the Southern part of Nigeria and dominant in the area of personal 
and family relations like marriage, divorce, guardianship and custody of children and 
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succession, customary law differs amongst different ethnic groups and is an 
indigenous law that reflects the culture, customs, values and habits of the people 
whose activities it intends to regulate.
70
 For instance, within an ethnic group, there 
are pockets of differences in some aspects of customary law. It is thus not unusual to 
observe that the marriage customs and inheritance rules of the Ibos of South- East 
Nigeria are different from those of the Yorubas of South-West Nigeria. Even within 
the Yoruba ethnic group or the Igbo ethnic group, there are sub-ethnic groups with 
different customary laws.  
Since customary law is mostly unwritten law with possible uncertainty and 
unpredictability in its application, the inherent flexibility of its usage makes it 
amenable to social and economic changes without losing its character. As an 
amalgam of customs and habitual practices accepted by members of a particular 
community as having the force of law due to long established usage, customary laws 
are usually enforced in mostly lay customary courts occupying the lowest rung on 
the hierarchy of courts in Nigeria.
71
  
 
1.4.5 Islamic Law 
Nigeria is one of the countries where Islamic law survived the colonial era 
because the 1904 criminal code introduced in Northern Nigeria allowed native courts 
to try offenses under Islamic law regardless of whether they were punishable under 
the criminal code.
72
 When the British occupied Northern Nigeria under the policy of 
indirect rule, they did not, subject to a repugnancy test, interfere with the application 
of Islamic law in civil and criminal cases.
73
 According to Peters, the application of 
pre-independence Islamic criminal law was entirely usurped by the 1959 penal code 
for Northern Nigeria that remained in force until the reintroduction of Islamic law in 
some Northern states of Nigeria in 2000.
74
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Islamic law is based on the Islamic religion and was introduced into Nigeria 
as a consequence of a successful process of Islamization.
75
 According to Baderin, 
while Islamic law may not be the sole factor for ensuring the realization of  human 
rights in Muslim states, it is certainly a significant platform for advancing human 
rights in states where Islamic law is applicable as part of the law.
76
 This system of 
law is based on the Holy Qur’an and is mostly applicable in Muslim-dominated 
Northern Nigeria. Unlike customary law, Islamic law is mostly written with clearly 
defined and articulated principles.
77
 In some areas, Islamic law after its introduction 
completely supplanted the pre-existing system of customary laws whereas in other 
areas, it became incorporated into customary law with the two systems fused and 
jointly administered.
78
  
The scope of Islamic law has broadened since the introduction of the Sharia 
legal system in a number of states in Northern Nigeria. The principal feature of this 
new development is the introduction of religious-based criminal offenses, especially 
on matters of morality and the introduction of punishments sanctioned by the 
Qur’an.79 According to Baderin, Sharia refers to the immutable corpus of law 
contained in the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Mohammad.80   
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Section 2 of the High Court Law of Northern Nigeria provides that native law 
and custom includes Islamic law.
81
 Also, colonial authorities classified customary 
law to include Islamic law and this trend continued until 1999 when all the Northern 
states repealed all the laws that made Islamic Law part of the customary law in their 
states. Oba has pointed out the inappropriateness of situating Islamic law under 
customary law,
 82
 and his views were supported by the Plateau State Customary 
Court of Appeal Law which defines customary law as:  
[T]he rule of conduct which governs legal relationships as 
established by custom and usage and not forming part of the 
Common Law of England nor formally enacted by the Plateau 
State House of Assembly but includes declaration or modification 
of customary law but does not include Islamic personal law.
83
  
The customary courts and Islamic courts while interpreting and applying 
customary and Islamic laws respectively are bound by the precedents of superior 
courts in cases of the same or similar facts, issues or situations. However, they are 
not bound by the decision of customary or Sharia courts of coordinate jurisdiction. 
According to Zubair, precedent is a non-existent judicial mechanism in the 
administration of Sharia justice because it is predicated on a single, final 
adjudicator.
84
 According to him, although there is division of jurisdiction of courts 
for administrative convenience, a stereotyped judgment is unknown to Sharia since 
each judge is guided by the Qur’an, the Sunnah and Ijma.85  
Adding his voice that precedent is inconsistent with Islamic law, Yodudu 
states that accepting the common law doctrine of precedent in the Sharia legal 
system will amount to turning Sharia upside-down because the kadi’s focus is on the 
just application of the law in an individual case.
86
  Similarly, Fadel opines that, a 
judge under Islamic law is obliged to consult the text of the law on each fresh 
question arising from the court’s decision and not merely a superior court’s ruling.87  
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1.5   Overview of the Nigerian Child Justice System 
Prior to 2003, the child justice system in Nigeria was governed by an array of 
federal and state legislations.
88
 The child justice system in Nigeria is distinct from 
the criminal justice system which is regulated by the Criminal Procedure Act 
applicable in Southern Nigeria and the Criminal Procedure Code applicable in 
Northern Nigeria. The Criminal Procedure Act came into being as Ordinance No 42 
of 1945, re-enacted as Ordinance No 43 of 1948 and was at various times amended 
by several Ordinances.
89
 The Criminal Procedure Code was enacted by the Northern 
Region of Nigeria in 1960 and applied only to the Northern Region, and when states 
were created to all the Northern states.
90
  
As a developing country, Nigeria has been struggling to fund its socio-
economic structures and services. The 2012 United Nations Human Development 
Report categorizes Nigeria in the low human development category and places it 
153
rd
 out of 187 countries and territories.
91
 Also, quantitative information on crime 
and criminal justice in Nigeria remains scarce and compounded by poor data 
management.
92
 As such, it is very difficult to determine precisely the number of 
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children involved in the child justice system in Nigeria.
93
 Since existing and accurate 
child crime statistics in Nigeria only relate to child detention facilities and represent 
only those children who are deprived of their liberty, the most comprehensive data of 
children in conflict with the law would be that compiled by the courts, which 
incidentally is nonexistent at state and national levels.
94
  
 
1.5.1  Children and Young Persons Act 
The first child specific legislation is the CYPA passed in 1943 by the British 
Colonial Government as an Ordinance applicable throughout the Protectorate of 
Nigeria.
95
 As the major piece of legislation that was dealing with matters affecting 
children and young persons in Nigeria, the CYPA was promulgated to make 
provision for the welfare and treatment of young offenders through the establishment 
of child courts.
96
 Abubakar aptly depicts the slant of the CYPA when he states that it 
has a very strong focus on penal sanctions and at the same time consolidated 
institutionalization and punishment as an appropriate response to child offenses.
97
  
On the introduction of a federal system of government with a state structure 
in Nigeria, most states of the federation enacted their own Children and Young 
Persons Law which were almost an identical reprinting of the 1943 CYPA. These 
state child laws provided three categories of children subject to child justice. The 
first are children in conflict with the law, the second are children in need of care and 
protection, and finally children beyond parental control.
98
 With the passage of time 
and more specifically, with the advancement in the articulation of child rights in 
international and regional human rights instruments and laws, the inherent 
weaknesses of the CYPA began to emerge more visibly.  
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The CYPA did not define the word ‘juvenile’ nor was the word defined in 
any other piece of legislation simultaneously applicable with the CYPA. Like the 
penal and criminal codes applicable in Northern and Southern Nigeria respectively, 
the CYPA established two categories of children. The first is a ‘child’ defined as a 
person under the age of 14, and the second is a ‘young person’ defined as a person 
who has attained 14 years of age but is under the age of 17.
99
 While the CYPA made 
provisions relating to children in conflict with the law and children in need of care 
and protection, it did not specifically set separate standards for the treatment of 
children in conflict with the law and the treatment of children in need of care and 
protection.  
Alluding to this fact, Abubakar holds the view that as a result of the failure to 
distinguish between the treatment of children in conflict with the law and children in 
need of care and protection, the CYPA classified and processed social welfare cases 
as criminal cases.
100
 Another defect of the CYPA in particular, and the rest of the 
pre-2003 legislation dealing with child rights in general, relates to the discrepancies 
in the age of criminal responsibility of children in conflict with the law. Rather than 
adopting a single age of criminal responsibility, the multiplicity of laws applicable at 
the same time as the CYPA adopted various age demarcations under which 
responsibility may or may not be assigned depending on the circumstances of the 
offense.
101
  
Consequently and as argued by Ijaiya, the rule under the pre-2003 legislation 
dealing with child rights is such that any child above the age of 12 years is deemed 
fully responsible for any act or omission committed by him or her.
102
 In pre-trial 
procedures, despite the fact that the constitution prohibits torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment and requires that every person must be informed in writing 
within 24 hours of the facts and grounds for his or her arrest,
103
 the CYPA is silent 
on the mode and procedure for the arrest of children and provides no guidance and 
obligation for police officers to treat children in a particular way including notifying 
parents of the arrest of their children. While the gaps of the CYPA enumerated above 
are not claimed to be exhaustive, suffice it to say that the CYPA was not a very 
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child-friendly legislation, although it remained the applicable law in matters relating 
to child rights for over 60 years in Nigeria.  
It was the foregoing gaps in the child justice provisions of the CYPA, 
coupled with the need to develop national legislation on child rights that is aligned to 
international and regional human rights standards that triggered efforts to promulgate 
the CRA. The CYPA and its amendments predate the evolution of contemporary 
human rights and child rights norms in Nigeria. The CYPA was originally intended 
to apply in Lagos but was later adopted as a regional law and subsequently as state 
laws. It was extended to the Eastern and Western Regions of Nigeria in 1946 and the 
Northern Region of Nigeria in 1958 through Order-in-Council of 1945 and 1958 
respectively.
104
  
Within the six decades of the application of the CYPA, Nigeria was the 
subject of intense national and international criticism due to its poor child rights 
record.
105
 The reality of Nigeria’s ineptitude in the protection of child rights 
intensified with the ratification of the CRC in 1991, submission of its first country 
report to the Committee on the Right of the Child in 1996 and ratification of the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) in 2001.
106
   
Owing largely to civil society advocacy and diplomatic pressure from 
international allies, the federal government proposed a bill on child rights in 1993. 
According to Alemika and Chukwuma, the bill was not passed into law due to 
irreconcilable differences between the Senate and House of Representatives on 
issues of religion and tradition. It has been stated that agreeing on a child rights bill 
was unsuccessful because certain sections of the country claimed that the bill 
accommodated provisions inconsistent with Islamic values, traditions and culture.
107
 
Following the failure of the 1993 draft child rights bill, a special committee was set 
up in 2002 to reconcile the religious and customary concerns raised by 
parliamentarians and stakeholders.
108
  
In view of the yawning gaps in the criminal and child justice systems and the 
increasing need to repeal the CYPA, the Nigerian National Assembly embarked on 
promulgating child rights legislation in conformity with regional and international 
standards and thus passed the CRA in 2003. The aim of the CRA is to improve on 
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the child protection mechanism in the CYPA and align child rights in Nigeria with 
the framework of the ACRWC and CRC. The promulgation of the CRA was also 
informed by the need for legislation that incorporates all the rights and 
responsibilities of children, government, parents and other authorities into a single 
legislation. The Act prohibits subjecting children to the criminal justice process and 
further guarantees due process at all stages of the judicial proceedings of children in 
conflict with the law.
109
  
 
1.5.2  Legislative History of the Child Rights Act  
There is a dearth of academic and other literature documenting the legislative 
history of the CRA. This oversight may have caused the legislative history of the 
CRA to be distorted, under-represented or misrepresented. To attempt an overview 
of the legislative history of the CRA, this thesis will try to link disjointed narratives 
on the subject matter.  
Predicated on the inherent gaps of the CYPA vis-a-vis international child 
rights standards in general and child justice in particular, there was a very strong 
need to strengthen and align the Nigerian child justice legal framework with 
international human rights standards.
110
 In Ladan’s view efforts to promulgate the 
CRA were informed by the need for legislation that incorporates all the rights of 
children as well as articulates the duties and obligations of government, parents and 
other authorities.
111
 While this expedience accords with the state party obligation 
under the CRC, the background to the adoption of the Childs Rights Act in Nigeria 
was much politicized along ethnic, religious and cultural lines.  
The first legislative effort to entrench a strong child rights regime that is 
compliant with international and regional normative standards initiated by the then 
military government of General Ibrahim Babangida did not result in a decree due to 
opposition from religious groups and traditionalists across the country.
112
 The 
ensuing limbo and disagreements over the content of the child rights legal 
framework persisted until General Babangida surrendered the country to the short-
lived interim government of Ernest Shonekan in 1993. As recounted by Alemika and 
Chukwuma, at the end of the interim government of Shonekan and during the tenure 
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of General Sani Abacha as Head of State, a special committee was set up within the 
Ministry of Justice in 1995 to harmonize the draft child rights bill with diverse 
religious and cultural values in the country.  
The committee was also seized with the responsibility of analyzing the 
obstacles to the adoption of a country-wide and uniformly accepted child rights 
framework in compliance with international and regional standards. Incidentally, no 
progress was made in this direction throughout the five-year tenure of General Sani 
Abacha that terminated in 1999.
113
 Even the committee designated to articulate the 
draft child rights bill ended in disagreement and was polarized along religious and 
tribal lines to the point that no unanimously accepted report was adopted and 
presented for the consideration of the Head of State.
114
 
In 2002 and under the democratically elected government of President 
Olusegun Obasanjo, the endeavor to promulgate child rights legislation was 
resuscitated once again with the preparation and presentation to the National 
Assembly of a bill providing for the rights and responsibilities of children in Nigeria, 
as well as for a renewed system of child justice. The difference between earlier 
endeavors to promulgate the child rights bill and the 2002 initiative was the fact that 
all the previous efforts happened during a military administration with no democratic 
posture and no reputation for respecting and observing human rights.  
Incidentally, the 2002 attempt at promulgating nationwide legislation on 
child rights despite being introduced within a democratic dispensation was once 
again rejected by the National Assembly in October 2002. It was disallowed on the 
same grounds of religious and cultural concerns akin to those that gave rise to the 
demise of initial efforts in 1993 and 1995 respectively.
115
 Citing the inconsistencies 
of the bill with Islamic values, traditions and cultures, it was stated that the majority 
of the members of the National Assembly, particularly those from Northern Nigeria 
objected to the bill on the grounds that it amongst other things sets 18 years as the 
minimum age for marriage contrary to religious and cultural traditions allowing 
‘marrying out’ girls at a much younger age, in which case the consent of the bride is 
immaterial and subsumed into family preferences and choices.
116
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According to Ogunniran, the Supreme Council for Shari’a in Nigeria 
pressured states in Northern Nigeria that are implementing Islamic law to keep their 
representatives in both the Senate and House of Representatives from supporting the 
draft bill.
117
 It was also recounted that the Supreme Council for Shari’a in Nigeria 
opposed the draft bill because of concerns that the bill would destroy the very basis 
and essence of Sharia and Islamic culture. The Council cited for instance the fact that 
the draft child rights bill accorded equal rights to male and female children on 
matters of inheritance, coupled with the fact that the creation of family courts under 
the bill impinges on the jurisdiction of Sharia court in all matters relating to 
children.
118
 Depicting the foregoing stern opposition to the draft child rights bill on 
religious grounds, Ojielo narrated that other subsidiary Islamic groups opposing the 
bill argued that as a federal state, Nigerian law, institutions and peoples must respect 
cultural diversities intrinsic in the nation, including religious beliefs and cultural 
practices.
119
 
The failure of the legislative efforts in 2002 to adopt a child rights bill, as 
against widely held expectations of easy passage due to its introduction in a 
democratically elected government, was not well received by national and 
international stakeholders.
120
 Both civil society organizations and development 
partners dissatisfied with the outcome of the child rights legislative process, mounted 
media pressure and persuaded the National Assembly towards reconsidering its 
decision not to pass the child’s rights bill into law.121  
In response to the progressively growing criticism and out-cry against the 
non-passage of the child rights bill, the National Assembly of the second tenure of 
President Obasanjo quickly moved into action, cognizant of the difficulties of 
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articulating culturally and religiously agreeable child rights legislation that is 
applicable to the entire federation.
122
 The National Assembly was also sensitive of 
the fact that it might not secure the necessary ratification by a majority of the state 
houses of assembly in the federation as stipulated under Section 12(2) of the 
Constitution if it were to legislate for the whole federation. To circumvent these 
challenges, the National Assembly acted under its constitutional powers to legislate 
exclusively for the Federal Capital Territory pursuant to Section 299(a) of the 1999 
Constitution.
123
  
By the sheer fact that the CRA was enacted pursuant to the powers of the 
National Assembly to make laws applicable only to the Federal Capital Territory, the 
scope and application of the 2003 CRA was automatically restricted only to the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja unless adopted by the houses of 
assembly of the respective states.
124
  
Juxtaposing the difficulties of promulgating the CRA with the experiences of 
other African countries in adopting child rights legislation, it may be argued that the 
protracted processes leading to the promulgation of the CRA was not an exception 
limited only to Nigeria. The process of developing and eventually enacting 
acceptable child rights legislation compliant with international child rights standards 
seems to be inordinately long and procrastinated in other African countries, 
particularly those with mixed and somewhat tense Muslim and Christian populations.  
The experiences of promulgating child rights legislations in countries such as 
Namibia, Kenya, Ghana and Uganda are not without challenges congruent with 
Nigeria.
125
 The process of developing the Namibian Child Rights Bill first began in 
1994 and was finalized in 2002. The South Africa Law Commission process which 
was formally started in 1997 was completed in 2000. In Kenya, the process lasted 
eight years from the inception of the process to the time the legislation was enacted. 
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The completion of a similar legislation in Ghana and Uganda took five and four 
years respectively.
126
  
 
1.6 Overview of Thesis Chapters 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters, with chapter one as the introduction 
and chapter eight the conclusion. Each of the chapters is prefaced with an 
introduction of the subject under investigation and presented in a logical and 
complementary sequence. Every chapter concludes with a summary that 
recapitulates its main findings and sets the tone for the next chapter. 
As the introduction, chapter one sets the tone of this thesis and poses the 
research question. To address the research question and having considered other 
research methodologies, the chapter adopts the law in context methodology. To 
provide proper context to this thesis, the chapter presents an overview of Nigeria, its 
constitutional framework and legal system, with a particular focus on the child 
justice system. 
Chapter two provides the philosophical and normative foundation of child 
rights as well as an overview of the prevailing international and regional normative 
frameworks. It argues that the philosophical foundation of child rights is extrapolated 
from the philosophical foundation of human rights. Noting that restorative justice is 
the contemporary philosophical paradigm for child justice, the chapter places the 
philosophical foundation of child rights within the intersection of natural law and 
positive law described as inclusive legal positivism. Additionally, the chapter traces 
the normative foundation of child rights from the Covenant of the League of Nations 
to the International Bill of Rights and further links it to several other international 
and regional human rights instruments, particularly the CRC and the ACRWC. The 
chapter concedes that while universal and relative disputation of human rights also 
applies to child rights, it argues that in the context of child justice, the twin pillars of 
child justice are universally applicable.  
Building on this conceptual analysis, chapter three argues that child justice is 
an integral component of child rights because it is codified as such in several 
international and regional human rights instruments. The chapter posits that the 
rights of children in conflict with the law can only be protected if their reduced 
culpability is taken into consideration when arriving at a judicial decision against 
them. In a bid to extract the twin pillars of child justice, the chapter analyses the 
principles of child rights and concludes that the principles of proportionally and the 
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best interests of the child encapsulate all other principles of child rights and converge 
to form the twin pillars of child justice.  
Chapters four and five calibrate the principles of proportionality and the best 
interests of the child respectively as the twin pillars of child justice. It traces the 
normative foundation of the twin pillars of child justice to international and regional 
human rights instruments. Having examined the conceptual overview of the twin 
pillars and their deontological and consequentialist stands, this chapter posits that 
since child rights are by their very nature deontological, the twin pillars of child 
justice are equally deontological. On the other hand, and cognizant that the 
overriding aim of child justice is to protect the best interests of children in conflict 
with the law so that they do not receive disproportionate punishment for their offense 
and culpability, the chapter concludes that the twin pillars of child justice are not in 
conflict with the interest of justice. It also posits that the flexibility in the definition 
and application of the twin pillars represents their inherent strength in responding to 
the multiplicity of child justice cases and scenarios. 
Having confirmed that the principles of proportionality and the best interests 
of the child are mutually reinforcing and complementary, and together form the twin 
pillars of child justice, chapter six, while noting that the CRA is an improvement on 
the CYPA, calibrates the extent to which the twin pillars are legislated in the CRA. 
The chapter argues that the content of the twin pillars of child justice in the CRA 
meets international and regional standards.  
On the basis that the CRA meets the international and regional threshold of 
the twin pillars of child justice, chapter seven investigates the practical application of 
the twin pillars by family courts in respect of children in conflict with the law in 
Nigeria. It observes that despite the strong legal framework for the promotion and 
protection of child rights in Nigeria through the CRA, children in conflict with the 
law in Nigeria are not availed the envisaged protection. The chapter points out the 
drawbacks to the application of the twin pillars to children in conflict with the law in 
Nigeria. The chapter observes that the distribution of legislative functions between 
the federal and state governments under the exclusive and concurrent legislative lists 
of the 1999 Constitution impacts on the implementation of the twin pillars 
guaranteed in the CRA 
Chapter eight concludes that the CRA as promulgated is only applicable to 
the Federal Capital Territory with an option for states to adopt it into state law. It 
notes that whilst most states have adopted it into state law, some states of the 
federation are yet to do so. The chapter concludes that the reason for the limited 
scope of the CRA within the jurisdiction of the Federal Capital Territory and its 
optional adoption into state law relates to the fact that the National Assembly 
promulgated it under Section 299(a) of the 1999 Constitution. This chapter observes 
that the competence to legislate on human rights issues in general and child rights in 
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particular are enumerated neither in the exclusive legislative list earmarked for the 
federal government nor the concurrent legislative list where the federal and state 
governments share competence. On the basis of these constitutional, legislative, 
structural and institutional challenges to the implementation of the twin pillars of 
child justice guaranteed in the CRA, this chapter proffers policy, legislative and 
constitutional amendments amongst other recommendations. 
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Chapter Two 
Philosophical and Normative Foundation of Child Rights 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Based on the research methodology adopted in chapter one and coupled with 
the fact that the conceptual appreciation of human rights in this thesis is explicitly 
normative, this chapter sets out the philosophical and normative foundation of 
human rights as a basis for extrapolating the philosophical and normative foundation 
of child rights.
1
 It notes that prior to the Second World War, child rights discourse 
was less common when compared to the period after the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
2
 The post 1948 era witnessed increasing political 
commitment to the promotion and protection of child rights at the national, regional 
and international levels.
3
  
This thesis views human rights as those broadly recognized fundamental 
global standards of morality that inhere in human beings by virtue of their humanity 
and which are normatively instituted. Predicated on the argument that child rights 
share a philosophical affinity with human rights, this chapter construes child rights as 
those rights that are normatively established and are specifically and affirmatively 
applicable to children because of their age, level of mental development, inherent 
vulnerability and mitigated culpability. This chapter further elaborates on the 
conflicting arguments between the universality and relativity of human rights in 
general and child rights in particular and argues that in the context of child justice, 
the twin pillars are non-derogable and universally applicable.  
 
2.2 Philosophical Foundation of Child Rights 
The philosophical foundation of child rights is very contestable. Langlois’s 
postulation that there are several philosophical foundations of human rights could be 
extended to apply to the philosophical foundation of child rights.
4
 Although the 
classical philosophical divides of human rights may not specifically speak to child 
rights, the latter could be extrapolated from the general philosophical foundations of 
human rights. There is no gainsaying the fact that since child rights are an integral 
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component of human rights, the philosophical foundation of child rights is 
essentially linked to the broad philosophical foundation of human rights.
5
  
There are several philosophical foundations of law that present distinct and 
most times interrelated heritage of human rights. They include the natural law, 
positive law, sociological, Marxism, realism, utilitarianism, historical and 
anthropological foundations. While all of these theoretical foundations have bearing 
on the conception of law in general and human rights in particular, they are not 
uniformly relevant to the universalist conception of child rights. Consequently, this 
thesis will not explore all the available theoretical foundations of human rights but 
will focus on those deemed very useful in extrapolating the theoretical foundation of 
child rights and also essential in illuminating and contextualizing the philosophical 
preferences of this thesis.
6
  
 
2.2.1 Natural Law 
There are various strands of natural law with their theoretical underpinning 
based on the existence of a ‘higher law’ derived from divine nature as a scale for 
measuring its validity. The crux of natural law is that law must be propelled by 
morality. Whilst Blackstone states that ‘no human laws are of any validity, if 
contrary to the law of nature’,7 Bix argues that natural law is not susceptible to 
changes due to the passage of time and its standards are uniformly accessible by 
resort to reason.
8
  
According to Bix, one of the renowned ancient writers on natural law is 
Cicero. He provided an elegant restatement of already established Stoic views that 
true law is right reason in agreement with nature, universal in application, 
unchanging and everlasting.
9
 Thomas Aquinas has also been lauded as one of the 
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most influential writers on natural law.
10
 While classifying law into natural, eternal 
and divine, and calling for outright disobedience to unjust laws, Lisska recounted 
Aquinas as stating that positive law inheres from natural law because the latter is the 
guiding framework for the promulgation and legitimacy of the former.
11
  
Natural law theory was later anchored in natural rights, deepened 
international law debate and appears to have played a significant role in the 
constitutions of several countries and the modern civil rights movement.
12
 On the 
other hand, Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf have been identified as prominent 
examples of theorists whose writings on natural law had significance in the 
grounding of human rights on natural rights.
13
 The natural rights approach was 
further synthesized by Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke into 
the ‘social contract’ theories.14  
Commenting on the social contract theories, Laslett argues that Locke 
visualized the existence of human beings in the state of nature where human beings 
are accorded freedom and equality, are not subjected to the will of another and are 
able to determine their actions.
15
 Accordingly, there arose a need to dispense with the 
hazards and inconveniences of nature in which case a social contract was entered 
into whereby men mutually agreed to form a community with ground rules.
16
 
Another leading voice in the natural law school is Beitz. Acknowledged for his 
hybrid alternative to Locke’s theory, he argues that the source of human rights is not 
the law of God but rather the quest for social justice.
17
  
Criticizing Locke’s social contract theory, Freeman cited Grotius who is also 
a protagonist of natural law theory as characterizing human beings as possessing the 
social impulse to coexist harmoniously with one another.
18
 He also cited Thomas 
Hobbes and argued that the latter sought to justify natural law not as a derivative of 
the law of God but as law ordained on the basis of humanity.
19
 On the other hand, 
Edmund Burke furthered the opposition to Locke’s postulation when he argued that 
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‘men’ and by extension children had rights that are not derivable from the state but 
originating from the ‘organic tradition and institutions of the society’.20  
The works of the early theorists on natural law understandably differ from the 
contemporary discourse of natural law.
21
 Finnis’s contemporary writings on the 
nexus between natural law and natural rights have been secular, emphasizing ‘the 
requirements of reason rather than divine command, purpose, will or wisdom.’22 
Writing in a similar tone to Aquinas, Finnis founded his claim on ‘self-evident basic 
goods’ which he described as things one values for their own sake. Negating positive 
law as a single-track authority where orders are originated from government as a sole 
source, Fuller called for a certain condition precedent before a rule could in its true 
sense be titled as law.
23
 He proposes complementarity and co-operation between 
government and citizens so that rules must meet certain criteria to earn the title law. 
He also substituted a positive law analysis of law based on power, orders and 
obedience for analysis based on the ‘internal morality’ of law.24  
Contrasted to natural law theorists, Fuller’s theory is based on process and 
function rather than strictly on moral content. Similarly Dworkin challenged positive 
law and offered an alternative vision of law in which there are abundant resources 
for resolving disputes ‘according to law’.25  Several other contemporary writers have 
contributed to the literature on natural law. They include Michael S. Moore,
26
 Lloyd 
Weinreb,
27
 Ernest Weinrib,
28
 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword,
29
 and Mark 
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Murphy.
30
 These series of scholarships on natural law do not expressly allude to 
child rights except through an expansive reading of ‘people’ to include children.31  
As such, in a deductive sense, the natural law theory construes child rights as those 
inherent ingredients of human dignity held universally and equally by children 
because of their membership in the human race in the first place and because of their 
age in the second instance.  
As a vocal apostle of the natural law school, Locke’s writings infer that 
natural rights which by deductive inference include child rights are synonymous with 
natural law and founded on the basis of the law of God.
32
 The social contract theory 
of Locke which by extension supports the natural law conception of child rights may 
be appropriate in the circumstance of its enunciation. However, situating this theory 
in the contemporary era would conflict with emerging child rights claims based on 
the elasticity of present day human needs.  
Natural law’s age-long conception of human rights made no mention of child 
rights specifically. Also, contemporary scholars such as Finnis, Freeman and 
Langlois also omitted any reference to child rights in their discourse of the 
conception of the philosophical foundation of natural law. While Langlois interprets 
human rights as natural rights possessed by men by virtue of their humanity and held 
universally and equally by all people,
33
 Freeman opined that human rights are held 
against the whole world, essential to the maintenance of human dignity and 
ultimately inevitable for the realization of human worth.
34
  
The different shades of natural law theory and the strains of its philosophers 
notwithstanding, it emphasizes the basis for the protection of human rights, including 
child rights, equality and freedom and the presupposition of a value transcendental to 
the naked power of the state and one of the propelling forces behind the growth of 
the contemporary child rights regime.
35
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2.2.2 Positive Law 
There is apparently no unitary strand of positive law as disagreements exist 
within the same theory. Its prominent adherents include important nineteenth century 
philosophers such as John Austin, as well as twentieth century thinkers such as Hans 
Kelsen,
36
 H. L. A. Hart
37
 and Joseph Raz.
38
 Hart argues that the central tenet of 
positive law is the difference between the way the law is and the way it ought to be 
and its validity as a norm is not necessarily linked to its moral value.
39
 Positive law is 
opposed to the natural law theory because of their respective interpretation of the 
concepts of legality and authority.
40
  
While not disagreeing on a possible overlap between law and morality, it has 
been argued that positive law dispenses with the need for moral validity of a norm.
41
 
Coleman and Leiter call this ‘negative positivism’ and state that the mutually 
reinforcing convergence of law and morality should be the ultimate aspiration of 
law.
42
 On the other hand, since the threat of sanction accounts for the normativity of 
law and compels citizens to obey the law, the legality of a law under positive law is a 
function of its source and not dependent on the merits of its substantive provisions.
43
  
Gardener further argues that the existence of the law is one thing and its merit or 
demerit is another. As such, law is the order of a sovereign backed by a threat of 
sanction in the event of non-compliance.
44
  
In that case, positive law emphasizes the ‘source’ and not the ‘merit’ of the 
law such that the validity of the law depends on its source.
45
  It therefore follows that 
the validity of the law is not subject to the morality of the law and it is immaterial 
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that such a norm would have been an excellent norm if adopted.
 
 Positive law 
entrusts upon the state the mandate to institutionalize what is considered ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ and establish a legal regime separate from the moral foundation of society. 
It validates legal obligation regardless of its moral content and irrespective of its 
repugnancy with any other value system.
46
  
The philosophical strand of positive law is identifiable in human rights 
treaties, declaration and conventions in general and child rights instruments and laws 
in particular. The existence of a litany of international and regional human rights 
treaties, conventions and declarations codifying general and thematic human rights 
standards and articulating its enforcement mechanisms is credited to positive law.  
Notwithstanding the affinity of positive law to the philosophical framework 
of modern child rights instruments, it has been criticized for propagating the force of 
law over and above human morals and dignity. It has also been criticized for creating 
the legal platform for obnoxious regimes insensitive to human rights in general and 
child rights in particular such as the Nazi regime, the apartheid rule in South Africa 
and suppressive military dictatorships in Africa.
47
 According to Dworkin, positive 
law has been criticized for lending credence to immoral and obnoxious laws and 
most times is undeserving of its title as ‘law’.48  
Regardless of the intrinsic merit of the anti-positivist argument, the enablers 
of positive law are in consonance with modern day national and inter-state legal 
architecture whereby international, regional and national parliaments make binding 
laws on contemporary and emerging issues. Noting that certain norms incompatible 
with the value system of the citizenry may be smuggled legislatively under the guise 
of positive law, the antidote to the promulgation of immoral or unjust laws on the 
altar of positive law is found in the prevailing model of informed public 
participation.  
Under this process, citizens through their elected representatives and member 
states of the international community through their designated representatives are 
expected to oversee the promulgation of national legislation, international or regional 
treaties or conventions
 
 that are in tune with the unifying value system of the country 
or international community. With the active and informed participation of the 
citizenry in the process of positive law, the likelihood of the promulgation or 
adoption of democratic laws at variance with the morality and values of the majority 
of the citizenry is relatively farfetched.  
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Positive law is certainly an indispensable tool in modern day efforts to 
promote and protect child rights. The fact that it allows a certain degree of flexibility 
in meeting with evolving rights is one of the strengths of positive law. One result of 
the inherent elasticity of positive law is the fact that child rights which a few decades 
ago were not articulated as distinct human rights are today legislated internationally, 
regionally and nationally as discrete rights for specific categories of rights holders.
49
  
 
2.2.3 Other Philosophical Foundations  
There are other philosophical foundations that differ from the postulations of 
natural law and positive law. One of them is the sociological jurisprudence, which 
stresses the social purpose of law and underlines the fact that law should be aligned 
with evolving social conditions.
50
 According to Gardner, the forerunner of 
sociological jurisprudence is Montesquieu who expounded the thesis that natural 
rights are nothing more than legally protected social interests and recognized only 
insofar as aiding in securing the welfare of the society.
51
 In contrast to legal 
positivism which focuses on law in books, sociological jurisprudence defines law as 
a ‘matrix of relationships’ and shifts the focus of attention to the study of the ‘living 
law’ or ‘law in everyday life.’52 It considers the latter as the ‘true law,’ and, 
consequently, permits the abdication of any law in force, where such a law was, in 
the opinion of the court, contradictory to the ‘living law.’53  
Claiming that every rule of law owes its origin to some predicated motive, 
this school argues that the purpose of law is to secure the conditions of social life as 
determined by the social order of the ‘time and place’.54 Sociological jurisprudence 
does not specifically allude to child rights and may be construed to deny any 
universal body of legal rules or institutions. It also subsumes individual interests to 
social interests and classifies individual rights as means of the society to realize its 
social ends.
55
 Postulating that law is relative to the civilization of the ‘time and 
place’, sociological jurisprudence may be deemed to be compatible with child rights 
as an evolving trend in human rights. This is because the mission of the law under 
the sociological perspective is the advancement of civilization and changing with 
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changed conditions.
56
 Since human rights accentuate existing values of civilization, 
child rights under the sociological perspective are arguably adapted to further the 
ideals of human dignity. 
On the other hand, another philosophical foundation of law in general and 
human rights in particular is Marxism. It is the critical lens for challenging the 
wisdom of liberal legal thought and construes law as an instrument through which 
the capitalist class imposes and perpetuates its will.
57
  Marxism focuses on the nature 
of human beings and shares borders with natural law theory. It is, however, 
distinguishable from natural law theory on the grounds that it regards rights 
accruable to ‘citizens’ which includes children as not emanating from a divine 
nature, but as ‘species-being’.58  
Expounded by Karl Marx, this theory of human rights law like other theories 
did not treat children as a distinct class of rights holders. Preoccupied with the 
emancipation of the common man and by way of emphasis ‘common children’, 
Marxism implies that the essence of a ‘person’ which supposedly includes a child is 
to apply one’s potential to the fullest and greatest satisfaction of one’s needs.59 This 
theory espouses concepts such as ‘law’, ‘justice’, ‘morality’, ‘freedom’, and 
‘democracy’ as the coefficients of the material conditions and social circumstances 
of the people in general and by extension children in particular.
60
   
In opposition to the fundamental principles of capitalism, Marxism according 
to Mendus conceives a classless and anti-individualistic society facilitated by the 
state of social collectivity.
61
 Marxist appeal to child rights presupposes an ideology 
of possessiveness in the sense that when child rights are asserted as claims against 
the state, the assumption is that there is an endemic tension between the interest of 
the state and the interest of children.  At variance with modern day capitalism and as 
a denial to an idealistic society, Marxist philosophy was popular in several countries 
until it was destabilized by the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe.  
Whereas Marxism recognizes the competence of the international community 
to establish transnational human rights, including child rights norms, it subjects the 
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application and implementation of these norms to exclusive domestic jurisdiction. 
This may account for one of the reasons why governments often on grounds of 
national sovereignty justify why each country should be free to interpret human 
rights as it pleases because what is good for the species-being is to be determined by 
respective states and not a communal decision of the international community.
62
  
Another strand of the philosophical foundation of human rights is legal 
realism. The increase in the understanding of people and of their different cultures 
through the evolution of natural and social sciences gave rise to the realist 
conception of human rights and by extension child rights. According to White, this 
philosophical school, while departing from abstract and analytical types of 
jurisprudence, contextualizes behavioral dimensions of law and society.
63
 Its 
distinctive feature in the conception of child rights lies in the fact that ‘[i]t 
underscores the just equilibrium of interest among competing moral sentiments and 
in the context of social process identifies the empirical components of human rights 
system’.64   
There are numerous approaches to, and several leading philosophers of the 
realist theory of human rights and by extension child rights. According to James, the 
birth of the realist conception of child rights is anchored in the pragmatic principle 
that ‘the essence of good is simply to satisfy demand’.65 Without distinctly 
elaborating on child rights, he argues that the realist approach has an affinity with the 
development of contemporary human rights architecture which is stretching beyond 
classical civil and political rights, to economic, social and cultural rights. Although 
the realist conception of rights takes into consideration the realities of surrounding 
social processes of result-mindedness and process-mindedness, Llewellyn observes 
that it is weak because when juxtaposed with the realities of the contemporary world, 
its premise is flawed due to the inconsistencies of its normative conclusion that rights 
are derived from interest.
66
  
Another philosophical foundation of human rights is utilitarianism. The 
contribution of this philosophical foundation to the discourse of human rights in 
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general and child rights in particular is its focus on distributive rather than 
individualized happiness.
67
 Utilitarianism presupposes that the rightness or otherwise 
of an action is a function of whether it precipitates the greatest happiness for the 
majority.  Contrary to natural rights theory, utilitarianism predicates every human 
judgement on the arithmetic of pleasure versus pain of not just an individual but a 
group of individuals.
68
 As such, the scorecard of the government is not how well it 
performed in protecting abstract individual rights including those of children but how 
well it advanced collective rights and ensured the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number.
69
  
Langlois quoted the ‘anarchical fallacies’ of Bentham criticizing natural 
rights as rhetorical nonsense and argues that they are abstract metaphysical 
phenomena stemming from an unreal world.
70
 He categorized the rights of men as 
protective of the upper class citizen, as precipitating the capitalist domination by the 
wealthy and clogging the achievement of equality and well-being of the collective.
71
 
Bentham’s underlying communal preference principle, in Langlois’ view, has been 
criticized for arbitrarily reducing the rightness of an action merely to the arithmetic 
of individual versus communal benefits. In the contemporary child rights regime, the 
geometry of Bentham’s happiness theory of classical utilitarianism is inapplicable to 
the promotion and protection of child rights which is focused on an individual child. 
 Over time and based on the weaknesses of Bentham’s ‘happiness theory of 
the majority’, the utilitarian theory was reformed to guide the conduct of government 
not on the basis of pleasure or happiness, but as a reflection of maximum satisfaction 
and minimum frustration of wants and preferences.
72
 Even with the readjustment of 
utilitarian theory from pleasure and happiness to economic decision-making, Rawls 
contends that it is still unable to plug the conceptual and practical gaps inherent in 
the formulation of the theory.
73
   
Juxtaposing the economic decision-making theory of reformed utilitarianism 
to present-day human rights realities in general and child rights in particular, 
utilitarianism is insensitive to children’s individual autonomy and equality. 
Utilitarian maximization of aggregate desires or general welfare vis-à-vis individual 
satisfaction is inherently a weak option for the promotion and protection of child 
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rights because, whilst it treats people as equals, it did not disaggregate ‘persons’ to 
expressly include children.
74
  
 
2.2.4 Inclusive Legal Positivism 
From the analysis of the foregoing philosophical foundations of human rights 
in general and child rights in particular, it is clear that there are different and 
somewhat conflicting philosophical lenses for viewing child rights. It is also 
irrefutable that there are inherent weaknesses in these individual philosophical 
foundations. As such this thesis, akin to Coleman and Leiter’s postulation, proposes 
a paradigm that it calls inclusive legal positivism. This hybrid philosophical 
foundation postulates that while moral principles can be explained by the rule of 
recognition, the legality of moral norms is not a function of their morality but of their 
validity under a rule of recognition.
75
  
This strand of philosophical foundation of human rights in general and child 
rights in particular is inclusive because it combines the complementary and mutually 
reinforcing strengths of natural law and positive law philosophies. A blend of these 
two philosophies and resultant effects resonates with the realities of present day 
promotion and protection of child rights and is in tandem with contemporary child 
rights treaties, convention, legislation etc.  
The strength of inclusive legal positivism in the context of child rights is that 
while natural law’s philosophical strand postulates that child rights accrue to people 
of a specific age because of their membership in the human race, the legal positivist 
philosophical strand situates child rights within the parameters of what is prescribed 
by law.  Inclusive legal positivism exhibits and corroborates in child rights the 
double-barreled effects of natural law and positive law. This is because while natural 
law emphasizes the inherent dignity, vulnerability and mitigated culpability of 
children on the basis of their membership of a distinct class of the human race, the 
positive law expediency is evident in the fact that child rights is what the law has 
promulgated it to be. As such, the confluence of natural law and positive law in the 
protection of child rights under inclusive legal positivism manifest in the positive 
promulgation of moral norms in favor of children. 
Where morality is codified into law, it accumulates the individual strengths 
of natural law and positive law to provide compelling reasons for citizens to demand 
their rights and for government to implement the rights. According to Coleman and 
Leiter and in line with their ‘incorporationism and legality argument’, for a law to be 
authoritative, it must provide citizens with a reason to act that would have otherwise 
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not been available without codification.
76
 It is only when moral rights that are 
essential to the enjoyment of child rights are prescribed as law, could such moral 
rights have the ability to improve the well-being of children that lay claim to them. 
Inclusive legal positivism is in line with the United Nations conception of 
child rights as entitlements codified in international human rights treaties and 
covenants.  The preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights alludes to 
the point that:  
The General Assembly proclaims the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every 
organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall 
strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights 
and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and 
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition 
and observance, both among the peoples of Member States 
themselves and among the people of territories under their 
jurisdiction. 
Inclusive legal positivism postulated in this thesis may be attacked by ardent 
protagonists of natural law due to the fact that there is already an ongoing debate 
regarding the status of human rights or child rights claims prior to legislation. For 
instance, Dworkin objects to the positivist’s attempt to incorporate morality into law 
through the rule of recognition because a rule of recognition that includes reference 
to moral principles will violate the separability thesis of positivism.
77
  
Conversely, the question is whether legislative codification of child rights 
through treaties, conventions or national laws is the only process through which 
moral or any other claims are elevated to the status of child rights. Put differently, 
could child rights be guaranteed and protected in a country without enabling 
legislation? In response to these hypothetical questions and in justification of the 
philosophical foundation of inclusive legal positivism, suffice it to state firstly that 
child rights accrue to children by the simple fact of their age and their membership in 
the human race. Secondly, child rights claims could and do exist in isolation of the 
law, are not exclusively granted by law and do not necessarily require legislation to 
be effective.  
Although child rights are capable of existing in isolation of the law, accruable 
to children with or without specific legislation, the promotion and protection of child 
rights require law for vivid description of the rights and for their enforcement in the 
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event of imminent threat or breach of the right. The promulgation of child specific 
and other human rights legislation combines the tripartite complements of legality, 
authority and morality to make rights enforceable. Conceding that ‘the force of law’ 
is very important in holding states accountable for respecting child rights, regional 
and international instruments may not adequately guarantee the observance of child 
rights unless the proposed enforceable rights connect with the inherent dignity of 
humanity. As such, the codification of child rights instruments, treaties, conventions 
or legislation whether at the international or national level that penetrates beyond the 
legal code and reflects society’s values is inevitable in making child rights protection 
effective.
78
  
Alluding to this postulation is the theory of ‘consensus’ elaborated by 
Donnelly to the effect that human rights in the contemporary world are unanimously 
agreed moral obligations cast as universal standards, equipped with a distinctive 
cross cultural consensus and codified as human rights.
79
 While human rights may 
exist devoid of legislation and may be protected with or without a legal framework, 
in the contemporary world, the interest in protecting and promoting child rights is 
better served if such rights are codified into law via treaties, conventions, national 
constitutions or other Acts of Parliament. This accounts for the reason why present 
day child rights are legislatively depicted international, regionally and nationally as 
binding law.  
The effects of the inclusive legal positivism as a philosophical foundation of 
child rights reinforces as binding and enforceable law what ordinarily would have 
been mere ethical and moral claims. Therefore, unless moral values are codified into 
binding law, child rights may imperceptibly degenerate into empty rhetoric. On the 
basis of inclusive legal positivism, child rights are defined as a set of legally 
prescribed moral entitlements inherent equally in every child by virtue of their age 
and membership in the human race. It is immediately enforceable or progressively 
realizable through the legislative directives of designated national, regional or 
international institutions.  
 
2.3 Normative Foundation of Child Rights 
Following the ill effects of fragmentation, inter-religious and inter-ethnic 
violence in the twentieth century, states were obliged to commit to guaranteeing to 
their minorities certain collective rights and the abolition of religious and civil 
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disabilities as a condition precedent to joining the ‘family of nations’.80 The then 
‘family of nations’ was regulated by the League of Nations established to oversee 
international protection of rights of racial and religious minorities. Strong confidence 
was reposed in the League of Nations to amongst other things oversee international 
protection of minority rights. Incidentally, the operations of the League of Nations 
resulted in halfhearted support for racial equality and minority rights.  
According to Mazower, the League of Nations was also inhibited from 
commenting on racial segregation in the USA or criticizing the English treatment of 
Catholics of Chinese origin in Liverpool or the Nazi treatment of German Jews.
81
 
Although the Covenant of the League of Nations is not strictly a human rights 
instrument and did not mention human rights or child rights in any of its 26 articles, 
it did make reference to children in two articles in relation to maintaining fair and 
humane conditions of labour,
82
 and with regard to supervision of execution of 
agreements in relation to trafficking of children.
83
 The ensuing weakness of the 
League of Nations, the incidental loss of confidence and total distrust of the 
effectiveness of its protection mechanism under international law among other 
intervening steps culminated in the demise of the League and the signing of the 
United Nations Charter by twenty-six member states in January 1942.
84
 
 
2.3.1 United Nations Charter  
The present day prominence attached to human rights culminated after the 
Second World War in a strong reaction to the war-time atrocities.
85
 Although 
international law recognized some form of international human rights protection 
prior to the entry into force of the United Nations Charter, the normative foundation 
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of modern international human rights law and by extension the institutionalization of 
child rights was consolidated with the adoption of the United Nations Charter in 
1945.
86
  Under the Charter, the willingness to commit to the defense of human rights 
within and outside the borders of member states was highlighted.  
The Charter was also unprecedented in its articulation of human rights both 
in its preamble and its main body, thus making it one of the normative pillars of 
human rights and by extension child rights. Although the UN Charter is not a child 
specific instrument and does not expressly mention children as holders of rights, it 
makes reference to human rights in its preamble and six other articles which, by 
extrapolation, can be seen to obviously relate to children.
87
 The then member states 
of the United Nations pledged not only to adhere to the principles contained in the 
Atlantic Charter, but also to preserve human rights and justice within their respective 
territories. Article 1(3) of the UN Charter recognizes that one of the 
[P]urposes of the United Nations is international cooperation in 
solving various international problems, including humanitarian 
problems, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction such as 
race, sex, language, or religion. 
The United Nations General Assembly in line with the dictates of the Charter 
affirms that peace and security, development and human rights are the pillars of the 
United Nations system and the foundations for collective security and well-being. It 
also recognizes that development, peace and security, and human rights are 
interlinked and mutually reinforcing.
88
 The Charter also assigns to member states the 
responsibility for promoting ‘universal respect for and observance of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, language or 
religion’.   
Article 56 provides that all members pledge themselves to take joint and 
separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the 
purposes set forth in Article 55. Despite the inherent weaknesses of the Charter, 
particularly in relation to the non-binding nature of its provisions, Buergenthal 
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argues that the Charter provides the legal authority for the codification of human 
rights that ensued in 1948 and thereafter.
89
 
 
2.3.2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The bedrock of human rights is the International Bill of Rights adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly and which includes the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR).
90
 UDHR is one of the founding documents of human rights 
law and is a non-binding declaration adopted in 1948 by the United Nations General 
Assembly.
91
 As one of the greatest aspirational documents and corner-stone of 
human history meant to guide virtually all human rights, the UDHR urges member 
states to promote a number of civil, economic and social rights.
92
  An-Na’im 
postulates that the UDHR is the platform on which other human rights mechanisms 
are constructed, 
93
 and holds out human rights as ‘a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations’.94  
While the UDHR did not articulate any child-specific human rights provision, 
a deductive reading of the broad spectrum of rights guaranteed in the Declaration 
disposes it as one of the strongest normative frameworks for the protection of child 
rights. As ‘a first step in a great revolutionary process’ the UDHR was intended not 
to be a binding legal document but instead a declaration of basic principles of human 
rights and freedoms.
95
 According to the former Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, Mr. Kofi A Annan,  
[T]he principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration are the 
yardstick by which we measure progress. They lie at the heart of 
all that the United Nations aspire to achieve … Human rights 
belong not to a chosen few, but to all. It is this universality that 
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endows human rights with the power to cross any border and defy 
any force.
96
  
The scope of the UDHR is very broad and inclusive. As a seminal instrument 
that inaugurated a new body of international human rights law, the UDHR has not 
been eclipsed by the subsequent elaboration of its norms by new treaties. On the 
contrary, the binding instruments promulgated internationally and as well as in the 
regional realms have only highlighted the wisdom of the norms contained in the 
UDHR. The operative paragraph of the opening words of the UDHR indicates 
overwhelmingly that the drafters of the Declaration thought themselves as directing 
their attention to all members of the human race. It states that: 
Now therefore the General Assembly proclaims this Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every 
individual and every organ of society, keeping this declaration 
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to 
promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive 
measures, national and international, to secure their universal and 
effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of 
the Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories 
under their jurisdiction. 
The UDHR also set out in its preamble the recognition ‘of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family as 
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.’97 According to Alves, it is 
an extraordinary statement in the history of mankind that codifies the ‘hopes of the 
oppressed, supplying authoritative language to the semantics of their claims’.98 It 
also ‘offered a legislative basis for the political struggles for liberty and led national 
constitutions to transform the notion of citizen’s rights into positive law’.99 
Through the Declaration, the General Assembly reaffirms the 
interdependence and interconnectedness of human rights and requested the 
preparation of a human rights covenant and a draft measure for its implementation as 
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a matter of priority. It has been stated that the work of the Human Rights 
Commission, through the groundbreaking provisions of the Declaration was 
elaborated into two binding international covenants.
100
 The flip side of the UDHR, it 
has been noted, is the fact that the legal force of its provisions is neither sufficient to 
effectuate human rights nor does the content of its provisions accommodate any 
enforcement mechanism in the event of violation.
101
  
 
2.3.3 International Covenants 
In a bid to overcome the weaknesses of the UDHR and create a binding legal 
instrument, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights drafted a pair of 
binding covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)
102
 and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).
103
 Having been both adopted in 1966, the ICESR details the basic civil 
and political rights of individuals and groups of individuals and the ICESCR 
commits state parties to granting socio-economic rights to individuals, including 
labor rights, right to health, education and adequate standard of living.  
The ICCPR and ICESCR together with the UDHR form the ‘International 
Bill of Rights’ and jointly precipitates the expansion of international human rights 
and child rights standards in the form of treaties, declarations and conventions. In the 
context of child justice, Article 10(2)(b) of the ICCPR provides that children accused 
of being in conflict with the law shall be separated from adults and brought as 
speedily as possible for adjudication. Article 14 grants equality in the determination 
of a criminal change and other due process rights.   
While the adoption of both the ICCPR and ICESCR did not generate as much 
global attention as did the UDHR, it has been argued that both covenants provide a 
seismic shift that furthered the notion of human rights from one of vague and non-
enforceable provisions of the UDHR to a legally binding norm.
104
 The ICCPR and 
the ICESCR guarantee a broad spectrum of rights to all individuals within the 
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territory or under the jurisdiction of the state parties without discrimination.
105
 While 
the two covenants did not in actual fact provide expressly for child rights, the rights 
guaranteed to ‘all individuals’ under both covenants deductively apply to children as 
human beings. 
The character of the obligations undertaken by state parties differs from the 
ICCPR and ICESCR. Under the ICCPR, state parties undertake to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within their territory the rights recognized in the covenant. 
On the other hand, the undertaking of state parties under the ICESCR is to take 
measures to the extent of available resources with a view to achieving progressively 
the realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant.
106
 The difference in the 
articulation of these two covenants may have informed the implementation time 
frames and gaps between the two classes of rights, and may have been the reason 
why the ICCPR is immediately enforceable whereas the ICESCR is only 
progressively realizable.  
While this thesis will not delve into a detailed description of these two 
covenants and the working methods of the treaty bodies charged with overseeing 
their implementation, it is necessary to underline the fact that the elevation of human 
rights under these covenants as the ‘highest aspiration’ of the common man and 
‘common standard’ equally applies to child rights. 
 
2.3.4 Child-Specific International Instruments 
As was the case with human rights in general, the post-World War II era 
consolidated the normative foundation of child rights. It triggered a paradigm shift 
that precipitated international, regional and national legislation to accord children 
autonomous and distinct rights from those enjoyed by the rest of humanity.
107
 
Whereas the International Bill of Rights contains guarantees also applicable to 
children, there was the need for an international legal framework dealing specifically 
with children’s particular needs. It was in response to the apparent need for a legally 
binding instrument focusing exclusively on the specific needs of children that the 
CRC was adopted.
108
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The CRC thus became the first legally binding international instrument to 
exclusively focus on children and accommodate all classes of rights including the 
civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.
109
 The CRC has developed into 
an essential worldwide legal tool and enunciated core principles for the protection of 
rights of the child in general and particularly those in conflict with the law. To 
encourage the prompt domestication of the CRC, Article 4 urges member states to 
take all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the 
implementation of the rights recognized in the convention. 
Prior to the adoption of the CRC and the setting of non-negotiable standards 
and obligations, one of the first international legal instruments to comprehensively 
detail child rights in the particular context of the administration of child justice is the 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, commonly 
known as the ‘Beijing Rules.’110  The normative gains of the CRC and the ‘Beijing 
Rules’ were built upon with the adoption of the United Nations Rules for the 
Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty.
111
 The purpose of the Rules is to 
uphold the rights and safety of children and promote their physical and mental well-
being. Another international instrument that added to the normative fortress of child 
rights is the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency 
popularly called the ‘Riyadh Guidelines.’112  
These Guidelines underline preventive policies as a way of facilitating 
successful socialization and integration of children and young persons. In addition, 
the Declaration of the Rights of the Child,
113
 the World Summit for Children,
114
 and 
the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Children,
115
 consolidated 
the normative foundation of child rights. Other relevant instruments for the 
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promotion and protection of child rights include United Nations General Assembly 
Resolutions 2003/85,
116
 and 2004/47
117
 on the abduction of children and Security 
Council Resolution 1379
118
 and 1460 on Children in Armed Conflict.
119
  
At the regional level, the CRC has been widely ratified by member states of 
the United Nations including most African states. The mass ratification of the CRC 
in the African continent amongst other things influenced to a large extent the African 
human rights architecture. The contemporary normative architecture of Africa’s 
regional human rights system has been attributed to the coming into force of the 
Constitutive Act of the Organization of African Unity,
120
 culminating in the adoption 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) in 1981.
121
 The 
African Charter establishes a regional human rights framework in the continent.  
Motivated also by the enthusiasm to define and establish child rights within 
the parameters of the African value system, the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child was adopted.
122
 It regionalizes the contents of the CRC and 
interprets universal human rights in the light of the socio-economic realities and 
traditions of Africa.
123
 The ACRWC also provides for a separate justice system 
within which children in conflict with the law are adjudicated for rehabilitative 
purposes.
124
 At the national level, the legal framework for child rights in Nigeria is 
embodied in the 1999 Constitution, the CRA, other national legislation, and 
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indirectly through regional and international human rights instruments to which 
Nigeria is a state party.
125
  
 
2.4 Universality or Relativity of Child Rights 
The question whether human rights are universally applicable or subject to 
cultural sensitivities is a highly debated subject. Equally, the universal or relative 
applicability of child rights across countries and cultures is also debatable. To 
construct a basis for deciding whether this thesis will incline towards universal or 
relative applicability of child rights, the two sides of the divide will be succinctly 
analyzed.  
 
2.4.1 Relativity of Child Rights  
The relativity of child rights presupposes that in view of the diverse and 
divergent cultures across the globe, child rights principles are not compatible with all 
cultures.
126
 This argument is inclined to perceive universal child rights as Western 
cultural artifacts, rationalized in universalist terms and imposed on alien values.
127
 
According to Brown, the relativity argument negates attempts to unify cultural 
specificity of the West with opposing values.
128
 While appealing to culture and at the 
same time conceding that culture differs often dramatically across times and 
places,
129
 the relativity of child rights presupposes that since culture provides an 
absolute standard of evaluation, international or regional child rights instruments 
lack universal normative force in the face of divergent cultural traditions.
130
  
While the universality argument of child rights has been brushed aside as 
individualistic and as a flag bearer of Western culture,
131
 the crux of the relativist 
argument is that there is usually a nexus between the cultural origins of a value and 
its validity within a particular culture.
132
 By extension, relativist scholars posit that if 
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human rights in general and child rights in particular are not indigenous to a 
particular culture, their validity and applicability within that culture would rupture.
133
 
Arguing against any distinct ontological status of human rights in particular 
and by extension child rights, Howard-Hassmann emphasizes that human rights are a 
product of a particular kind of society and as such it is implausible to think that they 
can be de-contextualized and applied uniformly across countries and cultures.
134
 
Arguing similarly, Brown underlines the fact that the existence of elaborate 
international and regional child rights instruments is not in any way suggestive of a 
global consensus on the subject matter, but rather a manifestation of Western 
dominance.
135
 The foregoing arguments may have accounted for why Hunt casts 
human rights and invariably child rights as a ‘trap in the guise of a shelter’.136  
In the same vein, while Stammers argues that human rights must be situated 
within a social context,
137
  Gewirth is of the view that the universality of human 
rights can neither be justified by sheer inter-governmental consensus nor by 
international human rights law.
138
 Averse to the universality of child rights, Bentley 
questions the universality of the rights contained in the CRC in light of varying 
conceptions of childhood across countries and cultures.
139
 In doing this, he 
distinguished between rights accruable to children because of their age and those that 
inhere in them because of their membership in the human race.
140
  
In support of the argument that human rights including child rights are 
relative and susceptible to local variations and context, Arat brands universality of 
human rights as an outgrowth of ‘Western thoughts’ and ‘Western cultural 
imperialism’.141 Whereas An-Na’im and Henkin criticize universal applicability of 
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human rights as ‘universalization’ of the idea of Western constitutional rights,142 
Pegden brands it as a cultural artifact depicted as universal and immutable values.
143
 
Further impinging on the universality of human rights, Pegden cited the comments of 
the Saudi Arabian delegation to the committee that drafted the UDHR where the 
delegate maintained that it was not the task of the UDHR ‘to proclaim the superiority 
of one civilization over all others or to establish uniform standards for all the 
countries of the world’.144 The delegate further argued that most if not all the issues 
taken into consideration during the drafting of the UDHR are standards recognized 
by Western civilization. Akin to this, Mazower posits that human rights and by 
extension child rights are an ‘imposition of the tyranny of enlightenment values’ 
which statesmen ‘pay lip-service to and honor in breach because it represents an 
alien concept’ that is imposed on diverse cultural sensibilities.145  
Buttressing the relativity of the human rights argument, Hadjor, while not 
alluding to the particular context of child rights, argues that whereas human rights 
are presently regarded as an ‘expression of self-evident and unquestionable universal 
rights’, the reality is that the adoption of the UDHR is averse to any form of 
consensus about what is considered human rights.
146
 This position was corroborated 
by highlighting that while delegates could agree that some sort of bill of rights was 
desirable, there was no consensus in prioritizing what should be included. As such, it 
was the preferences of delegates from the powerful countries that prevailed 
arbitrarily over the rest to the extent that what was eventually elevated as universal 
human rights standards and values for the rest of the world were ironically the 
cultural preferences of the dominant Western nations.
147
  
In his work on the problem of secularism in human rights theory, Freeman 
recounted that simultaneous to the drafting of the UDHR, the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization commissioned a study into the 
philosophical problems of the universality of human rights.
148
 He quoted the 
introductory remarks of Jacques Maritain to the study wherein he held that ‘a 
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consensus on the justification of human rights would be impossible because of the 
diversity of philosophies around the world’. He stated further that while efforts to 
achieve a global consensus on human rights might be capable of producing an agreed 
text, the reality is that the different and co-existing philosophies around the world 
might prove to be an insurmountable obstacle to the implementation of the principles 
agreed upon and contained in the text.
149
 
In a similar vein and while contending that human rights as well as child 
rights must be grounded in local culture and religion, it has been  argued on religious 
sentiments that the universality of human rights in a Muslim context is subject to its 
compatibility with Islamic heritage.
150
 Some writers have also censured human 
rights, including child rights, by arguing that they raise questions of cultural 
legitimacy. This is because most human rights instruments were formulated by an 
exclusive club of privileged lawyers and bureaucrats at a time when Western culture 
was exclusive and non-receptive of other world views.
151
 Most recently and 
inadvertently in support of the relativity argument, Moyn paradoxically argues that 
human rights were born out of disillusion with utopias and have unwittingly become 
the last utopia.
152
  
 
2.4.2 Universality of Child Rights  
The principle of universality of human rights is the cornerstone of international 
human rights law as emphasized in the UDHR and reiterated in several other 
international human rights conventions, declarations and resolutions. Contrary to the 
relativity argument of child rights, the universality school of thought opines that child 
rights as articulated in international and regional instruments herald universal rights 
and provide the collective common platform that overrides any contrary cultural or 
religious dictates.
153
 This thread of argument presupposes that international and 
regional instruments are universally negotiated through a codification process that 
accommodates all rights that children are granted due to their humanity.
154
 
Articulating his position in favor of the universality of human rights and by 
extension child rights, Donnelly claims that the key norms within the UDHR 
constitute ‘principles that are widely accepted as authoritative’ by the international 
                                                          
149
 Ibid  
150
 Norani Othman, ‘Grounding Human Rights Arguments in Non-Western Culture: Shari’a and the 
Citizenship Rights of Women in the Modern Islamic State’ in  Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bells 
(eds) The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 1999) 49 
151
 Abdullahi A. An-Na’im and Louis Henkin, ‘Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the Universality 
Debate’ (2000)  94 American Society of International Law 95 
152
 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Harvard University Press 2010) 11 
153
 Michael Freeman, ‘The Problem of Secularism in Human Rights Theory’ (2004) 26 Human Rights 
Quarterly 375 
154
 R.J Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 1986) 11 
56 
 
community.
155
 In another of his works which did not specifically focus on child rights, 
Donnelly maintains that universal human rights when properly understood provide a 
considerable scope for national and regional cultural particularity and other forms of 
diversity.
156
 Lending his voice to the universality of human rights including child 
rights, Vincent suggests that regardless of the fact that the origin of human rights is 
traceable to European culture, ‘its spread internationally is best understood as the 
product of a universal social process.’157 In his view, the affinity of human rights to 
the Western construct and their proliferation occur due to the globalization of ideas 
and the legitimization of these ideas by the international community as universal 
norms.
158
  
Joining his voice in favor of the universality of human rights, Baderin states 
that although the impetus of human rights is traceable to Western inclined norms, 
there are still elements of human rights that are not typically Western oriented.
159
  He 
argues further that while modern internationalization of human rights alludes to the 
universalism of human rights, it also radiates cultural specificities.
160
 In support of the 
universalist postulation, the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights states that it 
is the duty of states to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
regardless of political, economic and cultural systems.
161
 
 
2.4.3         Confluence of Universality and Relativity of Child Rights  
In between the arguments in support of the universality of child rights on the 
one hand, and opposing arguments in support of relativity on the other hand, this 
thesis will adopt a middle line posture that situates child rights at the intersection of 
the universality and relativity arguments. This view was taken after due consideration 
of the strengths and weaknesses of both the relativity and universality arguments. This 
opinion is also anchored on the premise that child rights as articulated in international 
and regional treaties and conventions are evidently universal, while at the same time 
relative due to the participation in legislative or promulgation debates of regional and 
international human rights instruments by delegates from countries with vast cultures 
and histories. 
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 This view does not dispute the fact that the present day child rights regime 
may have been influenced by Western cultures and values. However, the fact still 
remains that the normative foundation of contemporary human rights in general and 
child rights in particular arose out of detailed deliberative engagements organized on 
the platform of the United Nations and other international or regional 
intergovernmental bodies.
162
 It may not be accurate to deny the connection of human 
rights with Western philosophy; however, it is one thing to link human rights to 
Western philosophy and another to extract other cultural stands from within the 
modern notion of human rights.
163
  
Furthermore, since international and regional child rights instruments reflect 
the combination and conglomeration of negotiated political processes incorporating 
the cultural sensitivities of participating member states, the normative foundation of 
child rights lies at the confluence of universality and relativity. International human 
rights instruments and by extension child rights instruments have been issued in 
response to violations and constructed through negotiations by state representatives 
who had different cultural backgrounds and philosophical dispositions. In that case, 
although the vocabulary of human rights may be reflective of Western philosophy, it is 
not conclusive that it is alien to other cultures.
164
 Corroborating this view, Vincent 
posits that:  
[If] the modernization which was associated at its outset with 
westernization continues, even in the circumstances of relative 
western decline, we may call it as universal social process in which 
it is difficult to identify the particular contribution of this or that 
culture. In this regard, the international law of human rights may 
be an expression of this global process, and not merely of the 
American…165 
On the other hand, the crossroads of universality and relativity of human rights 
in the contemporary world is evident in the obvious structure of the UDHR. 
International human rights norms are viewed as sufficiently flexible to allow for 
differences in emphasis and implementation so that their principles can be applied in a 
variety of ways within the different cultures of the world.
166
 Without disputing the fact 
that a good portion of the world population was still subject to colonial rule and had 
no voice in the debates that led to the adoption of the International Bill of Rights, the 
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presence of a significant number of non-Western states would suffice to discredit to a 
reasonable extent, claims that the UDHR is an aggregation of Western philosophy and 
its individualistic perception of human nature.
 167
   
In the particular context of the CRC and other child specific human rights 
instruments, while it is true that colonized peoples and several member states of the 
present day United Nations General Assembly did not participate in the negotiation 
that culminated in the adoption of the International Bill of Rights, the decolonization 
that followed enlarged the membership of the United Nations and thus accommodated 
a far greater number of countries and more diverse views during the debate and 
adoption of the CRC and subsequent child-specific instruments.  
Supporting the close nexus between the universality and relativity debate on 
child rights is the closing words of the debate on the adoption of the UDHR expressed 
by Abdul Rahman Kayala representing Syria. He noted that civilization had 
progressed slowly through centuries of persecution and tyranny until finally the 
present Declaration had been drawn up. According to him, the Declaration was not 
the: 
[W]ork of a few representatives in the Assembly or in the 
Economic and Social Council; it was the achievement of 
generations of human being who had worked towards that end. 
Now at last the people of the world would hear it proclaimed that 
their aim had been reached by the United Nations.
168
 
A more recent boost to the argument of the confluence of universality and 
relativity of child rights was witnessed in June 1993 at the World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna. Drawing representatives from all cultures and religions 
across a world virtually without colonies, the Vienna conference was the largest 
international gathering ever convened on the theme of human rights and produced the 
most significant human rights document in the last quarter of a century and one of the 
strongest human rights documents of the past hundred years.
169
 The ensuing Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by consensus without a vote or 
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reservation crystallized the principle that human rights are universal, indivisible, 
interdependent and interrelated.  
The Declaration firmly committed states to the promotion and protection of all 
human rights for all people regardless of their political, economic, and cultural 
systems. Article 1 of the Declaration emphasizes undisputedly the universal nature of 
rights and freedoms. Evidencing its relativity as well as universality strands, Article 5 
of the Vienna Declaration states that: 
While the significance of national and regional peculiarities and 
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be 
borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, 
economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.   
Since the aim of contemporary child rights is not to override traditions except 
those that are repugnant to the essence of human dignity, it is no longer stylish to 
respond to accusations of human rights violations within a country’s territory by 
pleading the ‘alibi’ of Western culture.170 Whilst conceding that child rights may not 
have been germinated in an African garden, were not exclusively fertilized with 
African values and ultimately were not harvested by African farmers with home-made 
devices, international child rights frameworks domesticated in the continent have 
yielded abundant fruits that have facilitated the nourishment of Africa’s children.171  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examined more specifically the philosophical strands of natural 
law and legal positivism, and cursorily, the other philosophical foundations. Based 
on the inherent weaknesses of natural law and legal positivism as stand-alone 
philosophies and bearing in mind their potential complementarity if their respective 
strengths are aggregated, this chapter proposed a paradigm philosophy that is 
branded as ‘inclusive legal positivism’. This chapter argued that the philosophical 
orientation of child rights is inclusive because it sums up the strengths of natural law 
and legal positivism in consonance with contemporary international and regional 
human rights frameworks. This chapter construed child rights are those specific 
moral rights that inhere in children due to their age and vulnerability and which are 
normatively protected. 
Recognizing the unending debate on the universality or relativity of human 
rights, this chapter noted that such contestation also relates to child rights to the 
extent that it is still unresolved whether child rights are relative or otherwise. Based 
on international and regional instruments including the Vienna Declaration and 
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Programme of Action, this chapter found that child rights are not exclusively 
universal and at the same time not exclusively relative. Rather, child rights 
accommodate both universalist and relative traits to ensure uniform applicability in 
multiplicity of cultures.  
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, chapter three focuses on situating 
child justice as an integral component of child rights and identifies which of the 
principles of child rights form the twin pillars of child justice.                                            
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Chapter Three 
 Interpreting Child Justice as Child Rights 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The preceding chapter examined the philosophical and normative foundation 
of child rights and predicated its philosophy on inclusive legal positivism which is at 
the intersection of natural law and legal positivism. This chapter traces the evolution 
of child justice and analyzes the philosophical contestations between the welfare and 
justice models of child justice. It also examines the ideological differences of these 
two models in the conception and treatment of children in conflict with the law and 
argues that since a stand-alone model is an illusion, the justice and welfare 
philosophies intersect in restorative justice. 
This thesis construes child rights and child justice respectively as the distinct 
rights and justice system for persons below the age of eighteen. It notes the definition 
of a child under Article 1 of the CRC and Article 2 of the ACRWC.
1
 While situating 
child justice within the parameters of child rights, this chapter provides an 
understanding of how child justice forms an integral component of child rights and 
further argues that children in conflict with the law are special right holders seized 
with more than the enjoyment of basic human rights.  
This chapter reasons that despite the enjoyment of generic human rights, 
children accrue other explicit rights due to their age, vulnerability and culpability. It 
further acknowledges the existence of several guiding principles of child rights and 
having examined the principles of non-discrimination, the best interests of the child, 
the right to life, survival and development, participation, dignity and proportionality, 
this chapter extrapolates which of these principles combine to form the twin pillars 
of child justice.
2
  
 
3.2 Evolution of Child Justice    
Prior to the evolution of child justice, most criminal justice systems were 
inclined to the classical crime control approach in which crime was considered the 
rational act of a free-thinking individual and punishable under the law.
3
 During that 
era, children in conflict with the law were considered as free-thinking individuals 
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and when they contravened the law, were subjected to strict penalties.
4
 The precise 
time that a distinct justice system for children evolved outside the scope of the 
criminal justice system is still debatable; however, there is consensus that it evolved 
as a protective system for children in conflict with the law.
5
 In alluding to the 
debatable evolution of child justice, it has also been opined that child justice evolved 
from an accidental confluence of several philosophies of justice.
6
 
Zimring writes that, before the introduction of a separate justice system that 
seeks to mitigate the culpability of children in conflict with the law, the criminal 
justice system regulated how offenders of specific offenses are dealt with regardless 
of age.
7
 Extending the frontiers of this account of the evolution of child justice, 
Friedlander stresses that prior to the establishment of a separate child justice system, 
the criminal justice framework in existence then required both child and adult 
offenders to be charged under the same penal codes.
8
 They were both subjected to 
the same criminal procedure rules, the same jurisdiction of criminal justice 
institutions and in the case of conviction, the same penalties.  
Another version of the evolution of child justice is traceable to the period of 
industrial revolution and the religious and moral revival of the early 19
th
 century.
9
 
This evolution of child justice has been described as a Victorian creation that was 
developed in the 19
th
 century to differentiate the punishment for juvenile offenders 
based on their age.
10
  
In England, one of the earliest visible landmarks of child justice as a distinct 
legal system and delineating children in conflict with the law as a special category of 
persons was linked to the creation of Chancery courts in 15
th
 century England to deal 
with petitions of those in need of aid or intervention especially women and 
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children.
11
 Through these courts, the king established the principle of parens patriae 
which allows the courts authority over children in need of care and protection, and 
the principle of loco parentis which allows the state to act in place of parents.
12
 
Kaufman recounts that common law established different treatment for young 
offenders with the introduction of reformatory and industrial schools for children in 
the 1850’s.13  
Writing in the context of English Common Law, Hawes conceives that child 
justice arose out of the practice whereby children in conflict with the law were 
placed in poorhouses and almshouses and treated as indentured servants.
14
 Similarly, 
it has been recounted that the British Children’s Charter of 1889 introduced legal 
protection for children and enabled the state to interfere in family life on the basis of 
legislation that excluded them from certain industries.
15
 These changes in the 
perception of childhood in England led to new conceptions of delinquency and the 
introduction of special courts for children in conflict with the law, through the 
British Children Act of 1908.
16
  
The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 created new problems in 
England for those involved in child justice administration.
17
 As one of the ill 
consequences of the war, the high number of orphans escalated child crime and in 
response, the children’s branch of the British Home Office was established in 1919 
with amongst other responsibilities, the management of reformatory and industrial 
schools, juvenile courts, probation and places of detention.
18
 Perkins recounts that in 
1927 and in view of the debates regarding the ill-treatment of children in conflict 
with the law, a committee established by the British government recommended that 
the welfare of the child or young person should be the primary object of child 
                                                          
11
 John H. Fisher, ‘Chancery and the Emergence of Standard Written English in the Fifteenth Century’ 
(1977) 52 Journal of Medieval Studies 870; J H Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (3
rd
 
edn, Butterworths 1992) 57 
12
 Ibid 
13
 Irving Kaufman, ‘The Child in Trouble: The Long and Difficult Road to Reforming The Crazy-
Quilt Juvenile   Justice System’ (1982) 60 Washington University Law Quarterly 743 
14
 Joseph Hawes, Children in the Urban Society: Juvenile Delinquency in Nineteen Century America 
(Oxford University Press 1971) 315 
15
 Kate Bradley, ‘Juvenile Delinquency and the Evolution of the British Juvenile Courts, c.1900-1950’ 
(2008) Institute for Historical Research 1; See also Monica Flegel, ‘Facts and Their Meaning: Child 
Protection, Intervention, and the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children in Late 
Nineteenth-Century England’ (2007) 33 Victorian Review 87 
16
 Gray Clapton, Viviene E Cree and Mark Smith, ‘Moral Panics and Social Work: Towards a 
Skeptical View of UK Child Protection’ (2012) 33 Critical Social Policy 197  
17
 Barry C. Feld, ‘A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a Revolution that Failed 
(2007) 34 Northern Kentucky Law Review 189;  Prue Rains, ‘Juvenile Justice and the Boys' Farm: 
Surviving a Court-Created Population Crisis 1909-1948’ (1984) 31 Social Problems 500 
18
 Kate Bradley, ‘Juvenile Delinquency and the Evolution of the British Juvenile Courts, c.1900-1950’ 
(2008) Institute for Historical Research, 1 
64 
 
courts.
19
 This Recommendation extended the frontiers of the 1908 Act and served as 
the precursor to the British Children and Young Persons Act of 1933.
20
 
In the case of the United States, a separate child justice system developed 
during the 19
th
 century through the creation of special facilities for troubled 
children.
21
 In 1825, the Society for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency 
established the New York House of Refuge to accommodate child delinquents and in 
1885 the Chicago reform school opened in an effort to protect children in conflict 
with the law by separating them from adult offenders.
22
 Writing in the context of the 
United States, it was recounted that the New York House of Refuge established in 
1825 to care for ‘novices in antisocial conduct’ underscored the need for 
minimalistic punishment of children in conflict with the law.
23
  
Fashioned under the template of English Common Law and based on the 
parens patriae doctrine, the first child court in the United States was established in 
Cook County, Illinois in 1899.
24
 The court was established on the philosophy that 
children are inherently different from adults, less culpable for their acts and more 
amenable to rehabilitation.
25
 Rather than punish children in conflict with the law 
with sentences prescribed for their offenses, child courts were to employ a 
minimalistic and individualized approach that focuses on rehabilitation and 
prevention of recidivism.
26
 Acknowledging that criminalization of delinquency 
contravenes the basic tenets and justification of a child justice system,
27
 a child court 
introduced in the State of Illinois, unlike the adult criminal courts, abolished the 
formal, open and adversarial process for children in conflict with the law and in its 
place established a ‘kind and just parent.’28  
Founded to loosen the rigidity of the law in respect of how the police, 
prosecutors and judges are authorized to handle children in conflict with the law, 
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child courts were permitted to take custody of children without the need for a 
criminal conviction and devoid of the bureaucracy and legal restrictions placed on 
criminal courts.
29
 The child court emphasized an informal, non-adversarial, non-
criminal, flexible approach with few procedural rules with the ultimate goal of 
guiding children in conflict with the law towards life as a responsible, law-abiding 
adult.
30
  
Another version of the evolution of child justice in the United States argues 
that the child justice system evolved because certain institutions were granted 
intervention powers in respect of delinquent children without regard to due process 
guarantees.
31
 This practice allowed courts and local officials to place children in their 
custody on the finding that institutionalization was in their best interests.
32
 
According to ABA Division of Public Education, Judge Julian Mack was one of the 
first judges to preside over child courts in the United States. He stated that:  
The child who must be brought into court should, of course, be 
made to know that he is face to face with the power of the state, 
but he should at the same time, and more emphatically, be made to 
feel that he is the object of its care and solicitude. The ordinary 
trappings of the courtroom are out of place in such hearings. The 
judge on a bench, looking down upon the boy standing at the bar, 
can never evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk, with 
the child at his side, where he can on occasion put his arm around 
his shoulder and draw the lad to him, the judge, while losing none 
of his judicial dignity, will gain immensely in the effectiveness of 
his work.
 33
 
Not too long after the establishment of the Illinois child court, the sweeping 
discretion granted to child courts in the United States, the informality and 
individualization inherent in the system, coupled with the fact that the due process 
bar was placed lower than in the adult criminal justice system, worked against the 
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enjoyment of due process rights on the part of children.
34
 To reverse the trend and 
ensure that child courts upheld the same constitutional protection and evidentiary 
standards as those required in adult criminal cases, the U.S. Supreme Court 
intervened to elevate the standard of evidence required for child courts, granted due 
process rights to children and limited the discretion of child judges.
35
  
In the case of Kent v. United States
36
 and In re Gault,
37
 the US Supreme 
Court extended many but not all of the due process rights to children in conflict with 
the law and accorded them legal rights ranging from legal representation, the right to 
cross-examine witnesses and protection against self-incrimination. These changes 
eroded the foundation of child courts and led to the enactment of tougher changes to 
child justice systems. It also enabled the reduction of the confidentiality requirement 
of court proceedings and allowed increased public access to court records.
38
 These 
stringent changes gave rise to debates as to the viability of separate child justice 
systems.  
During the 1980’s and 1990’s and as a result of widespread crime committed 
by young offenders in the United States, the support for the traditional lenient views 
regarding child delinquency began to decline. This led the majority of states in the 
United States to adopt legislative and other changes in their child justice systems so 
as to enhance the jurisdiction of courts to punish children in conflict with the law.
39
 
In the context of Nigeria and bearing in mind its colonial affinity to Anglo-
Saxon Common Law, the evolution of the child justice system is modeled on the 
British colonial template.
40
 With increased youth delinquency due to political, social 
and economic challenges in pre-independent Nigeria, the colonial administration 
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intervened to deal with such anti-social problems through the introduction of social 
welfare services and penal administration for children.
41
  
The rise in youth crime emerged as a national issue in Nigeria with the 
appointment of the first Social Welfare Officer in Nigeria in 1941 and the 
implementation of new legal and administrative mechanisms that clearly identified 
child delinquency as a social problem.
42
 According to Okonkwo, the penal 
administration of children in conflict with the law in Nigeria culminated with the 
establishment of the Boy’s Industrial Home Yaba Lagos in 1925 and thereafter the 
promulgation of the CYPA of 1946.
43
  Due to its inherent shortcoming and in a bid 
to offer further protection and curb incidences of delinquency in Nigeria, the CYPA 
underwent several amendments during the colonial era, in 1947, 1950, 1954 and 
1955.
44
 The CYPA as amended in 1955 was bequeathed to Nigeria on independence 
in 1960 and remained in force for 43 years until it was partially substituted in 2003 
by the CRA. 
 
3.3 Philosophical Models of Child Justice  
The philosophical models of child justice, unlike its debatable evolution, are 
much more settled. Due to the fact that the child justice philosophy is clouded by a 
lenient societal response to delinquency, a child offender ought not to receive the 
same punishment as an adult who is guilty of the same offense. As a basis for 
determining the appropriate punishment for a child offender, the child justice 
philosophy enjoins conscious analysis of the seriousness of the offense, the degree of 
violence perpetrated, the injury inflicted and ultimately the resulting harm to the 
victim.
45
 According to Field, the philosophy of child justice is founded on the notion 
that the culpability of a child offender ought not to be equated to that of an adult 
guilty of the same offense.
46
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The philosophy behind the establishment of child justice is averse to 
retribution, but rather predicated on the premise that individuals under a certain age 
who commit crimes supposedly do not act with the same degree of responsibility as 
their adult counterparts. As such, they should be treated differently bearing in mind 
their amenability to rehabilitative support by the state.
47
  The 1990 report of the 
Massachusetts Juvenile Justice System conducted by the Boston Bar Association 
rationalized child justice philosophy. It states that the philosophical justification of 
child justice is founded on the vulnerability of children and the compassionate 
consideration that their mental and intellectual weaknesses should be weighty 
enough to excuse them from commensurate punishment for their offense.
48
  
The report adduces that the behavior of children is potentially influenced by 
their social and family environments and as such, their limited mental autonomy and 
the frailty of their decision-making ability make it unjust to punish them strictly for 
their infraction of the law without consideration to their age, potential immaturity 
and prospects for rehabilitation.
49
  
Although the philosophy of child justice rationalizes culpability on grounds 
of age, there are two major strands of the philosophy which when applied to a 
particular scenario, result in different calibration of the blameworthiness of a child.
50
 
The philosophical models of child justice tend to be classified into welfare and 
justice models.
51
 These two key models have emerged due to historical and cultural 
factors and legal traditions. While the welfare model is a legacy of the North 
American legal tradition, it contrasts with the justice model that is of European 
heritage.
52
   
 
3.3.1  Welfare Model of Child Justice 
The welfare model of child justice is an offspring of a welfare state in which 
the administration of the state is designed to allow market forces to guarantee a 
minimum level of comfort to everyone and enable them to meet minimum exigencies 
of life.
53
  By that same token, this philosophical model of child justice aims at 
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securing the interests of the child offender through the subrogation of the state as the 
parent of the child.
54
 In Scott’s view, the welfare model of child justice confers on 
the state the responsibility to look out for the welfare of children in conflict with the 
law.
55
  
Calling for the mitigation of the culpability for an offense committed by a 
child offender on grounds of his or her age, some scholars argue that this philosophy 
presupposes that a child offender should not be punished, but rather protected to 
ensure his or her rehabilitation and integration into society.
56
 Rather than use 
criminal punishment to address delinquency, the welfare philosophy emphasizes 
rehabilitation as against deterrent punishment and calls for a diminished 
responsibility of children at all times on grounds of their ameliorated culpability.  
According to Ainsworth, the ground rule of welfare philosophy is that 
punishment should be avoided for child offenses, but where inevitable, it should be 
designed in such a way that it rehabilitates the child offender and attunes him or her 
against future reoffending.
57
 The fundamental paternalistic presumption of the 
welfare philosophy, also referred to as ‘protection model’, is that even though 
children engage in deviant behavior, they are viewed as victims of the environment 
within which they live and can be rehabilitated to become law abiding citizens.
58
  
Unlike retribution which seeks justice by looking backwards at past offenses, 
welfare philosophy is forward-looking, emphasizes rehabilitation and strives to 
convert children in conflict with the law into law-abiding citizens through 
rehabilitative interventions.
59
 As postulated by Schissel, the root of the welfare 
philosophy is more broadly traceable to the English Law doctrine that authorizes the 
monarchy to protect vulnerable parties in courts of equity.  
It was argued further that the welfare philosophy was accentuated with judges 
assuming wide discretionary powers to cater for children in conflict with the law 
through orders to authorize removal of children from destitute families.
60 
On this 
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premise, child courts assumed an important role in protecting children as immature 
beings with the state playing parens patriae. This role places emphasis on treatment, 
supervision and control of children rather than on punishment and allows the state 
the power to intervene affirmatively in the lives of young offenders.
61
   
Parens patriae was introduced into English Common Law through the court 
of law and equity and became applicable when the intervention of the court is 
apparently needed to forestall danger to the health and welfare of children and when 
these dangers seem unlikely to be mitigated by parental responsibility.
62
 Under the 
role of ‘parents of the child’, the state is morally authorized to step into the shoes of 
the parent and determine the guidelines for the development and growth of the child. 
The state also considers the social inadequacies of the situation in which the child is 
living and reacts to the problem of delinquency not by imposing punishment, but by 
searching for a treatment plan best suited to the particular needs of the child 
offender.
63
  
In such circumstances, the court’s verdict must be based on the ‘needs’ and 
not the ‘deeds’ of the child offender and the potential for his or her rehabilitation.64 
The rehabilitative ideals of the welfare philosophy demand that the court should 
consider the social and economic background of each child offender. As advanced by 
Hymowitz, it must treat child delinquency as a special disease requiring special 
therapy and consider the child offender as a passive and innocent being devoid of 
punishable criminal intent.
65
 These considerations ought to compel the court to 
concentrate on the individualized rehabilitative needs of the child offender 
notwithstanding the magnitude of his or her offense. 
While it has been argued that the welfare philosophy is the dominant 
philosophy of child justice,
66
 Cauffman, Woolard and Reppucci assert that the 
philosophy is not without its critics.
67
 As such, Scott and Grisso maintain that the 
optimism for rehabilitation of children in conflict with the law on which the 
philosophy is based has been put to the greatest scrutiny particularly in the face of 
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rising and violent breach of the law by children.
68
 Lipsitt furthers this criticism by 
arguing that with expanded constitutional rights and social protection granted to 
children, there is no unique purpose served by the rehabilitative focus of the welfare 
philosophy of child justice.
69
  
Further accentuating the criticism, Wiese argues that the welfare philosophy 
of child justice hides several abuses against children because of its limited 
recognition of due process and the subjectivity of the wide discriminatory powers of 
the child court.
70
 In criticizing welfare philosophy for its paternalism, Hamilton and 
Harvey claim that the United States cases of In re Gault,
71
 In re Winship
72
 and other 
U.S Supreme Court cases undermined the rehabilitative and welfare rhetoric of early 
child courts.
73
 Similarly, they criticize the welfare philosophy of child justice as 
bereft of due process safeguards and grant social workers dominant and overbearing 
roles.  
 
3.3.2 Justice Model of Child Justice   
Another strand of the philosophical model of child justice which is 
characteristic of accountability for offenses willfully committed by children in 
conflict with the law is the justice model. Under the justice philosophy of child 
justice, children are held accountable for all their actions in contravention of the law. 
According to Schulz and Hamutenya, the thrust of this philosophy is that all 
individuals, including children, are reasoning agents and ought to be fully 
accountable for their actions before the law.
74
  
In contrast to the welfare philosophy that is swayed by the perceived 
immaturity and irrationality of children, the justice philosophy advocates strict 
punishment of children in conflict with the law as a societal retaliation for their 
misconduct.
75
 The justice philosophy adopts a uniform penalty for both child and 
adult offenders who have committed the same offense and makes no distinction 
between the criminal actions of a child and an adult counterpart. Proponents of this 
philosophy argue that its catalectic factors are that it provides children in conflict 
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with the law with due process rights and fair hearing guarantees expected to 
adequately provide protective safeguards to them.
76
 In that case, this philosophy 
discount that children require or deserve any paternalistic concessionary measure to 
mitigate their criminal culpability.
77
  
The child justice philosophy focuses on the commensurate incapacitation and 
punishment of a child offender for purposes of deterrence.
78
 Yeckel elucidated this 
point when he argued that the reason commonly adduced by protagonists of the 
justice philosophy for retention of the ‘just deserts’ response is that a child offender, 
like an adult offender, is accountable for his or her actions that are in breach of the 
law.
79
 He argued further that the accountability of the child justice philosophy 
presupposes that since children are presently maturing earlier and getting involved in 
crime early, they need to be answerable for their crimes.  
On the other hand, where a conscious and independent deviant actor 
contravenes the law either as a child or an adult, the balance of the scales of justice 
ought to have been disturbed and can only be restored if and only when the offender 
is punished in accordance with the law.
80
 Some proponents of the child justice 
philosophy posit that in the event that there is need for a distinct child justice system, 
it ought to adopt more of the punitive characteristics of the criminal justice system.
81
 
In that sense, Schulz and Hamutenya argue that the proper role of child justice as is 
the case with criminal justice in general is to assess the degree of culpability of the 
individual child offender and apportion punishment in accordance with the degree of 
seriousness of the offending behavior.
82
  
In such a circumstance, the child offender ought to be accorded the same full 
due process rights and fair hearing protection enjoyed by adults instead of the open-
ended discretion of child courts exercised under the welfare philosophy. 
83
 Unlike the 
child welfare philosophy that searches for appropriate treatment, the child justice 
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philosophy places emphasis on the predictability and determinateness of criminal 
responsibility in canvassing for due punishment in accordance with the law.
 84
  
 
3.3.3. Sub-sets of Justice Model of Child Justice   
The child justice philosophy has two major sub-sets. The first is the deterrent 
philosophy of child justice which in Dresser’s view is adopted along the lines of the 
utilitarian school of thought.
85
 The deterrent philosophy of child justice presupposes 
that punishment is not merely a measure to punish the child offender for the present 
offense, but a mechanism to also compel him or her to refrain from offending in the 
future.
86
 Justifying the rationale behind deterrent justice, it has been stated that both 
the child offender and any third party observer will view the infraction of the law and 
ensuing punishment as undesirable actions and consequences.
87
  
Consequently, the goal of deterrent justice is to indirectly manipulate and 
discourage children contemplating criminal conduct to abstain from such endeavors. 
While this model of child justice commands respect at face value, von Hirsch argues 
that in practice, the level of deterrence achieved through it is very debatable and 
depends extensively on the ability of present and prospective child offenders to 
comprehend the risks associated with engaging in the prohibited act.   
The second strand of the justice model of child justice is the retributive child 
justice. It presupposes that delinquents who commit crimes deserve adequate 
punishment in tandem with their moral culpability.
88
 Blackmore and Welsh maintain 
that the retributive philosophy of child justice, as an integral limb of the child justice 
philosophy is on the same threshold as the deterrent justice philosophy and supports 
the intentional infliction of pain and suffering to the extent deserved by delinquents 
that willingly commit crime.
89
  
The ‘just-deserts’ posture of the child justice philosophy and its retributive 
and deterrent subsets have been criticized  by Akester, Masters and Owers for their 
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lack of coherence in balancing two important precepts of child justice.
90
 These two 
subsets of justice philosophy overemphasize the need to protect society against 
criminal behavior and at the same time over-look the need to also pay special 
attention to the age-related circumstances of children in conflict with the law.
91
  
The reliance of both deterrent and retributive models on the gains of 
incapacitation of the child,
92
 to put them out of criminal circulation,
93
 or reduce their 
overall propensity to commit crime is also debatable as it is not clear to what extent 
incapacitation actually prevents re-offending in a particular case.
94
 As such, 
implementing such a system as a mechanism for counteracting child delinquency 
would compel the court to move out of the realms of law and predict a young 
offender’s future behavior in the event he or she is not incarcerated.95  
The incapacitation calculation based on the forecasted behavior of a child is 
not grounded on any procedural rules. Its success depends not only on apprehending 
and sentencing children in conflict with the law, but also on the accuracy of 
permuting which of the potential delinquents will offend at a relatively early stage of 
his or her criminal career.
96
 Certainly, the incapacitation theory of deterrent justice 
negates equality principles because its application to delinquents is likely to produce 
different results because of the wide speculative discretion it grants to the court. The 
deterrent and retributive philosophies of child justice may likely fail the scrutiny of 
child rights standards because neither of them adequately takes into consideration the 
sensitivity of the child offender and his or her need for rehabilitation.
97
  
 
3.3.4.  Restorative Model of Child Justice 
Although welfare and justice models of child justice are widely seen as 
conflicting and the two leading theoretical philosophies of child justice, the dividing 
line between these two models is waning gradually. This is because there is a 
furtherance of welfare concerns in child justice, going on contemporaneously with 
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the consolidation of the justice model.
98
 The confluence of the welfare and justice 
models is resulting in a robustly emerging model of child justice which encourages 
child offenders to show penitence for their wrongdoing and the impact on their 
victim.  
This model is popularly known as restorative child justice. It accommodates 
welfare and justice interests in that it neither dispenses with rehabilitation nor 
overlooks punishment; rather, it places both within the context of the child offender’s 
responsibility for his or her actions.
99
 Stout notes the varied definitions of restorative 
child justice as pertaining to any justice process emphasizing the victim in place of 
the state.
100
 Marshall defines restorative child justice as a problem-solving approach 
to crime involving the parties on the one hand and the community on the other in an 
active relationship with state institutions.
101
 Similarly, Johnston argues that the 
characteristics of child justice are underlined by the fact that responses to a crime 
should make an offender acknowledge the harm caused to the victims, and ensure 
that reparation measures are collectively decided between the offender, victim and 
the community so as to reintegrate the offender back into the community.
102
 
The distinctiveness of restorative child justice is the emphasis it places on 
process as well as outcome. It envisions crime more broadly than other justice 
models through the recognition of the role and participation of the victim in justice 
processes. It also co-opts the involvement of stakeholders beyond the national justice 
institutions and focuses on reparation at the expense of punitive sanctions.
103
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Restorative child justice like the welfare model of child justice underlines the 
rehabilitation of the offender; however, it goes much further than the child justice 
model in emphasizing restitution to the victim and the community. It is attuned to the 
African conception of the rights of the child by promoting the desirability of 
balancing child offenders' rights against their responsibilities to the community.  
Restorative child justice is a philosophy that embraces a wide range of human 
emotions and offers a process whereby those affected by the criminal infraction are 
involved in resolving the issues which flow from the offending.  According to 
Consedine, it disregards vengeance and punishment and seeks to heal both the 
community and the individuals involved by putting the notion of reparation and not 
punishment at the center.
104
  
As a radical shift from adversarial trials and unlike retributive justice that 
focuses on how to punish the offender, restorative child justice places victims at the 
center of the justice equation. While healing the victim, it attaches responsibility for 
the crime to the perpetrator.
105
 In aiming at reconciliation, rather than punishment, 
the cardinal philosophy of restorative child justice, according to Wundersitz, is that 
the infraction of the law by a child offender primarily aggrieves the victim of the 
offense and where there is an opportunity for reparation by the child, priority should 
be given to the victim and not the society or state as the case may be.
106
  
In Bilchick’s view, restorative child justice personifies the victim and focuses 
on crime as harm and justice as mitigation of the harm.
107
  He also considers it as the 
opposite of retributive justice, and notes that it adopts a ‘soft’ response to crime in 
comparison with other models of justice.
108
 Acknowledging that child infraction of 
the law inflicts harm on the victim and most times the community, Omale argues that 
the underlining importance of restorative child justice is to repair or mitigate the 
harm caused, by using participatory process involving the victim or community.
109
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Through the platform of restorative child justice, both the victim and offender 
are accorded central roles in justice-seeking processes with state and legal 
professionals facilitating a system of accountability and reparation. Zehr argues that 
restorative child justice emerged from the expedience to take the needs of the 
immediate victim and the community as the secondary victim more seriously.
110
  
Restorative child justice expands the participants in the criminal justice 
system beyond the government to include the victim and the community and elevates 
accountability by ensuring that the offender appreciates the impact of his or her 
action on the victim and takes steps to assuage them.
111
 Braithwaite considers 
restorative child justice as a process of limiting the powers of the state and securing 
dominion of citizens in the criminal justice process through repair, transformation 
and empowerment of the victim, community and the offender.
112
 
Having reviewed the justice, welfare and restorative justice philosophies of 
child justice, it is pertinent to note that while the contemporary move in child justice 
administration is towards restorative child justice, the inclination of this thesis is on 
the welfare model of child justice. This choice is made bearing in mind that in the 
context of Nigeria where this thesis is focused, child justice is predominantly 
welfare-oriented due to fundamental child justice legislation in Nigeria. The welfare 
leaning of child justice in Nigeria further consolidated by the adoption of the CRA in 
2003 completely omits reference to restorative juvenile justice, but rather reinforces 
welfarism. The welfare-centered child justice system in Nigeria places a premium on 
Parens Patriae and emphasized informality in the court room. It also underscored 
the sensitivities of the child justice process and authorizes the insulation of children 
and family courts from the brand of criminality. 
 
3.4 Child Justice as Child Rights   
The specific codification of child justice as child rights in international, 
regional and national instruments is a recent development.
113
 The treatment of 
children as objects and proprietary interests of their parents remained until 1944 and 
resulted in the subjection of children in conflict with the law to various forms of 
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abuse, neglect and exploitation.
114
 It has been argued that as one of the positive 
consequences of World War II, state paternalistic tendencies towards children gave 
way to the conception of children as individuals and autonomous beings with 
inherent due process rights.
115
  
This landmark stride was possible on the strength of a plethora of human 
rights instruments in general and child rights instruments in particular that 
dramatically altered the articulation and attitude of the law to the extent that children 
were considered not as parental property or possessions, but as a distinct and special 
class of immature and vulnerable persons in need of special protection.
116
  
On the premise that child justice is an integral part of child rights, the CRC 
established standards for the administration of child justice and obliges state parties 
to provide children in conflict with the law with basic human rights guarantees as 
well as legal or other assistance for their defense. The convention also enjoins state 
parties to ensure that judicial proceedings and institutional placement of children in 
conflict with the law are applied as a last resort.
117
  
The nexus between child rights and child justice is also evident in other child 
rights instruments such as the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice, commonly known as the ‘Beijing Rules.’ 
Construing child justice as child rights, the Beijing Rules instituted international 
norms for the administration of child justice and additionally provided guidance to 
states for protecting child rights through a separate and specialized child justice 
system. The Beijing Rules further set out elaborate principles and commentaries on 
the treatment of children in conflict with the law.
118
   
In addition to the CRC and the Beijing Rules, there are several others child-
specific instruments that also situate child justice in the realm of child rights. These 
instruments include the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles 
Deprived of their Liberty.
119
 The substance of the Rules is to uphold the rights, 
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safety and promotion of the physical and mental well-being of children. Under the 
Rules, deprivation of the liberty of a child should be a disposition of last resort, for 
the minimum necessary period and should be limited to exceptional cases.
120
  
Another international instrument that situates child justice within the remit of 
child rights is the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile 
Delinquency, popularly called the ‘Riyadh Guidelines.’ These Guidelines categorize 
child justice as child rights by emphasizing on preventive policies for facilitating 
successful socialization and integration of children and young persons, particularly 
through the family, community, peer groups and as well as voluntary 
organizations.
121
  
In the context of the African continent, the impact of the International Bill of 
Rights on the promotion and protection of child rights is reflected in the emergence 
of regional and national legislative frameworks.
122
 These instruments situate child 
justice within child rights and strongly elaborate specific categories of rights that 
children are granted when they are in conflict with the law.  
The ACRWC was adopted to set continental binding standards in the sphere 
of child rights, including child justice. Distinct from the CRC, the ACRWC 
correlates the rights of children with responsibilities.
123
 It grants children in conflict 
with the law special rights in a manner consistent with their sense of dignity and 
worth and interprets the establishment and effective administration of child justice 
not as a discretional policy that member states are at liberty to domesticate and 
implement nationally, but as an obligation.
124
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The incorporation of child justice as child rights in the ACRWC influenced 
the Nigerian child justice framework. Domesticating child justice as an integral 
component of child rights, the CRA represents an important national step in 
subsuming child justice within the ambit of child rights. It supplanted the 
paternalistic notion of the juvenile justice regime under the CYPA with the current 
good practice of treating children as autonomous human beings afforded rights 
independent of their parents.  
While the evaluation of the actual realization of the rights entrenched in the 
CRA by children in conflict with the law in Nigeria is the subject for subsequent 
chapters, at this stage, it is pertinent to note that the CRA is certainly eloquent in 
interpreting child justice in light of the overall vision of child rights. Like the CRC 
and ACRWC, the CRA ushered in a veritable normative standard for connecting 
child justice with child rights in Nigeria. The fact that child justice in Nigeria is 
clothed with child rights is founded on the premise that since children in conflict 
with the law are inhibited by unequal mental footing when compared to an adult, 
they deserve the necessary support that is not ordinarily at the disposal of adult 
offenders. 
Despite the plethora of human rights frameworks linking child justice to child 
rights, the expectation that children in conflict with the law should be processed 
through the child justice system derives from the prevailing view that children 
deserve specific human rights and special treatment due to their age. Consequently, 
the special treatment of children in the child justice system accrues to them not out of 
the benevolence of the state and its institutions, but due to the understanding that it is 
their human rights. On this note, the argument of Freeman that posits that child 
justice interests of children are best protected if perceived as a fundamental 
obligation on the part of the state rather than rights inherent in children is 
contestable.
125
  
His view is counteracted by the argument that the best protection of child 
rights and in the particular context of those in conflict with the law is that their best 
interests are served better by a child justice system that responds to them as holders 
of rights entitled to the protection of international and regional human rights norms 
and standards. It has also been argued that since the underlying purpose of child 
justice is to treat children in a benevolent way, this derogates from the purview of 
human rights and realistically borders on charity and magnanimity towards the 
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child.
126
 The premise of this argument is also frail because, although the processing 
of children in conflict with the law may be tainted with benevolence, it is more 
fundamentally predicated on the rights of the child offender as an autonomous being.  
Equally, Young’s interpretation of the establishment of child justice as an 
administrative obligation of the state rather than as child rights is contestable and 
somewhat averse to the autonomy of children.  Since child rights are predicated on 
regional and international instruments and as independent human beings capable of 
enjoying rights, children in conflict with the law are seized with the humane 
treatment of the child justice system as part and parcel of their rights, and not 
necessarily as the benevolence of the state and its institutions.  
Cognizant of the lack of mental development and maturity of children which 
impair their rational sense of judgement, the contemporary practice of adopting 
affirmative policies, quotas and subsidies accords with the same protective shield 
that child justice, as an integral part of child rights, provides children in conflict with 
the law.
127
 To buttress the foregoing arguments that seek to draw a nexus between 
child justice as child rights, the statement of Roscoe Pound that the child court is one 
of the most significant advances in the administration of justice since the Magna 
Carta is very material.
128
  
 
3.5 Principles of Child Rights 
The principles of child rights have been articulated by amongst others the 
committee on the implementation of the CRC. In the course of the first formal 
session of the committee in 1991, it elaborated on the meaning of child rights and 
highlighted the general principles that would facilitate the interpretation of the 
convention as a whole and also guide its implementation.
129
 The first of these 
principles of child rights that underpin equality of opportunities is ‘non-
discrimination’. Article 2 of CRC states that:  
State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the 
present convention to each child within their jurisdiction without 
discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's parents or 
legal guardian, race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
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other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, poverty, disability, 
birth or other status. 
This principle applies to all child rights and presupposes that all children 
should be afforded the rights guaranteed in the convention without discrimination of 
any kind.
130
 In a bid to breathe life into the equality of opportunities envisaged in 
Article 2 of the convention and underpinning the interpretation of all children's rights 
and freedoms, the second principle of child rights provides for ‘best interests of 
children’ as a primary consideration in all decisions affecting them.131  
The third principle of child rights is ‘survival and development.’132 It is 
aimed at securing the economic and social well-being of children and entrusts an 
obligation on government to ensure the survival and development of children.
133
 In 
furtherance of equality of opportunities, the best interests of the child and the 
promotion of the economic and social well-being of children, the fourth principle of 
‘participation’ enjoins the active and informed involvement of children in all actions 
and decisions that affect them.
134
 The fifth principle is ‘proportionality’ and seeks to 
ensure proportionate treatment of children in conflict with the law.
135
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These five principles are not in conflict with one another but are rather 
complementary and mutually reinforcing. While the principles of best interests of the 
child and proportionality are substantive principles that establish the objective of 
achieving the rights of children, the other three principles of the CRC are procedural 
principles that provide the methodology for reaching the goal of the two substantive 
principles. While acknowledging that the committee on the implementation of the 
CRC has classified these five principles as the guiding principles of child rights, but 
in the particular context of child justice and as a standard for the treatment of 
children in conflict with the law, this thesis holds the view that the principles of 
proportionality and the best interests of the child encapsulate all other principles of 
child rights to form the twin pillars of child justice.  
While aiding and abetting the interpretation and implementation of all rights 
enumerated in the CRC, the twin pillars of child justice contribute to the overall 
promotion and protection of child rights.  Since the aim of child justice is the 
rehabilitation and integration of child offenders into society after being in conflict 
with the law, this goal would be meaningless if their best interests are disregarded 
and if they are subject to punishment disproportionate to the gravity of their offense 
and culpability.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the evolution of child justice in general and its specific 
history in the United States, England and Nigeria. It construed child justice as a 
system of substantive and procedural rules that provides a protective legal 
framework for children in conflict with the law. To situate child justice within the 
realm of child rights, the chapter discussed the justice and welfare models of child 
justice and also the evolving trend of restorative child justice. Noting that the 
demarcating lines between justice and welfare philosophies of child justice are fluid 
and the fact that it is not uncommon to identify a confluence of multiple philosophies 
of child justice operating simultaneously in the one child justice system, the chapter 
leaned towards welfare philosophy because the child justice system in Nigeria is 
welfare-oriented. 
The chapter predicated the philosophy of child justice on the notion that 
while children in conflict with the law may be blameworthy for their offense, they 
should not be considered blameworthy in the same manner as an adult and 
consequently should not receive the same reproach as an adult offender. The chapter 
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noted that child justice is an integral component of child rights and that irrespective 
of the plethora of human rights accruable to children by virtue of their humanity, 
children and particularly those in conflict with the law deserve special human rights 
due to their age and vulnerability.  
Having examined the principles of child rights as enunciated by the 
committee on the implementation of the CRC the chapter elevated the principles of 
proportionality and the best interests of the child as the twin pillars of child justice. 
On the basis that the principles of proportionality and the best interests of the child 
are the twin pillars of child justice, the next chapter will elaborate on the principle of 
proportionality as one of the twin pillars of child justice. 
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Chapter Four 
The Principle of Proportionality in Child Justice 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter recognized child justice as the rights of children in 
conflict with the law and further postulated that the principles of proportionality and 
the best interests of the child are the twin pillars of child justice. This chapter 
examines conceptually the principle of proportionality by narrowing it down to the 
perspective of child justice and particularly as a sentencing tool. 
Acknowledging critical arguments to the effect that proportionality is 
susceptible to discrepant interpretation and application, this chapter examines 
consequential and deontological versions of proportionality and argues in favor of 
deontological proportionality as the overarching and indispensable tool in child 
justice. As a basis for justifying proportionality as the key plank of child justice and 
also as a right accruing to children in conflict with the law, this chapter traces the 
normative framework of proportionality to several human rights and child rights 
instruments and laws. 
 
4.2 Conceptual Overview of Proportionality 
Proportionality in its broad sense is a legal principle which has ancient 
historical roots in the lex talionis of Hammurabi and presupposes that the penalty 
should fit the crime.
1
 The principle is not exclusively associated with any one area of 
law. It applies and spans the ambit of constitutional law, criminal law, administrative 
law, public and private international law, human rights law, etc. Transcending many 
areas of law, the universal and cross-cutting nature of the principle endears it as a 
judicial sentencing tool for judges determining criminal, constitutional or 
administrative cases.
2
  
In the context of constitutional law, Kumm holds that the hallmark of the 
principle is ‘equilibrium’,3 which is applied to the weighing of a judicial remedy 
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against a perceived wrong and limits the level of permissible retribution.
4
  It has been 
argued in the area of constitutional and criminal laws that the principle enables the 
court to analyze whether limits imposed on the realization of certain constitutional 
guarantees are justified and whether punishment imposed on a particular offense 
serves ‘traditionally recognized penological goals.’5  
Whether it is in the area of criminal, constitutional or administrative law, 
scholars have noted that the principle is fast becoming a universal standard of 
rationality.
6
 As a universal legal principle that is essential in the adjudication of 
rights in liberal democracies worldwide,
7
 the principle, according to Singer, first 
arose out of Anglo American jurisprudence on the basis of the Magna Carta whereby 
‘[a] free man shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault; 
and for a great crime according to the heinousness of it’.8  Supporting the Anglo-
American heritage of the principle and while writing on the functions of 
proportionality in European Union law, Harbo states that the principle reflects the 
philosophy of the Anglo-American heritage applied in judicial proceedings to 
manage disputes involving an alleged conflict between two ‘rights claims, or 
between a rights provision and private or public interests’.9 
In the context of child justice, the principle implies that child punishment 
should correspond with the crime and the culpability of the offender.
10
 It has also 
been described as a vital ingredient of modern ‘just deserts’ which underlines the 
nexus between crime and the moral gravity of its punishment.
11
 While Bruce argues 
that the principle is an attempt to ensure that child punishment is as fair and 
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proportionate as possible,
12
 Kumm stresses the fact that the principle is the 
foundation of any legitimate system of state punishment and prohibits punishment 
that is excessive in relation to the crime and the culpability of the child.
13
  
As an alleviative penal measure, proportionality is predicated on the three-
prong consideration of the offense, culpability and punishment.
14
 It ensures that 
punishment takes into consideration the offense and the culpability of the offender. 
Describing proportionality as an indispensable tool in sentencing, von Hirsch is of 
the view that the principle is concerned with how much punishment one deserves.
15
 
Arguing that punishment not only attempts to express blame and repay the offender, 
von Hirsch opines that the fundamental element of proportional punishment is that it 
should be commensurate to the degree of culpability and harmfulness of the 
conduct.
16
 
This view was re-emphasized by Poole when he argued that in order to render 
punishment compatible with justice, the principle demands that punishment for crime 
ought to be graduated and proportionate to the offense.
17
 Elucidating further on the 
ingredients of proportionality and drawing a link between an offense, the degree of 
culpability and the degree of punishment deserved, Burgh noted that,  
…it is not enough that we restrict punishment to the deserving, but 
we must, in addition, restrict the degree of punishment to the 
degree that is deserved. The idea is that, in committing an offense, 
we do not think of the offender as deserving unlimited punishment; 
rather we think of him as deserving a degree of punishment that is 
proportional to the gravity of the offense he committed… Justice, 
in other words, not only requires a principle of desert, but also 
requires a principle of proportionality between the gravity of the 
offense and the punishment deserved.
18
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4.2.1 Proportionality as a Sentencing Tool 
The principle of proportionality as a sentencing tool is applied by judges in 
calibrating the extent to which legislation or other administrative actions intrude on 
the rights of citizens.
19
 As the central principle in sentencing and a tool in judicial 
efforts to balance competing interests, it ensures that the final sentence is 
commensurate with the totality of the subjective and objective circumstances of the 
offense.
20
 In the particular context of child justice, the principle gained ground 
during the 1970s with the paradigm shift that occurred in common law countries and 
primarily in the United States from harsh sentences to consideration of other 
extraneous factors such as the circumstances of the offense and offender.
21
   
By allowing for the interplay of extra-judicial considerations in judicial 
sentencing, the principle seeks to maximize the aggregate satisfaction of offenders 
and victims,
22
 and permits the court at the sentencing stage to reckon with the 
peculiar disadvantages and circumstances of the offender as an excusing and 
mitigating factor.
23
 It is on this basis that Mullender argues that the effect of 
proportionality in sentencing is to balance the potential and actual penalty based on 
an empirical analysis of facts personal to the offender.
24
 Other writers such as 
Mackenzie, Wyles and Thomas support the view that in sentencing, the court 
resolves the proportionality question by making a threshold balancing of the crime 
committed against the sentence imposed,
25
 and weighs whether the punishment was 
cruel and unusual under the ‘evolving standards of decency’.26  
Further light on the role of proportionality in sentencing was shed by Gunn 
when he argued that in some instances, the principle is equated to a rule of restraint 
integrating the norm of fairness in judicial remedies and sanctions that fit the legal 
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harm.
27
 Conceding that the principle sets the lower and upper ceilings of punishment 
and limits the excessively lenient as well as the overtly severe response, Gunn states 
that the principle does not prescribe the ‘exact matching of crime and punishment’ 
but delimits the parameters outside which a punishment may be deemed 
unjustified.
28
   
The principle of proportionality is distinguishable from the judicial discretion 
of mercy, which Fox describes as ‘an act of grace and a gift’ subject to an 
unconstrained discretional sentiment and devoid of principled application.
29
 Judicial 
mercy has been recognized as a mitigating factor that has been allowed in actualizing 
the principle of proportionality.
30
 It also aids the determination of the weight to be 
ascribed to a mitigating factor and gives impetus to certain consideration not visibly 
captured by criminal law and procedural rules. Unlike judicial mercy, the application 
of the principle of proportionality in criminal law in general and child justice in 
particular is guided by procedural rules.  
The principle of proportionality has been accorded statutory recognition in 
the child justice systems of several jurisdictions. In the Australian context, the 
principle is so important in the particular context of judicial sentencing that it cannot 
be trumped even by the goal of community protection.
31
 According to the Victorian 
Sentencing Act of 1991, one of the purposes of sentencing is to impose just 
punishment and to ensure that the court has regard to the gravity of the offense, the 
offender’s culpability and the degree of responsibility.32  
In some other jurisdictions, the principle of proportionality has suffered 
legislative setbacks with deliberate government policy targeting tougher sentences 
for children in excess of what is proportionate to their offense and culpability. The 
Australian Sentencing Act of 1991 for instance provides for indefinite jail term for 
serious offenses where the court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the 
offender is a serious danger to the community.
33
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On the basis of the trend towards tougher sentences, von Hirsch maintains 
that the primary criterion for punishment should be the gravity of the crime. He 
defends the proportionality calculus and contradicts the claim that ‘no sacrifice of 
equity occurs when one relegates the principle of proportionality to the margins’. 
Accordingly, the principle of parsimony to the effect that doubts about the degree of 
punishment should be resolved in favor of less punishment ultimately guides the 
application of desert in the scaling of punishment’.34  
Other eminent writers that highlighted ingredients of the principle of 
proportionality as a tacit support tool in judicial sentencing include Lovegrove. He 
states that in the case of child justice, the principle should be used in the ‘allocation 
of sanctions, requiring commensurability between offense seriousness and sanction 
severity’.35 This tacit endorsement of the proportionality calculus is based on the 
argument that the principle is not an exclusive consideration, because under certain 
circumstances prescribed by law, it can be overridden in the interests of crime 
control or the rehabilitation of the offender.
36
 Contrary to Lovegrove’s view, crime 
control and rehabilitation are immaterial results of the application of the principle of 
proportionality. According to von Hirsch  
[T]he more one looks away from the gravity of the conduct 
towards its predictive features in deciding how much to punish, 
offenders will be meted with undeserved punishment due to an 
extraneous and arbitrary interpretation of recidivism.
37
 
Elaborating further on what may be called the ‘injustice’ inherent in 
disproportionate child punishment, James argues that proportionality is rooted in 
retribution and questions whether an offender has received a ‘just deserts’ for an 
offense vis-à-vis the offender’s moral culpability and harm inflicted on the individual 
or society.
38
 On the basis of the foregoing and as a core component of just desert, the 
effects of crime control and rehabilitation are immaterial to the application of the 
principle of proportionality. This is because the equal treatment of the equally 
deserving and proportionate treatment of the unequally deserving is clearly 
inevitable requirements of justice in general and child justice in particular. As a 
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framework that assists child courts in the fair and equitable disposition of cases and 
as part of the bedrock of fundamental child justice, proportionality obliges the courts 
to consciously juxtapose the nuanced circumstances of the child offender against the 
offense.
39
  
 
4.3 Theories of Proportionality  
In its simplistic meaning, proportionality presupposes that punishment must 
fit the crime. Irrespective of its straight-forward meaning, the application of the 
principle of proportionality to children in conflict with the law is influenced by the 
philosophical and conceptual dichotomy inherent in the principle. Two such theories 
applicable at the legislative and sentencing levels and relevant to the subject of child 
justice are the consequentialist and deontological theories of proportionality. These 
two theories play unique roles in interpreting proportionality, particularly in the 
context of common law legal systems and most especially in the domain of child 
justice.  
The primacy of the consequentialist and deontological theories of 
proportionality over other theories accords with the view that these are two main 
sentencing theories with divergent appreciation and application of proportionality as 
a notion of child justice.
40
 Accentuating the primacy of these two theories, it has 
been argued that while the consequentialist theory is applied through the utilitarian 
rationale, the deontological theory is applied through the just desert or retribution 
rationale.  
Accordingly, regardless of the fact that both consequentialist and 
deontological theories are mutually reinforcing and present twin perspectives on 
punishment, they do, however, differ due to their divergent posture on the necessity, 
justification and quantum of punishment deserved by child offenders.
41
 The 
distinguishing feature of both the deontological and consequentialist theories is that 
they apportion differing weight to the purpose and goal of punishment.
42
 
 
  4.3.1 Consequentialist Theory of Proportionality 
The consequentialist theory of proportionality is also called utilitarian 
proportionality. According to Thomas and in the context of the United States, 
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consequentialist proportionality supports the proposition that punishment can only be 
justified or rationalized to the extent that its imposition will secure benefit to the 
society at large, and that such a benefit must outweigh the harm imposed on and 
suffered by the wrongdoer.
43
 As a deterrence-focused theory, it is more concerned 
with the crime preventive benefits of punishment and derives from the ‘spontaneous 
human tendency to retaliate against aggression’.44  Under this theory, punishment is 
justifiable if the benefit accruable to society by its imposition outweighs the harm to 
the individual offender or if the need for crime prevention and control is met.
45
   
The consequentialist theory of proportionality as a forward-looking theory of 
punishment justifies social measures based on the extent to which it promotes 
aggregate satisfaction. Describing the theory as merely an application of the 
utilitarian theory of morality to the specific issue of child punishment, Bagaric cites 
the proposition of Bentham to the effect that punishment is justified because the 
good consequence it produces to society outweighs the counterpart bad 
consequences it inflicts on society as well.
46
  
The consequentialist theory of punishment is forward-looking to such an 
extent that the commission of a criminal act does not on its own justify punishment. 
Rather, punishment is warranted and inevitable if some net good to society is 
derivable from it. Providing further understanding of consequentialist proportionality 
as forward-looking, it has been argued that the imposition of punishment is 
justifiable in so far as its beneficial effects to society at large outweigh the harm it 
produces on the individual offender.
47
  
In other words, the dividend of punishment must include the prospect of 
preventing future crime and a strong focus on the reduction in crime for the safety 
and protection of the public.
48
  Corroborating the futuristic lens of consequentialist 
proportionality and the fact that the moral culpability of the offender on its own does 
not justify the imposition of punishment, Smith argues that punishment imposed on 
an offender is only justifiable if it is imposed specifically with the sole aim and as a 
mechanism of averting future social harm to society at large.
49
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The consequentialist theory of aggregate satisfaction as propounded by 
Bentham was later reformulated by subjecting punishment to ‘cost benefit analysis’ 
which is predicated on the notion that punishment must maximally balance its 
beneficial and detrimental consequences on the offender, the victim and the society 
at large.
50
 In consequence thereof, consequentialist proportionality supports the view 
that the state is justified in imposing punishment on an offender if and only if the 
said punishment can secure benefits for the society as a whole.  
According to Thomas, the punitive goals of deterrence and mere 
incapacitation are not enough to impose punishment on an offender; rather, 
punishment must be based on the delicate balancing of the benefits of the positive 
and negative consequences of punishment.
51
 Proportionality in the consequentialist 
sense seldom focuses retrospectively on the nature of the offense as a determinant of 
the quantum of punishment, but rather on prospective and future-oriented deterrence 
and retribution.  
Since the harm and benefit equilibrium is the sole determinant of the 
quantum of punishment for any crime, consequentialist proportionality does not cap 
the degree of punishment that can potentially be imposed on an offender. Rather it 
balances the harm and benefit by juxtaposing the harm imposed on the wrongdoer 
against the benefits secured by the society at large.
52
 Although examined through the 
lens of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it has been argued 
that the concern of consequentialist proportionality is the achievement of a just 
outcome and the maximization of some measure of aggregate social benefit through 
punishment.
53
   
In that vein, Dolinko concludes that a just punishment under the 
consequentialist platform is one that maximizes the costs of crime and ensures that 
the criminal conduct must be so atrocious that society’s interest in deterring the 
offender wholly outweighs any other consideration.
54
 Similarly, punishment is 
desirable on the sole basis that its imposition must generate beneficial consequences 
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to the society over and above the harm it inflicts on the offender.
55
 In its original 
form of ‘aggregate satisfaction’ and its revised version of ‘cost benefit analysis’, the 
consequentialist theory of proportionality ‘does not aid the determination of the 
quantum of punishment to be visited on an offender due to the reprehensibleness of 
their conduct’.56  
The reformulated cost-benefit analysis of consequentialist proportionality still 
portends an affront to justice and is capable of supporting disproportionate 
punishment.
57
 This is because punishment is not only predicated on the quantum of 
punishment or the gravity of the criminal conduct, but more also on the prospects of 
the offender reoffending. While this theory may achieve some preventive gains, the 
fact that its goal is to censure and condemn makes it sometimes insensitive to the 
culpability of the offending conduct.
58
  
Negating the consequentialist theory of proportionality as it relates to the 
jurisprudence of child justice and as an ineffective tool for measuring and 
apportioning punishment, Wood quotes Bentham as stating that punishment ought to 
be restricted to those who have voluntarily committed offenses when availed with 
the requisite mental capacity.
59
 This view is conceded to by von Hirsch who 
maintains that the preventive efficacy of punishment should not be the sole basis for 
punishment and that punitive sanctions should be proportionate in severity to the 
degree of culpability of the offender.
60
 
 
4.3.2 Deontological Theory of Proportionality  
The deontological theory of proportionality otherwise known as retributive 
proportionality or just desert underlines the fact that persons who willfully choose to 
commit morally blameworthy acts deserve punishment. Deontological 
proportionality advocates a penal rationale that is humane and not in excess of what 
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is necessitated by the crime committed.
61
 Although deontological proportionality 
prescribes punishment, this is only to such extent that such punishment serves the 
desired end or is necessary for the attainment of its goals.
62
  Corroborating this view 
which is more pertinent in the context of child justice, Fontaine reasons that a 
punishment is unjust if its impact is greater than what is required to achieve the 
desired punitive goal.
63
   
In his contribution to the debate on theories of proportionality, Pinncoffs 
opines that deontological proportionality is generally based on the premise that ‘the 
return of suffering for moral evil voluntarily done is itself just or morally good’.64 He 
considers deontological proportionality as a necessary corollary of the principle of 
desert in which case the moral wrongdoing determines who should be punished and 
the degree of wrongdoing determines the amount of that punishment.
65
 
Similarly, deontological proportionality is particularly concerned with the 
moral appropriateness of individual punishment in relation to the offender’s 
culpability.
66
 This contention is relevant in the case of child justice because ‘just’ 
punishment in the context of deontological proportionality takes into consideration 
and appropriately balances the offender and the offense.
67
 Along the same lines, 
Braithwaite and Pettit argue that deontological proportionality is encapsulated in 
penal desert and opines that child penalties should be scaled to reflect the culpability 
of the offender.
68
  
Emphasizing the strong interconnectedness between culpability and penalty, 
it was stated that as a basic requirement of fairness, the desert rationale of 
deontological proportionality accords sentencing its most dominant role.
69
 The 
double-barreled effects of deontological proportionality is that ‘equally blameworthy 
conduct be punished equally and that penalties be ranked in severity to reflect the 
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relative seriousness of the criminal behavior’.70 Deontological proportionality is a 
tool for scaling punishments and any deviation from matching the severity of 
penalties with the gravity of the offense must be adequately justified.
71
 
 In line with this view, if a sentence connotes blame, it should be scaled in 
accordance with the level of culpability of the conduct,
72
 and thus graduated 
proportionately to fit the gravity of the criminal conduct.
73
 When deontological 
proportionality is distinguished from other future-oriented sentencing theories, the 
gravity of past conduct and not the likelihood of future behavior should be the 
determining factor behind punishment.
74
 This argument is subscribed to because the 
appropriate sentencing framework must reflect deontological considerations.  
In response to the criticism of imprecision leveled against deontological 
proportionality, it is noteworthy that all judgements are approximate and imprecise 
and that while the law operates in standardized templates, it does permit certain 
deviations in some circumstances.
75
 Furthermore, bearing in mind that child judges 
are legally trained and not social scientists and are in a better position to evaluate 
crime seriousness than they are to gauge reoffending and the treatment potential of 
children,
76
 deontological proportionality when compared to consequentialism is a 
veritable tool in child justice sentencing.  
Corroborating this view, Wood argues that since the deontological measures 
are by their very nature necessarily harsh and unpleasant to the recipients, such 
intrusive measures are solely needed for their backward-looking retributivist and not 
forward-focused reformative purposes.
77
 To ensure fair and equal payback for the 
offender’s conduct, the severity of punishment must connote and convey the amount 
of blame directly in consonance with the alleged misconduct. Unlike any other 
theory of proportionality, the key question in arriving at a fair punishment from a 
deontological sense is how much to punish offenders for the crimes committed and 
not for crimes foreseen to be committed.  
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Despite the role of deontological proportionality in mitigating the harshness 
of judicial sentencing and the intrusion of penal sanctions on rights, the principle has 
been sternly criticized for being prone to varied interpretations, clogged with factual 
and moral misjudgements and incapable of withstanding scrutiny.
78
 Bagaric argues 
further that the principle does not facilitate uniform sanctions for like offenses and 
does not provide a meaningful guide to sentences because of its weak definition and 
application.
79
  
Several proponents of proportionality have countered Bagaric’s argument and 
contend that deontological proportionality focuses attention on the severity of 
punishment being imposed on the child offender. As a deliberate design and an 
essential tool in judicial sentencing, the principle is intentionally circumscribed 
loosely and is non-prescriptive of the exact quantum of punishment in order to 
enable its application to a multiplicity of scenarios, facts and actors.
80
  
 
4.3.3 Deontological Proportionality: Basis for Child Justice 
As a basis for child justice, deontological proportionality has been described 
as the moral and legal scaffolding for arriving at a just punishment for children in 
conflict with the law based specifically on their age and maturity.
81
 In a similar vein, 
it has also been observed that deontological proportionality in child justice, also 
known as the retributive theory of child justice, integrates the principle of 
proportionality in the administration of child justice and ensures that children in 
conflict with the law deserve reduced punishment.
82
  
Walgrave postulates that deontological proportionality in the context of child 
justice draws a balance between treatment and punishment in response to youth 
crime.
83
 Akin to this, von Hirsch proposes that at all points on the penalty scale of 
child offenses, a reasonable proportion should be maintained between the quantum 
of punishment, the gravity of the conduct and the degree of culpability.
84
 He 
postulates further that deontological proportionality in the context of child justice 
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involves the consideration of the ‘ordinal’ and ‘cardinal’ ingredients of 
proportionality.  
In the first place, for child punishment to be commensurate with the gravity 
of the offense and in tune with deontological conception of proportionality, it must 
be ordinal and ensure parity with the culpability of the child offender. On the other 
hand, since the culpability of children in conflict with the law differs from that of 
adult offenders even though they commit similar offenses, the permissible deviation 
in child justice highlights the mitigated culpability of children in conflict with the 
law.
85
  
Deontological proportionality in the context of child justice is thus inclined 
towards drawing the boundary of what an adequate punishment for a child offender 
is. Writing within the context of the African human rights framework, Malley opines 
that even when equity mitigates the harshness of the law, there may still be a 
miscarriage of the law for children in conflict with the law through procedural and 
structural variables.
86
 He postulates that the principle of proportionality is a key 
modality in averting and mitigating the harshness and potentially the unintended 
consequences of substantive and procedural laws applicable to child delinquency.
87
   
Similarly, Fox maintains that retribution blends with the deontological 
principle of proportionality to guide the allocation of punishment for child offenses 
and offenders. Accordingly, although punishment should be commensurate to the 
seriousness of the offense, there is a pertinent need for a reduction in the severity of 
the punishment with regard to mitigating factors personal to the child offender.
88
 In 
so far as retribution justifies punishment for child wrongdoing, it nevertheless 
requires a deontological consideration of mitigating factors in determining 
proportionate punishment for the child offender.  
By the same token, Burgh noted that retribution in child justice must as a rule 
evaluate whether its application in a particular case generates results consistent with 
the deontological principle of proportionality.
89
 von Hirsch is a vehement protagonist 
of deontological proportionality and is supportive of deontological proportionality in 
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child justice as well. He argues that for children in conflict with the law to deserve 
punishment, their lesser culpability and the impact of punishment on them must be 
thoroughly evaluated.
90
 In actual fact, the reduced punishment of children in conflict 
with the law ought to be hinged on their lesser degree of culpability exemplified in 
their lesser capacity to appreciate the harmful effects of criminal action. As such, 
severe punishment for children in conflict with the law overstates blame because it 
responds to them with culpability far beyond what is proportionate.  
Conversely, and while writing in the context of the United States, von 
Hirsch’s argument for the abolition of separate child courts and in their place courts 
of general jurisdiction to process child cases and apply separate and milder 
sentencing standards is contestable.
91
 The fact that he may seem to propose courts of 
general jurisdiction operating equally with special jurisdiction to hear child cases is 
inconsonant with several legal systems and jurisdictions of developing countries 
such as Nigeria. In these countries, there is a stark absence of well-defined 
sentencing guidelines for child justice administration except for the substantive 
Criminal Procedure Codes.  
Other erudite scholars bring additional perspectives to the debate on 
deontological proportionality in the context of child justice. According to Feld, 
because the idea of deserved punishment emphasizes culpability, criminal law 
confronts in a special way the case of those who are criminally responsible, yet 
manifestly impaired, mentally ill or developmentally different from competent adult 
offenders.
92
 He argues that the developmental limitation that impinges on the 
culpability of mentally ill offenders applies to children in conflict with the law 
because they are less competent decision-makers and thus require greater protection 
than adults because of their immaturity. In supporting this dictum, the United States 
case of Thompson v Oklahoma held that:  
[L]ess culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile 
than to a comparable crime committed by an adult… Inexperience, 
less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to 
evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same 
time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion 
or peer pressure than an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not 
                                                          
90
 Andrew von Hirsch, ‘Proportionate Sentences for Juveniles: How Different’ (2001) Punishment & 
Society 221 
91
 In an earlier writing, von Hirsch notes that the justification for penal differentiation between 
children and adult offenders must be based not just on children’s greater sensitivity to punishment, but 
also on  age-related normative expectations for judging the behavior of a young person’. See Andrew 
von Hirsch, ‘Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment: From ‘Why Punish’ to ‘How Much’? 
(1991) 25 Israel Law Review 549 
92
 Barry C Feld, ‘Competence, Culpability, And Punishment: Implications of Atkins For Executing 
And Sentencing Adolescents’ (2003)  32 Hofstra Law Review  646 
100 
 
trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also 
explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally 
reprehensible as that of an adult.
93
  
This decision accords with the postulation of Barry to the effect that 
notwithstanding that children are capable of inflicting blameworthy harm by their 
conduct, their actions connote and carry less culpability than those of adults. The 
logic behind this argument is that if the law acts paternalistically to impose 
contractual disabilities on a young person vis-à-vis adults because of his or her 
inexperience and immaturity, it will amount to a double standard if the law treats the 
culpability of adults and young offenders equally.  
Similarly, due to the fact that children are not endowed with rational 
cognitive capacity nor self-control and volitional capacity equivalent to that of 
adults, it is inappropriate to hold them equally accountable and responsible for their 
conduct as adults. Ristroph added some perspectives to deontological proportionality 
in child justice. Although his conception of deontological proportionality was 
adduced in the specific context of the constitutionality of the State of California’s 
‘three strikes’ policy, it is, however, relevant to an understanding of deontological 
proportionality in child justice.  
According to him, proportionality in the context of child justice presupposes 
that all sentences are ameliorable to the extent that punishment which would 
normally be regarded as commensurate to the gravity of an offense may be alleviated 
in consequence of the factors personal to the offender’s circumstances.94 In other 
words, the principle of proportionality is a mitigating factor in child justice and is 
generally anchored in the age and immaturity of the child offender.
95
  
According to O’Hear, the principle of proportionality shapes the fairness of 
the child justice system and its response to child delinquency by imposing 
punishment that is proportionate to the culpability of the child offender.
96
 The 
principle is also based on the assumption that young offenders are not morally 
blameworthy or accountable for their faults because of their reduced mental 
development.
97
 
In the context of child justice, deontological proportionality makes a 
paradigm shift and focuses not only on the offense but most importantly on the 
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offender. Accordingly, factors personal to the child offender’s circumstances and 
which serve to mitigate the harshness of retributive justice such as the child’s age, 
immaturity and culpability must be considered. As a derivative of the above-
mentioned, consequentialist and deontological theoretical strains of proportionality 
in the sphere of child justice sometimes intersect to the extent that it is not unusual to 
observe a mixture of the forward-looking disposition of consequentialist 
proportionality and the backward-looking thread of deontological proportionality in 
contemporary child justice systems. In the particular context of child justice, 
proportional punishment is deontological because amongst other things, human 
rights standards are by their very nature deontological. 
 
4.4 Normative Framework of Proportionality in Child Justice 
The principle of proportionality is a key feature and central plank of child 
justice jurisprudence. As with other legal principles, scholars contend that the 
principle is based on a normative framework articulated through several international 
and regional human rights norms and child specific instruments.
98
 Deontological 
proportionality in the context of child justice is evident in the CRC. Article 40(4) 
enjoins state parties to:  
[T]reat every child alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having 
infringed the penal law in a manner appropriate to the well-being 
of the child and proportionate both to their circumstances and the 
offense.
 99
  
The deontological inclination of the CRC’s child justice framework lends 
credence to the primacy of the principle in child justice administration. The 
convention enjoins state parties to treat every child in an appropriate and 
proportionate manner having regard for the offense and well-being of the child. 
According to Balmer, the underlying normative strength of Article 40(4) of the CRC 
is the phrase ‘manner appropriate to the well-being of the child and proportionate 
both to their circumstances and the offense’. This normative framework enjoins 
consideration of circumstantial issues by the court including the culpability of the 
child offender, his or her immediate environment or mental state, the nature of the 
injury to the victim and ultimately the quantum of the punishment to be imposed.
100
   
Unlike the CRC, the ACRWC deductively articulated proportionality in a 
deontological perspective. While proportionality is expressly mentioned in Article 
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40(4) of the CRC, the reverse is the case with respect to all the articles of the 
ACRWC including the section relating to the administration of child justice. The 
closest to the principle of proportionality in the ACRWC states that:  
Every child accused or found guilty of having infringed the penal 
law shall have the right to special treatment in a manner consistent 
with the child’s sense of dignity and worth and which reinforces 
the child’s respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
others.
101
 
Although the ACRWC does not specifically mention proportionality in 
Article 17(1) and other provisions relating to child justice, deontological 
proportionality in the African child justice normative framework is inferable. The 
phrase ‘the right to special treatment in a manner consistent with the child’s sense of 
dignity and worth’ is arguably an African-centric conception of proportionality.  
Excavating the reason why the principle was not expressly mentioned in the 
ACRWC is outside the ambit of this thesis, however, it may be speculated that the 
age-long and undocumented African traditional belief and practice of mitigated 
response to childhood misdeed on the basis of their emotional immaturity and 
development can account for this omission.
102
  
Certainly, the omission of proportionality in the ACRWC is by no means 
suggestive of the unimportance of the principle in the African child justice 
framework. Bearing in mind that the principle plays a pivotal role in the adjudication 
of child rights, its significance in the continent cannot be over emphasized. While the 
express articulation of deontological proportionality under the ACRWC may not be 
adjudged adequate, the same cannot be said of the United Nations Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice.
103
  
The deontological slant of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Administration of Juvenile Justice is evident in Rule 5 and its commentary. As a 
mechanism for ensuring deontological proportionality, Rule 5 calls for no less and no 
more than a fair reaction in any given case of child delinquency and crime. It 
underlines the well-being of the child and proposes that any reaction to a child 
offender shall always be in proportion to the circumstances of both the offender and 
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offense.
104
 Furthermore and in confirmation of the deontological proportionality 
inclination, commentary 5.1 considers proportionality as an instrument for curbing 
punitive sanctions and refers to the principle as one of the most important objectives 
of child justice. The commentary goes further to elaborate on the deontological 
inclination of the Rule to the effect that: 
The response to young offenders should be based on the 
consideration not only of the gravity of the offense but also of 
personal circumstances. The individual circumstances of the 
offender (for example social status, family situation, the harm 
caused by the offence or other factors affecting personal 
circumstances) should influence the proportionality of the 
reactions (for example by having regard to the offender's 
endeavour to indemnify the victim or to her or his willingness to 
turn to a wholesome and useful life).
105
 
By the same token and acknowledging that there is an apparent possibility 
that certain reactions aimed at ensuring the welfare of young offenders may go 
beyond necessity and therefore infringe upon child rights, any judicial reaction 
against children is expected to accommodate the tripartite of the offender, the offense 
and the victim. Rule 6 (1) of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice provides that:  
In view of the varying special needs of juveniles as well as the 
variety of measures available, appropriate scope for discretion 
shall be allowed at all stages of proceedings and at the different 
levels of child justice administration, including investigation, 
prosecution, adjudication and follow-up dispositions. 
The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of 
Juvenile Justice combine several important, fair and humane features of child justice 
administration to allow the exercise of discretionary powers and by extension, 
proportionate balancing at all stages of judicial processing. This is to enable those 
who are charged with decision-making pertaining to a child to take the necessary 
actions deemed to be most appropriate in each individual case. To provide 
deontological guidance to a competent authority in the exercise of its discretionary 
powers, Rule 16 requires that adequate social services should be available to deliver 
social inquiry reports of a qualified nature. It states further that: 
In all cases except those involving minor offences, before the 
competent authority renders a final disposition prior to sentencing, 
the background and circumstances in which the juvenile is living 
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or the conditions under which the offence has been committed 
shall be properly investigated so as to facilitate judicious 
adjudication of the case by the competent authority.
106
   
Deontology proportionality, which in practice is the hallmark of child justice, 
could be deciphered from Rule 17 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Administration of Juvenile Justice. It provides that in all cases of adjudication 
and disposition, the competent authority shall ensure that the reaction taken against a 
child shall always be in tandem not only with the circumstances and the gravity of 
the offense, but also with the circumstances and the needs of the child as well as the 
needs of the society.  
While the proportionality principle under the foregoing instruments and laws 
under consideration may have taken account of the child’s individual levels of 
responsibility, the finding is that in all these instruments and laws, their inclination to 
deontology is evident. This conclusion is based on the premise that the above 
instruments and laws impose an obligation on the courts to evaluate and analyze the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of every child offender. According to Fontaine, the 
consideration of the extraneous characteristics and circumstances of the offender 
presuppose that, to the extent possible, child sanctions should view desert as 
necessary but not sufficient to justify punishment that is without recourse to the 
culpability of child offenders.
107
 
In this sense and to ensure that the finding of delinquency is in accordance 
with the law, punishment is expected not to exceed the maximum or jurisdictional 
limits prescribed by enabling law, having regard for the totality of the child 
offender’s circumstances and the prerequisite need for his/her rehabilitation. 
Consequently, and in line with Frase’s argument, the normative basis of the principle 
of proportionality which is equated to equilibrium,
108
 enjoins the courts in 
delinquency proceedings to closely consider any and all mitigating factors that may 
potentially reduce the subjective culpability of the delinquent.
109
  
Defining proportionality as a limitation on the scope and quantum of penal 
options available to a court in delinquency proceedings, and on the basis of the 
analysis of the foregoing human rights instruments, the normative framework of 
proportionality in child justice is deontological. Also, the centrality of deontological 
proportionality in the normative framework of child justice is further buttressed by 
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the fact that child justice is within child rights which are by their very nature 
inherently deontological. On grounds of deontological proportionality, the 
culpability of children in conflict with the law should not be measured only by the 
amount of harm caused by the child offender or the impact of his or her offense on 
the victim or society, but also on his or her mitigated culpability.  
Thus, in determining the culpability of children in conflict with the law, the 
issue confronting the court is how to determine to what extent and in what ways the 
immaturity of the child offender could be taken into consideration in arriving at an 
appropriate and mitigated punishment. The tool for navigating this delicate balance 
is proportionality. As one of the twin pillars of child justice, proportionality directs 
that punishment meted to a child offender should be proportionate not only to the 
latitude prescribed by law and the amount of harm caused to the victim and society at 
large, but also to the culpability of the offender. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Having examined the principle of proportionality in the particular context of 
child justice and also as an invaluable sentencing tool, the chapter found that the 
conceptual overview of proportionality presupposes that punishment must fit the 
crime and the culpability of the offender. After examining the backward-looking and 
forward-looking classification of proportionality, this chapter found that 
deontological proportionality is the overarching principle and basis for child justice.  
In rationalizing proportionality as the key plank of child justice and also as 
rights of children in conflict with the law, the chapter traced the normative 
foundation of proportionality and its deontological strand to international and 
regional child specific instruments. Comparing the proportionality provisions in the 
CRC and other child rights instruments, vis-à-vis the ACRWC, this chapter observed 
that even though the ACRWC provision of proportionality is comparatively weak 
and merely deductive, the relevance of the principle in the African child justice 
framework is nevertheless important.  The chapter found that in the supervening 
interest of justice, children in conflict with the law should not be held to the same 
evaluative standards by which adult culpability and punishment are judged. Rather, 
children in conflict with the law should receive proportionately less punishment than 
adults for the same crimes because of their immaturity and vulnerability.  
Having established the importance of proportionality in child justice and 
bearing in mind that the principle has been elevated to one of the twin pillars of child 
justice, this thesis will therefore move to examine the other principle of child rights 
that complements the principle of proportionality to form the twin pillars of child 
justice. 
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Chapter Five  
The Principle of the Best Interests of the Child 
 
5.1 Introduction  
While the preceding chapter examined the principle of proportionality as one 
of the twin pillars of child justice, this chapter examines the principle of the best 
interests of the child as the second pillar of child justice. It also identifies the 
normative foundation of the principle of the best interests of the child particularly in 
the context of child justice. The chapter acknowledges the arguments that impinge on 
the application of the principle of the best interests of the child and the possibility 
that it may entertain diverse interpretations of a single fact. However, after due 
exploration of the principle, particularly in the context of child justice, this chapter 
argues that the principle of the best interests of the child is the second pillar of child 
justice and a worthwhile balancing tool at the disposal of courts while processing 
children in conflict with the law.  
 
5.2 Overview of the Principle of the Best Interests of the Child 
In the nineteenth century, children were not considered as independent right 
holders, and as such, the concept of child rights and its promotion and protection 
both within the family and society were almost nonexistent.
1
  The twentieth century 
paradigm shift enabled the state to protect children as independent beings and on the 
basis of their best interests.
2
 The emergence of the twentieth century came with 
dedicated laws to protect children on the basis of their best interests.
3
 In 
Goonesekere’s view, the introduction of the law of equity mitigated the harshness of 
common law by boosting the notion of child rights through the intervention of the 
crown on the grounds of the best interests of the child.
4
  
Whilst the principle of the best interests of the child is an age-long notion in 
family law traceable to both English and French laws,
5
 it delimits, in the context of 
child justice, how courts are to treat children in conflict with the law. According to 
Archard, the principle of the best interests of the child has featured in diverse areas 
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of law but more pivotally in family law, particularly in custody disputes.
6
 Wayne, 
among several authors, has tried to give meaning to the principle of the best interests 
of the child. Even though he did so in the context of family law, he described it as a 
prediction of what among available alternatives, holds the most promise for meeting 
the child’s holistic needs.7  
Also linking the history of the principle of the best interests of the child to 
family law, it has been argued that the principle is used in the sphere of child 
protection and child rights to influence decisions relating to children.
8
 Accentuating 
and clarifying on the principle further, Joyce considered it to be a method of making 
decisions that requires the decision-maker to think what the best course of action is 
for the child.
9
 In her opinion, the principle does not presuppose the personal views of 
the decision-maker, but rather, compels the decision-maker to consider both the 
current and future interests of the child, weigh them up and decide which course of 
action is, on balance probabilities is in the best interests of the child.
10
  
Elucidating further the principle outside the boundaries of family law, Parker 
argues that the principle of the best interests of the child provides the framework for 
evaluating the laws and practices of state parties where the matter is not governed by 
positive rights in the convention.
11
 Despite its origin in family law and by extension 
its incidental welfare inclination, the content and significance of the principle of the 
best interests of the child has transited over the years out of the family law domain. 
At present, the principle, having become entrenched in several international and 
regional human rights instruments and laws, is prevalent in several areas of law but 
is particularly more dominant in the area of human rights generally and child justice 
in particular.   
According to Ihua-Maduenyi, the principle presupposes that the best be done 
for the child,
12
 and for Buchanan and Brock, the principle maximally promotes the 
good of the child.
13
 Writing within the framework of the CRC, Kohem argues that 
the principle of the best interests of the child has been elevated to a fundamental 
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element of the CRC.
14
 In calibrating the weight to be ascribed to the best interests 
principle and postulating within the framework of the CRC, Archard opines that the 
terms ‘paramount’ and ‘primary’ are used with either the definite or indefinite 
articles and the words ‘a’ and ‘the’ are key in construing the weight to be accorded to 
the best interests of the child.  
Archard identifies five possible weightings of the best interests of the child as 
‘the paramount’, ‘a paramount’ ‘the primary’, ‘a primary’ and ‘a consideration’. He 
argues that a consideration that is primary ranks first whereas a consideration that is 
paramount will trump all other considerations as the overarching determining 
factor.
15
 Lending his voice to the utmost importance of the principle, particularly in 
the context of child justice, Kaime argues that as a guiding principle of child justice, 
the principle of the best interests of the child has been a cardinal and heavily relied 
upon standard in the interpretation of state party obligations under the CRC.
16
 The 
principle is relied upon because it espouses the best and highest standards for the 
protection of children in conflict with the law.
17
  
Regardless of the inherent strengths of the principle of the best interests of 
the child, there are numerous criticisms against it. For instance, using the 
sociological theory of rational argumentation, Skivenes argues that the application of 
the principle has weakened the legal protection of children and parents and resulted 
in arbitrary and subjective decisions.
18
  He also posited that the principle is fluid and 
provides little guidance and guidelines on decision making.
19
  
Other legal writers such as Mnookin have faulted the principle of the best 
interests of the child on the grounds that what is best for any child or even children in 
general is often vague, speculative and requires a highly individualized choice 
between alternatives.
20
 He argues that determining the child’s best interests is 
synonymous with predicting results and consequences that are difficult to access.
21
 
Along the same lines, Freeman also argues that the indeterminacy of the principle is 
derived from the fact that while the best interests standard is upheld, other 
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considerations can permeate the ‘smoke screen’ and corrupt the application of the 
principle.
22
  
Criticizing the principle further on cultural and religious grounds, Buchanan 
and Brock argue that the universal application of the principle may not produce 
similar results because the best interests interpretation in the case of two different 
children may be discordant with regard to the cultural and future interests of the 
children.
23
 Arguing also on the grounds of the cultural frailties of the principle, 
Eekelaar noted that the principle of the best interests of the child is subject to cultural 
relativity.
24
 Alluding to this, Freeman posits that the principle is incongruous because 
it neither creates rights nor imposes duties and is subject to unpredictable 
interpretation.
25
  
Arguing that the principle is pregnable with prejudices and susceptible to 
swaying influence of contemporary dominant meanings, Freeman maintains further 
that the principle could easily be limited by other rights and principles since the best 
interests of the child is not the determining consideration, but only a primary 
consideration which permits of other considerations.
26
 Mnookin added a skeptical 
voice to the principle when he observed that the principle is indeterminate, fraught 
with formidable preference problems. He noted that: 
The conditions that make a person happy at age seven to ten may 
have adverse consequences at age thirty. Should the judge ask 
himself what decision will make the child happy in the next year? 
Or at thirty? Or at seventy? Should the judge decide by thinking 
about the decision the child as an adult looking back would have 
wanted to make? In this case, the preference problem is 
formidable, for how is the judge to compare ‘happiness’ at one age 
with ‘happiness’ at another age?27 
While there may be valid points in the antagonism of these writers towards 
the principle of the best interests of the child, it is pertinent to emphasize they are 
made in the context of family law in general and custody disputes and medical 
decisions affecting children in particular. Since none of these criticisms was made in 
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the explicit situation of child justice, the alleged drawbacks of the principle by the 
writers in question cannot be extended to erode the potency of the best interests of 
the child specifically at the sentencing stage, and as a sentencing tool.  Conceding 
that the travaux preparatoires of the CRC envisaged exceptions to the application of 
the principle of the best interests of the child on certain grounds such as medical 
emergencies, the same cannot be said in the particular context of child justice for 
children in conflict with the law.  
Consequently and in the context of child justice in general and sentencing in 
particular, it is erroneous to argue that the best interests of the child are capable of 
being overridden by other circumstances and considerations, including the interest of 
justice. As a standard-setting principle for the exercise of the court’s discretional 
powers in multifarious situations, the principle does not need to be stiffly 
determinate, rigidly specific or certain. In the context of child sentencing, the best 
interests of the child is the universal principle that traverses multiple cultures and 
guides judicial sentencing of children in conflict with the law.
28
  
On the basis of the foregoing, the principle of the best interests of the child, 
particularly in the context of sentencing is the framework that guides child courts in 
the application of the rights of children in conflict with the law. Likewise, the 
principle is the framework through which courts are guided in the determination of 
the least detrimental cause of action for the survival and development of the child 
offender.
29
  This principle applies to the extent that any outcome of such hearing 
including the sentence imposed by the court ought not to offend the letter and spirit 
of relevant international and regional child justice instruments and laws.  
Consequently, the principle of the best interests of the child in the context of 
child justice in general and sentencing in particular is defined as those written, 
unwritten and extraneous long and immediate term considerations, which the court 
must explore in determining and arriving at an informed decision on a course of 
action for or against a child offender. Such a course of action in the best interests of 
the child must be appropriate for a child in conflict with the law, and would 
unavoidably facilitate his or her eventual positive development as an independent 
being.  
This working definition accords with the position of the concluding 
observation of the committee overseeing the implementation of the CRC, which 
suggests that the determination of the best interests of the child involves a holistic 
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assessment and evaluation of all legislation and policy directives.
30
 Akin to this 
postulation, Tobin posits that a proposed outcome for a child cannot be said to be in 
his or her best interests where it conflicts with the provisions of the convention.
31
 
Accentuating this fact, Freeman states that, since the best interests principle in 
Article 3 of the CRC is preceded by Article 2, the application of the best interests 
principle is the overarching framework of rights recognized in the CRC.
32
 
 
5.3 The Best Interests of the Child versus the Interests of Justice 
Under the CRC, the best interests of the child permit other considerations 
since it is 'a primary consideration' rather than ‘the primary’ or ‘the paramount’ 
consideration. As such, there are circumstances in which other interests including the 
interests of justice might collide with the child’s best interests. In the context of child 
justice, the best interests principle is the child rights framework to protect children in 
conflict with the law because of their vulnerability. As a principle that presupposes a 
focus on the need and circumstances of the child offender rather than on the 
characteristics of the penal sanction, the best interests of the child in the just-deserts 
worldview entails the balancing of two important precepts for protecting society 
against criminal behavior and paying special attention to the personal circumstances 
of the child offender.
33
  
Conversely, the thrust of the interest of justice is that individuals, including 
children, are reasoning agents and should be responsible and accountable for their 
actions before the law. As an exception to the interests of justice, the best interests of 
the child allows particularly in the context of child justice, the treatment of children 
in a special way due to their mitigated culpability. Hence, when a child enters the 
child justice system, one of the most important considerations of the court is what 
impact would the child justice proceedings have on the rest of the child’s life. 
Therefore, and in affirmation of Arteaga’s postulation, the court or any 
administrative agency must be mindful of delicately balancing the interests of justice 
and by necessary extension, the necessity for society to be protected against crime 
and the overarching best interests of the child to have a fulfilling life post-offense.
34
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As an exception to the interests of justice, the principle of the best interests of 
the child has been criticized from numerous fronts. LaFave posits that the principle is 
‘raising more questions than answers and counterproductive in some respects’.35 
Equally, Wolfson argues that without a consensus as to a clear dividing line between 
the two interests, the courts are inclined to excuse their own viewpoints on what is 
best for the child.
36
 It has also been postulated that the best interests principle is 
susceptible to the personal values, beliefs and biases of the judge and is thus capable 
of diverting the cause of justice.
37
   
Furthermore and vis-à-vis the interests of justice, the principle of the best 
interests of the child is adjudged to be subjective, difficult to uniformly articulate and 
applied in the problematic ‘know it when I see it’ fashion.38 The principle has also 
been described as a nebulous and ill-defined standard that negates justice and opens a 
plethora of considerations and priorities.
39
 It has also been advocated that the 
principle of the best interests of the child vis-à-vis the interests of justice is so 
difficult to define to the extent that it has been omitted from the sixth edition of 
Black’s Law Dictionary and from other reference tools designed to translate legal 
terms into everyday language.
40
  
Appreciating the difficulties of understanding the meaning of the principle of 
the best interests of the child as a legal standard, Millar argues that the courts in 
seeking to achieve justice have been challenged by the fact that what is in the best 
interests of the child is fraught with unknown possibilities that are dependent on the 
unpredictable future vagaries of the child’s development.41 It was on this basis that 
Arteaga argues that the multiplicity of possible applications of the principle may 
likely pervert justice.
42
 Challenging the practical application of the best interests 
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principle as ‘the’ or ‘a’ primary consideration in actions concerning children, Smith 
argued that while the overreaching goal of the principle is treatment and 
rehabilitation,
43
 in practice, the  courts while adjudicating child offenders fail to meet 
the interest of justice.
44
  
Some other critical writers on the principle, such as Van Deusen, consider it 
to be an indeterminate standard without established legislative and judicial 
guidelines for its application, which thus leaves the courts with much unfettered 
discretion that accounts for undesirable and unpredictable justice outcomes.
45
   
Lending a critical voice against the principle vis-à-vis the interests of justice, Sarkwo 
also describes the best interests of the child as belonging to the category of the ‘test 
of a reasonable man’ or ‘reasonable person’ which disposes several judges to reach 
different results on what the reasonable man in law should or should not have done 
in a given factual circumstance.
46
  
As the antithesis of the interests of justice, the best interests of the child has 
been argued to be more of a sociological paradigm than a concrete juridical standard, 
the reason being that courts cannot assume what is in the best interests of the child 
without straying into the realm of assumptive, moral, social and attitudinal 
disposition of the child in question.
47
 In support of this view, it has been noted that in 
the delicate balancing of the best interests of the child and the interests of justice, 
legislative and judicial standards and guidance are not very clear cut,
48
 and that child 
courts are very speculative of what the best interests of the child are in practical 
terms.
49
  
Similarly, Wlster argues that the principle of the best interests of the child 
when applied by courts has the propensity to generate unjust decisions because child 
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courts will most likely not have the skills to be able to accurately predict acceptable 
preferences for children when they grow up.
50
 He argues further that in practice, the 
best interests principle is often formulated in a way that allows some scope for other 
criteria to the extent that the principle is deemed to be an unhelpful tool in reaching 
decisions.
51
  
The foregoing criticism against the principle of the best interests of the child 
may have been accentuated by the lack of legal literature and jurisprudence that have 
elaborated on the principle as is the case with the interests of justice. The above 
arguments against the principle of the best interests of the child notwithstanding, the 
principle is not impotent particularly in the context of child justice. As a cardinal 
principle in child justice and to mitigate the harshness of the interests of justice, the 
principle of the best interests of the child is pivotal and a useful tool in giving clear 
direction and guidance on what needs to be done by the courts in the treatment of 
children in conflict with the law.  
Although criticized in its generic application, the principle of the best 
interests of the child as applied in the context of child justice to mitigate the 
harshness of the interests of justice is undoubtedly an article of faith intentionally 
and elastically couched to capture the multiplicity of circumstances evident in 
delinquency proceedings. While remaining the best principle in navigating the maze 
of issues around delinquency proceeding due to its fact-driven focus, the principle 
presupposes that all relevant factors in the determination of delinquency are to be 
contextualized, considered and evaluated.
52
  
In that sense, the value added advantage of the principle of the best interests 
of the child has a flip side and ironically, it is this flip side that is inadvertently 
misconstrued to be its weakness. The indeterminacy of the principle is at the same 
time its potential strength in being a universally adaptable and applicable tool in 
child justice. Essentially, the principle is a deliberate and concrete effort to evade the 
problems which arise in every-day legal practice when a crucial element of the law is 
inelastic. To present the principle in any other form, would precipitate falling into the 
trap of overt rigidity of legislative and sentencing guidelines that is devoid of ample 
room for the human element inherent in judicial decision making. 
There is no doubt that rigid legislative guidance or an inflexible application 
of the principle of the best interests of the child will constrain judges from 
considering the context of a case or the individual characteristics of the child 
offender. As a very well-known philosophy, one of the aims of child justice is to 
ascertain the most effective way of rehabilitating the child into a productive law-
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abiding citizen. In realizing this goal, the interests of justice may differ from the best 
interests of the child because the needs and circumstances of children differ 
dramatically.  
As such, judges presiding over delinquency hearings require the kind of 
flexibility inherent in the principle of the best interests of the child so as to enable 
them to formulate particularized treatment that, although may not seemingly serve 
the interests of justice, should certainly serve the best interests of the child.
53
 Bearing 
in mind the lack of coherent legislative and judicial sentencing guidelines in 
balancing the somewhat irreconcilable interests of justice and the best interests of the 
child, the courts are duty-bound to make extensive finding of fact in regard to every 
point canvassed and in sentencing, delicately subject the interests of justice to the 
best interests of the child.  
Elster’s argument buttresses this view. He argues that there are no 
permissible instances where the courts will knowingly and deliberately jettison what 
is in the best interests of the child on the grounds that more general public interests 
such as interests of justice, the greater good of all and public policy considerations 
override the singular best interests of the child.
 54
 On the above premise, the view 
that there are circumstances where compensatory and retributive reasoning suggest 
that the interests of justice cannot be overlooked in the consideration of the best 
interests of the child is contestable.
55
  
While the committee on the implementation of the CRC recommends that the 
application of the best interests may require the prioritization of other interests,
56
 it is 
implicit in the jurisprudence of the committee that the need to balance other 
competing interests particularly in the context of child justice takes second place vis-
à-vis the application of the best interests principle. While noting that the best 
interests principle is not stipulated in absolute terms, the United States Federal 
Juvenile Delinquency Act
57
 (FJDA) provides the best known legislative effort at 
providing practical guidance in balancing what would be in the interests of justice 
and the best interests of the child. The guidance requires federal judges to consider 
certain statutory criteria of rehabilitative potential including the age and social 
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background of the child, the nature of the alleged offense, the extent and nature of 
the child’s prior delinquency record, etc.58  
In other words, for the purpose of a rehabilitative-orientated child justice 
system and in the event of tension between the best interests of the child and the 
interests of justice, the courts should in the absence of preconceived guidelines be 
enjoined to favor the best interests of the child as there is no safer way of ensuring 
and protecting the rights of children in conflict with the law. Similarly, although 
international and regional instruments and laws may not have provided clear-cut 
practice guidance as to how the courts should construe and balance the best interests 
of the child and the interests of justice in delinquency proceedings, the best interests 
of the child should, where there is a conflict, override the interest of justice. 
 
5.4 Normative Framework of the Best Interests of the Child 
The principle of the best interests of the child, unlike the principle of 
proportionality discussed in the previous chapter, lacks academic literature 
classifying it into deontological or consequential philosophies. While the reason for 
the gap in academic research is outside the scope of this thesis, it may be related to 
the origin of the principle of the best interests of the child, which is traceable to 
family law where sentencing and punishment is not usually applicable. Furthermore, 
the principle of the best interests of the child has seldom been analyzed academically 
from the perspective of its role in the retention and justification of punishment and 
the key literature relating to the principle is seldom focused on its theoretical 
perspective.  
Based on the peculiar nature of human rights and the way and manner in 
which international and regional human rights instruments and laws have articulated 
the principle of the best interests of the child, this thesis will situate the principle 
within the deontological philosophical framework. One of the reasons for situating 
the principle of the best interests of the child within the deontological theory is that 
human rights in general and child rights in particular are by their very nature 
deontological. The principle of the best interests of the child in its stand-alone form 
provides a self-sustaining tool for analyzing and ensuring that children in conflict 
with the law receive equitable and fair judicial treatment. This view is supported by 
the postulation of Kaime to the effect that the principle of the best interests of the 
child sets out the legal parameters and what decisions affecting children should entail 
and consider.
59
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5.4.1 International Framework for the Best Interests of the Child 
The introduction of the principle of the best interests of the child in 
international law dates back to 1924 when the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of 
the Child was adopted.
60
 The declaration recognized that mankind owes to the child 
the best that it has to give and that in the enactment of laws for this purpose, the best 
interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration.
61
 After 1924 and prior to 
the promulgation of the CRC, several international treaties dealing with human rights 
generally and child rights in particular captured cursorily, the best interests of the 
child through protective languages such as promoting the ‘greatest well-being of the 
child’ and the ‘welfare of the child’.  
The flavor of the principle of the best interests of the child could also be 
tasted slightly in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
62
 Although the 
UDHR mainstreams the rights of children within its overall framework, Article 2 
states that the rights set out in the declaration are for all ‘without distinction of any 
kind’. Whilst age was not part of the distinctions mentioned, the UDHR went further 
to provide that motherhood and childhood are to be entitled to special care and 
assistance and children born out of wedlock are to enjoy the same social protection. 
After the adoption of the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) were adopted. None of these instruments mentioned the best 
interests of the child except for the inferences that could be drawn from the 
provisions generally relating to children.  
Setting aside the superficial consideration of the principle of the best interests 
of the child by the above-mentioned instruments and laws, the first human rights 
instrument to specifically employ the term the ‘best interests of the child’ is the 1959 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child. The declaration while proclaiming that 
mankind owes to children the best it has to give states in its principle 2 that:  
The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given 
opportunities and facilities, by law and by other means, to enable 
him to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and 
socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of 
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freedom and dignity. In the enactment of laws for this purpose, the 
best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration.
63
     
Thereafter, the principle of the best interests of the child was strengthened 
through the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women.
64
 Article 16(1)(d) of the CEDAW requires state 
parties to ensure that the interests of children are paramount and the primordial 
consideration in all cases. Furthermore, and in the context of adoption and foster 
placement, the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection 
and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption 
Nationally and Internationally, proposed the best interests of the child as a 
paramount consideration.
65
 
The principle of the best interests of the child further gained renewed 
prominence specifically in the context of child justice through the adoption of the 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, 
otherwise known as the ‘Beijing Rules’.66 Adopting the ‘well-being’ language, the 
‘Beijing Rules’ provide that the child justice system shall emphasize the well-being 
of the juvenile offender and further call for adequate attention towards full 
mobilization of all resources for the purpose of promoting their well-being. The 
‘Beijing Rules’ also used the term ‘wellbeing’ in the context of investigation and 
prosecution of children in conflict with the law and provide that contact between the 
law enforcement agencies and a child offender shall be managed in such a way as to 
promote the well-being of the juvenile.
67
  
Also, the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of 
their Liberty, adopted after the ‘Beijing Rules’, also did not use the phrase the ‘best 
interests of the child’.  Rather, they interchangeably used the phrase ‘well-being’ of 
juveniles and provide that the child justice system should uphold the rights and 
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promote the physical and mental well-being of children.
68
 Unlike the United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice and the United 
Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty which uses 
the phrase ‘well-being of the juvenile’ respectively, the United Nations Guidelines 
for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, otherwise known as ‘The Riyadh 
Guidelines’, uses both the ‘wellbeing of young persons’ and ‘best interests of young 
persons.’  
In the context of the ‘best interests’ language, the Riyadh Guidelines provide 
that the institutionalization of young persons should be a measure of last resort, for 
the minimum necessary period and the best interests of the young person should be 
of paramount importance. In adopting the phrase ‘wellbeing’ the Riyadh Guidelines 
also provides as its fundamental principles, the safeguarding of the overall interest 
and well-being of young persons, the physical and mental well-being of children and 
the promotion of the rights and well-being of all young persons.
69
 
The adoption of the United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child in 
1990 consolidated the normative framework of the principle of the best interests of 
the child as the predominant language of the convention.
70
 As an omnibus clause, 
Article 3(1) permeates the length and breadth of the CRC and prescribes the general 
rule to be followed in all actions concerning children. These include all actions that 
affect children directly or indirectly and even when the child is not the object of the 
decision. While the best interests of the child are a primary consideration in all 
actions concerning children, they extend to decision-making by legislative, 
administrative, judicial authorities and other institutions. There is no right recognized 
in the CRC that is not impacted by the best interests of the child principle.  
Also, the committee on the implementation of the CRC has declared that the 
best interests of the child is a guiding principle of the entire convention with a 
pervading effect on the application and interpretation of the convention.
71
 In 
describing the permeating effect and importance of the principle in all matters 
                                                          
68
 UN General Assembly, United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their 
Liberty 14 December 1990; See also A.D. Viccica, ‘Promotion and Protection of Children's Rights 
through Development and Recognition of an International Notion of Juvenile Justice and Its Child-
Centered Perspective in the United Nations’ (1989) 58 Nordic Journal of International Law 68  
69
 UN General Assembly, United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, 14 
December 1990 Guidelines 5(c)(d), 12, 46 and 52; See also Barry Goldson and Gordon Hughes, 
‘Sociological Criminology and Youth Justice: Comparative Policy Analysis and Academic 
intervention’ (2010) 10 Criminology and Criminal Justice 211 
70
 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child 20 November 1989; See also David 
A. Balton, ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child: Prospects for International Enforcement’ (1990) 
12 Human Rights Quarterly 120; Jonathan Todres, ‘Emerging Limitations on the Rights of the Child: 
The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child and Its Early Case Law’ (1999) 30 Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review 159 
71
 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) UN Committee on the Rights of the Child: Report 
on the Forty-first Session   12 May 2006 12 
120 
 
concerning children, the United Nations Human Rights Committee describes the 
principle of best interests of the child as ‘the paramount interests of the child’72 
The first paragraph of Article 3 of the CRC enunciates the best interests 
principle, whereas the second paragraph imposes an obligation on state parties to 
take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures to ensure children’s well-
being. Equally, the third paragraph imposes an obligation on state parties to ensure 
that those responsible for the care and protection of children conform to the 
standards established by competent authorities. Article 3(1) of the CRC which is 
deontological in nature because it focuses on the moral appropriateness of any 
intervention against children and the achievement of a just outcome, provides that: 
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or 
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative 
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall 
be a primary consideration 
The formulation of Article 3(1) of the CRC according to Couzens suggests 
that the best interests of the child principle apply to both cases concerning individual 
children as well as to decisions concerning children as a group.
73
 This position is 
supported by legal commentators as well as the committee on the implementation of 
the CRC on the basis that using the plural ‘children’ as opposed to the singular 
‘child’ in the first part of Article 3(1) suggests the applicability of the principle to 
children as a group as well as to an individual child.
74
 According to Alston, the use 
of the plural word seems to indicate an intention to achieve a broad rather than 
narrow coverage for the best interests principle. He postulated further that Article 
3(1) supports, justifies and clarifies issues arising out of the convention.
75
 The 
committee on the implementation of the CRC endorses this interpretation and further 
holds that the principle of the best interests of the child is a mediating principle and a 
tool for resolving competing rights within the framework of the convention.
76
  
On the strength of the above Articles of the CRC and because of the fact that 
the best interests of the child shall be of primary consideration in all actions 
concerning children, it may thus be argued that the consideration of the best interests 
of the child in the treatment of children in conflict with the law is a CRC right as 
well as a cardinal principle in child justice. Being that it is a convention right, state 
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parties are to undertake all appropriate legislative and any other measures for its 
implementation.
77
 The committee on the implementation of the CRC accedes to this 
interpretation and requires that states provide information: 
On how the best interests of the child have been given priority 
consideration in family life, school life, social life and in areas 
such as: Budgetary allocations, including at the central, regional 
and local levels, and where appropriate at the federal and 
provincial levels, and within governments departments; Planning 
and development policies, including housing, transport and 
environmental policies; Adoption: Immigration; asylum-seeking 
and refugee procedures; The administration of child justice; The 
placement and care of children in institutions; Social Security.
78
 
In the consideration of a state party report, the committee on the 
implementation of the CRC interpreted Article 3(1) as a general measure applicable 
for the implementation of all the provisions of the CRC. It states that: 
Every legislative, administrative and judicial body or institution is 
required to apply the best interest principle by systematically 
considering how children’s rights and interests are or will be 
affected by their decision or actions – by, for example, a proposed 
or existing law or policy or administrative action or court decision, 
including those which are not directly concerned with children, but 
indirectly affect children.
79
 
Indeed, Article 3 of the CRC has enumerated the institutions, administrative 
authorities and legislative bodies that must make the best interests of the child a 
primary consideration in all matters affecting children. On the basis of this article, it 
has been argued that although the principle applies to all actions, it is however 
limited to only official actions of those institutions or persons that come within its 
purview, thus excluding parents from its contemplation.
80
 This thesis argues that 
since the enumerated bodies under Article 3 are all inclusive without any exception, 
it is an untenable argument that certain bodies or agencies not mentioned in the CRC 
are exempted from adherence to the best interests of the child principle. The best 
interests of the child principle as it relates to parents is additionally found in Article 
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18(1) of the CRC which enjoins states parties to use their best efforts to ensure 
recognition of the principle of the best interests of the child as a basic concern.  
Based on the scope of Article 3 of the CRC and although no specific 
provision exists regarding the implications of derogation and non-compliance with 
the best interests of the child principle, it is trite to argue that the ambit of the 
principle is expansive. In addition to the key formulation of the principle of the best 
interests of the child in Article 3 of CRC, it should be pointed out that the principle 
appears in seven specific contexts in the CRC such as the separation of the child 
from the family 
 
(CRC Article 9), parental responsibility for the upbringing and 
development of the child (CRC Article 18), foster placement (CRC Article 20), 
adoption (CRC Article 21), deprivation of liberty (CRC Art. 37), and child justice 
(CRC Art. 40) where it is stated that every child accused of having infringed the 
penal law shall have his or her matter determined without delay in accordance with 
due process of the law in the presence of a legal representative unless the interests of 
the child determine otherwise.  
 
5.4.2 Regional Framework for the Best Interests of the Child 
The international instruments and laws described above positively influenced 
the European normative framework in the application of the principle of the best 
interests of the child and gave rise, for example, to child-specific provisions of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. The ECHR makes specific references to children in Article 5(1)(d), 
Article 6 and the First Optional Protocol of 1952. The ECHR is not couched 
specifically in the language of the best interests of the child except that in its 
preamble, it refers to ‘the inherent dignity and … equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family.’81 However the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights enjoins domestic courts to consider the interest and rights of all 
concerned and that in circumstances where the balancing of interests is necessary, 
the interests of the child must prevail.
82
  
Within the African continent, the ACRWC is influenced in its conception of 
rights of a child by the CRC because it adopts the language of the ‘best interests of 
the child’ and reaffirms adherence to the principles of the rights and welfare of the 
child.
83
 The omnibus Article of ACRWC on the principle of the best interests of the 
child is Article 4(1) which provides that ‘in all actions concerning the child 
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undertaken by any person or authority the best interests of the child shall be the 
primary consideration.’ The ACRWC mentions the phrase ‘best interests of the 
child’ in Article 20(1)(a) which tasks parents and other persons responsible for the 
upbringing and development of children to ensure that their best interests are their 
basic concern at all times.  
In respect of adoption, Article 24 of the ACRWC enjoins state parties to 
ensure that the best interests of the child is a paramount consideration. The principle 
is also provided in Article 9, in relation to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. It is also provided in Article 19 relating to parental care and protection and 
Article 25, in relation to separation from parents. Compared to the CRC, the 
language and scope of the principle of the best interests of the child in the ACRWC 
is broader and more elastic because it is couched in such generic and all-inclusive 
language. While the ACRWC considers the best interests of the child as the 
overarching consideration, the CRC regards it as ‘a primary consideration’, 
suggestive that it admits of other considerations.
84
 Contrasted with the CRC, which 
limits the application of the principle and excludes some domains such as family 
from the reach of the best interests principle, Article 4(1) of the ACRWC provides 
better protection for children since it captures the actions of any person or authority 
without making any distinction.
85
  
It should be emphasized that the principle of the best interests of the child is 
not mentioned in the Article of the ACRWC relating to the administration of child 
justice. Article 17(1) of the Charter states that:  
Every child accused or found guilty of having infringed penal law 
shall have the right to special treatment in a manner consistent with 
the child’s sense of dignity and worth and which reinforces the 
child’s respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
others.
86
  
Furthermore, Article 17(2) of the ACRWC prohibits torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. It also requires that state parties ensure that 
children are separated from adults in their place of detention or imprisonment and are 
presumed innocent until duly recognized guilty. Also, children are to be afforded 
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legal and other appropriate assistance in the preparation and presentation of their 
defense and shall have the matter determined as speedily as possible by an impartial 
tribunal. Article 17(3) stipulates that the essential aim of treatment of every child 
during the trial and also if found guilty of infringing the law shall be his or her 
reformation, re-integration into his or her family and social rehabilitation.
87
 
The reason for the omission of the principle of the best interests of the child 
in the child justice provision of the ACRWC is outside the immediate consideration 
of this thesis. However, it may be extrapolated that this was an unintentional 
oversight on the part of the drafters of the ACRWC, bearing in mind the importance 
accorded to the omnibus provisions of the principle in Article 4 of the ACRWC. Be 
that as it may, the oversight of not mentioning the best interests of the child in the 
article dealing with child justice under the ACRWC does not in any way undermine 
the importance of the principle in the administration of justice in the continent.  Like 
the committee on the implementation of the CRC, the committee on the 
implementation of the ACRWC has substantively expatiated on the scope of the 
principle of the best interests of the child.  
The committee on the implementation of the ACRWC mentioned specifically 
that the ACRWC is grounded on four main principles, including the principle on the 
best interest of the child. The committee specifically noted in its general comment 
three important aspects of the principle that should be upheld by all officials, 
including the justice official who might come into contact with a child or deal with a 
matter in which a child is involved. The committee stipulates that the principle of the 
best interests of the child relates to all actions concerning children and enjoins states 
parties to respect, protect and fulfil the best interests of children in all actions. 
Secondly, the committee interprets the principle of the best interests of the child as 
an obligation on all officials or persons that might come into contact with a child or 
deal with a matter in which a child is involved. Lastly, the committee opines that 
persons dealing with matters involving children should ensure the best interest of the 
child as the final outcome.
88
 
The normative conclusion that flows from the ambit of Article 4 of the 
ACRWC is that the principle permeates and impacts the interpretation and 
application of other articles of the charter and as such need not be specifically 
mentioned in the child justice provision to be operational and applicable thereto. 
According to Miller, the effect of Article 4 of the ACRWC vis-à-vis Article 17 is 
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that the principle of the best interests of the child connotes that any judicial decision 
taken against a child must protect him or her from harm.
89
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the principle of the best interests of the child in the 
particular context of child justice and found that irrespective of the flexible manner 
in which the principle is articulated in international and regional instruments, it is the 
overarching juristic tool at the disposal of courts in the treatment of children in 
conflict with the law. Whilst rationalizing the best interests of the child as the second 
pillar of child justice, and also as rights of children in conflict with the law, its 
normative foundation was traced to international and regional instruments.  
The chapter also examined the conceptual overview of the principle and 
noted the critical view that there is no consensus regarding the interpretation of the 
principle and the standards which a sentence must meet to be in the best interests of 
the child. This chapter argued that the principle of the best interests of the child is 
more efficacious in its loosely couched form because it makes it applicable to varied 
contexts and legal systems. The chapter noted that the needs and circumstances of 
children in conflict with the law differ, and the institution of child justice is 
committed to a theory of individualized justice. It argued that the human rights based 
approach to child justice requires that the discretional powers of the child court are 
defined elaborately and extensively to respond to the needs and not the deeds of the 
child offender.  
In conjunction with chapter four, this chapter found that the twin pillars of 
child justice regulate the treatment of children in conflict with the law and are an 
essential tool in the adjudication of rights of children in conflict with the law. It 
noted that the penal alleviative measures of the principle of proportionality combined 
with child-centric consideration of the principle of the best interests are the 
overarching rights-based juristic tool at the disposal of courts in the determination of 
delinquency.  
This chapter found that the principle is amply provided for in international 
and regional instruments and laws as an obvious manifestation of its importance in 
child rights generally and child justice in particular. Juxtaposing the general strength 
of the best interests provisions in CRC and the ACRWC, the chapter found that the 
latter provides a more elastic content than the former, because whilst the ACRWC 
considers the best interests of the child as the overarching consideration, the CRC 
regards it as a primary consideration invariably admitting of other considerations.  
In the particular context of child justice, the chapter found that the best 
interests provision of the ACRWC is weaker than the CRC because the principle was 
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not expressly mentioned in the ACRWC. This chapter also argued that the broad and 
expansive meaning of the best interests principle in Article 4 of the ACRWC extends 
to and strengthens the frail articulation of the principle in the child justice provision 
of the ACRWC.  
Having situated the twin pillars of child justice as encapsulating all other 
principles of child rights and also as the overarching rights-based juristic tool at the 
disposal of courts in the determination of delinquency, this thesis moves to the next 
chapter to calibrate the degree to which these twin pillars of child justice are 
legislated in the 2003 CRA of Nigeria. 
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Chapter Six 
Calibrating the Twin Pillars of Child Justice in the Child Rights Act 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Prior to 2003, the legal framework in Nigeria for child rights in general and 
child justice in particular was sprinkled across several federal and state laws, most 
especially the Children and Young Persons Act. The CYPA was initially a federal 
law but was later adopted as Children and Young Persons Laws of various states of 
the federation. Apart from the CYPA, other laws with an impact on children before 
2003 include the criminal code of various states of Southern Nigeria
1
 and the penal 
code of states of Northern Nigeria.
2
  
The first criminal code was introduced in Northern Nigeria in 1904. With the 
1914 amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates, it was made 
applicable to all the protectorates in Nigeria.
3
 Thereafter, in 1959, a specific penal 
code applicable only to the Northern Protectorate was enacted in consideration of 
their predominant and majority Muslim interests, values and standards.
4
 Other laws 
with an impact on child rights include the adoption, custody, guardianship, and 
matrimonial causes laws of the respective states.  
The above laws individually and collectively support one aspect of child 
rights or the other and make specific provision relating to the administration of child 
justice. Regardless of the inherent weaknesses and limited scope of the CYPA on the 
protection of child rights, it was, before the promulgation of the Child Rights Act in 
2003, the most comprehensive and authoritative law regulating issues relating to 
child rights in general and child justice in particular. During the era of the CYPA, the 
effects of the inherently un-unified body of laws dealing with children and the 
inevitable legal uncertainty created by the plurality of laws with impact on child 
rights fashioned a situation of legal unpredictability.  
 
6.2 Overview of the Child Rights Act 
As an attempt to consolidate all laws relating to children into one single piece 
of legislation, the enactment of the CRA in 2003 also amounts to the implementation 
of Nigeria’s commitment under international law to domesticate, recognize and 
enforce within its territory, the provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC. According 
to its preamble, the essence of the CRA is to provide and protect the rights of 
Nigerian children, and to secure their rights and interests irrespective of their 
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parents’ or guardian’s state of origin, ethnic nationality, sex, race and circumstances 
of birth, political opinion or religion.  
Abubakar supports the view of the CRA when he posits that the CRA is 
aimed at boosting and extending the frontiers of existing legislation contained in 
different federal and state laws protecting the interest of Nigerian children.
5
 
Structurally, the CRA is divided into twenty four parts and eleven schedules. Apart 
from providing for specific rights for children in conflict with the law, the CRA, 
while adopting all the fundamental rights in Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution, 
creates a host of other child rights. In line with Africa-centric balancing of rights and 
responsibilities and in a bid to channel the energy of children towards building a 
healthy and prospective Nigerian nation, Section 19 of the CRA imposes on the child 
corresponding duties towards his or her family, community and the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria.  
The Act also contains 16 distinct human rights for children including the 
right to survival and development, the right to a name, freedom of association and 
peaceful assembly, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the right to private 
and family life, the right to freedom of movement, and freedom from discrimination. 
Others are the right to dignity of the child, the right to leisure, recreation and cultural 
activities, the right to health and health services, the right to parental care, protection 
and maintenance, and the right to free, compulsory and universal primary education.
6
  
In terms of administration of child justice, the CRA replaced the hitherto 
juvenile justice administration in place in Nigeria since independence in 1960 with 
the child justice administration. As an agglomeration of many international human 
rights instruments and laws and in a bid to grant due process of the law to any child 
in conflict with the law, the CRA prohibits the subjection of any child to the criminal 
justice process and lays down procedures for dealing with children in conflict with 
the law from the point of arrest, investigation, to final adjudication.
7
 
Emphasizing a child-oriented justice system which underlines the 
reintegration of the child offender into society so that he or she can play a 
constructive role thereafter, the CRA articulates non-custodial dispositions including 
a placement under care order, a guidance order and a supervision order, etc.
8
 In this 
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respect, Ogunniran argues that the CRA recognizes the need for correcting the child 
offender within the family and community so that such a child can easily be 
reintegrated back into society.
9
  
The CRA provides for certain procedural rights for children in conflict with 
the law and forbids the imposition of a death sentence against a child who is below 
the age of 18.
10
 Section 151 of the CRA confers upon family courts the responsibility 
to administer the child justice system and grants them unlimited jurisdiction to 
entertain civil and criminal matters relating to children. In exercising their powers, 
the family courts are enjoined to encourage reconciliation and promote out of court 
settlement of matters between the parties involved. As a practical approach towards 
peaceful and non-adversarial resolution of disputes, the CRA while not mentioning 
restorative justice, encourages quick disposition of cases and also creates room for 
restoring long-lasting relationships between the parties.   
Section 277 of the CRA provides that no child shall be subjected to the 
traditional criminal justice process or to criminal sanctions. As such, a child who is 
alleged to have committed any prohibited act which constitutes a criminal offense if 
it were to be committed by an adult shall be subjected to the child justice system and 
the processes set forth in the Act. The protection of this section extends to every 
person below the age of 18 years, since the CRA defines a child to mean a person 
under the age of 18. 
The CRA stipulates what the family courts should do at the conclusion of a 
case.  By virtue of Section 223, if the case against the child is not proved, the court 
will dismiss the charge or discharge the child offender. Where the case is proved 
against the child, the court could place the child under a care order, guidance order or 
supervision order. The family courts could also commit the child to the care of a 
relative or guardian or any other fit person by a care order or send the child to 
approved accommodation by a corrective order.  
Other measures at the disposal of family courts include an order for the child 
offender to participate in group counseling, an order for the parents of the child to 
pay a fine, damages, compensation or costs, or give security for the child’s good 
behavior, or to undertake community service under supervision.  The child offender 
could be committed to custody, foster care, guardianship, or hospital order, etc.  
Similarly, a detention order may be called as a disposition of last resort when there is 
compelling reason to do so. This compelling reason must as a matter of procedure be 
placed on the record of the family courts. Section 155 of the CRA provides for the 
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procedure that must be adopted while proceedings are pending in court, including the 
right to counsel of the child’s choice.   
The CRA also provides for judicial officers and other court personnel to 
receive professional training in subjects such as sociology and behavioral sciences 
through in-service, refresher courses and other modes of education.
11
 It specifically 
established specialized children police to be manned by highly trained police officers 
in the prevention, control, apprehension and investigation of child offenders. 
Ultimately, the CRA prescribes that police investigation and court proceedings shall 
only be used as a last resort. To ensure the friendly disposition of cases of children in 
conflict with the law, Section 149 of the CRA established two levels of family 
courts.  
The first level is a family high court composed of a judge and two assessors 
knowledgeable on matters relating to children, especially in child psychology. The 
jurisdiction of the family high court includes hearing applications for the 
enforcement of the fundamental rights of children, dealing with offenses punishable 
with death or imprisonment for a term of 10 years and above, and claims involving a 
certain amount of money, divorce and custody of children. Decisions of the family 
high court are not final as appeal can be filed to the court of appeal. The family high 
court is also charged with powers to hear appeals from the family courts at the 
magistrate level. 
At the magistrate court level, the family court is composed of a magistrate 
appointed by the Chief Judge of the state, who shall sit with two assessors, one of 
whom shall be a woman knowledgeable in child psychology, and proficient in 
dealing with matters relating to children.  It has the power to try offenses not 
assigned specifically to the family high court under Section 152 of the Act. At both 
family high court and family magistrate court levels, there are three members 
including a judge and two other members, at least one of whom has been trained in 
child psychology.
12
  
At the family magistrate court level, a further requirement of having a female 
member is prescribed. The inclusion of a woman in the composition of the family 
magistrate court is not a mere gender-affirmative action, but the fact that the 
presence of a female will provide a conducive atmosphere for child offenders to feel 
at ease during the hearing of their case. The CRA, while encouraging amicable 
resolution of non-serious cases, empowers family courts at both the high court and 
magistrate court levels to employ a series of diversion methods at the point of 
apprehension without recourse to formal trial. Notwithstanding these laudable 
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provisions of the CRA in relation to child justice, its downside is that it did not 
expressly provide the minimum age of criminal responsibility and also did not 
provide for the enforcement mechanisms of its orders.   
 
6.3 Twin Pillars of Child Justice in the Child Rights Act 
     As enunciated in chapters four and five, the principles of proportionality 
and the best interests of the child combine to form the twin pillars of child justice. 
Although the twin pillars of child justice are cardinal and ought to be integrated into 
any decision affecting children in conflict with the law, the extent to which they are 
articulated in the 2003 CRA has seldom been reviewed academically. As conceded 
in the research limitation of this thesis,
13
 the calibration of these twin pillars in the 
CRA by this thesis is one of the initial studies in this area and is thus constrained by 
the dearth of relevant academic literature.  
  
  6.3.1 Proportionality in the Child Rights Act  
  As a vital ingredient of ‘just desert’ and underscoring the fact that 
punishment should fit the crime,
14
 the principle of proportionality as one of the twin 
pillars of child justice is provided for in the CRA.
15
 Section 215 (1) (b) of the CRA 
which is deontological in nature mandates the family courts to ensure that the 
reaction to the infraction of a child offender must always be proportionate not only to 
the circumstances and the gravity of the offense but also to the circumstances and 
needs of the child and the needs of the society. Contrary to the consequentialist 
rationale adduced by Thomas whereby the crime preventive benefits of punishment 
are justifiable to the extent that its imposition adds value to society in excess of the 
harm suffered by the wrongdoer, the CRA exhibits a deontological inclination and 
prescribes that the well-being of the child is the guiding factor in the consideration of 
any case against him or her.
16
   
  To ensure proportionate treatment of a child offender, the CRA provides 
that the deprivation of liberty should be the last resort and with minimal restriction 
after careful consideration of the entire circumstances of the case and the offending 
child.
17
  Such proportionate social inquiries are expected to reveal the child’s 
background, his or her living environment and circumstances under which he or she 
committed the offense. There is also the need to consider the child’s social and 
family background, educational experience and school career.  
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  The deontological importance of such facts cannot be overemphasized as 
they would go a long way in helping the court to determine how to integrate the 
circumstances of the child in reacting proportionately to the offense and offender. 
True to its deontological proposition that punishment should be humane, not in 
excess of what is necessitated by the crime committed, and in a bid to ensure fairness 
in the treatment of children in conflict with the law, the CRA clearly subscribes to 
the principle of proportionality as prescribed in international human rights 
instruments and laws.  
  Comparing Section 215 of the CRA with Article 40(4) of the CRC, the 
provision of the CRA relating to proportionality is much more fleshed-out than that 
of the CRC because it predicates the application of proportionality not only as a 
response to the infraction of a child offender, but also as a consideration of the 
circumstances and gravity of the offense, and of the circumstances and the needs of 
the child vis-à-vis the needs of the society. In the African context and particularly in 
Nigeria, the ‘circumstances and gravity of the offense and of the circumstances and 
the needs of the child offender’ are usually swayed by cultural beliefs that a child is 
not yet mature, under the guidance and surveillance of parents and as such should not 
be held accountable for crimes committed apparently in an immature state of mind. It 
is on this note that the elaborate provision of the CRA enjoins the family courts to go 
outside the culpability consideration to circumstantial issues including the immediate 
environment of the child offender.  
Recalling that proportionality as a principle of child justice was not expressly 
mentioned in the ACRWC, particularly in the section relating to the administration 
of child justice, the inference to proportionality in the ACRWC would be through a 
deductive reading and meaning of the phrase ‘the right to special treatment in a 
manner consistent with the child’s sense of dignity and worth’. As such, the 
provision of proportionality in the CRA equally surpasses the proportionality 
standard in the ACRWC.  
The elasticity of the proportionality provision in the CRA can only be 
equated with that prescribed by the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice. As a mechanism for ensuring proportionality, the 
Rules provide that there should be no less or more than fair reaction in any given 
case of child delinquency and crime.
18
 It also provides that child justice shall 
emphasize the well-being of the child and shall ensure that any reaction to children 
in conflict with the law shall always be in proportion to the circumstances of both the 
offender and offense.  
Comparing the proportionality provision of the CRA with three other 
common law jurisdictions in Africa, the strength of the CRA is evident. In the 
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 Rule 5.1, UN General Assembly, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration 
of Juvenile Justice (‘The Beijing Rules’) 
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context of Kenya, Children’s Act No. 8 of 2001 domesticated the CRC and in its 
Section 186 provides guarantees to a child accused of an offense without expressly 
mentioning proportionality.
19
 Overall, there is no express mention of proportionality 
in any of the 199 Sections of the Kenyan Children’s Act.20 Rather, the principle 
could be deciphered through a deductive and conjunctive reading of Section 186.
21
 
The entirety of this section ensures that to achieve proportionate sanctions, the 
procedure and all other elements of the child justice system should factor in the 
situation of the child, his or her rights, his or her family situation and his or her 
willingness to reform.
22
  
While the Children’s Act of Uganda also did not provide for proportionality 
in any of its sections,
23
 the Ghanaian Child Justice Act articulated proportionality 
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 Chapter 59 Laws of Kenya; See also Section 94(1) (b and g) which provides that a family and 
children court shall have the power to make any of the following orders where the charges have been 
admitted or proved against a child: (b) Caution, (g) Detention for a maximum of three months for a 
child under sixteen years of age and a maximum of twelve months for a child above sixteen years of 
age. Also, the Children Act imposes a maximum punishment of imprisonment of three years to a 
juvenile who commits any offence that attracts a death penalty. Section 94(1g) provides that in the 
case of an offence punishable by death, the family and children court may sentence the child to 
imprisonment for a maximum period of three years. 
20
 Although not expressly mentioned, in order to ensure that juveniles are not given disproportionate 
sentences upon arraignment before a Juvenile Court for an offence, the Kenyan Children’s Act 
provides that the Juvenile Court shall order a social enquiry report to be submitted to the court. This 
report which shall be prepared by a Probation Officer shall be taken into account by the court in the 
making of an order. As a mitigating platform, the report shall include particulars on the background of 
the juvenile, the present circumstances of the juvenile, the conditions under which the offence was 
committed etc. In addition to the report, the court may request an oral report from the probation 
officer in addition to the social enquiry report. To ensure proportionality in sentencing a juvenile 
offender, the Court is mandated to take into account the recommendations contained in the social 
enquiry report in determining what punishment to impose. Where the court does not follow the 
recommendations given in the report, written reasons shall be given as to why the recommendations 
were not complied with. 
21
 Article 186 of Kenyan Children’s Act No. 8 of 2001 provides that every child accused of having 
infringed any law shall- (a) be informed promptly and directly of the charges against him; (b) if he is 
unable to obtain legal assistance be provided by the Government with assistance in the preparation 
and presentation of his defense; (c) have the matter determined without delay; (d) not be compelled to 
give testimony or to confess guilt; (e) have free assistance of an interpreter if the child cannot 
understand or speak the language used; (f) if found guilty, have the decisions and any measures 
imposed in consequence thereof reviewed by a higher court; (g) have his privacy fully respected at all 
the proceedings; (h) if he is disabled, be given special care and be treated with the same dignity as a 
child with no disability.  
22
 The tiny strands of the principle of proportionality could also be extracted from the Kenyan 
Children’s Act through its Section 186 that provides that matters involving children should be 
determined without delay; Section 190 that outlines the restrictions on punishment; Section 191 that 
outlines the methods of dealing with offenders and Section 194 detailing proceedings in respect of a 
child accused of having infringed any law. 
23
 Ugandan Children’s Act Cap 59 
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better than its East African counterparts.
24
 The Ghanaian Child Justice Act protects 
the rights of children, and ensures appropriate and individual response to children in 
conflict with the law. Section 1(2) provides for separate treatment of children in 
conflict with the law except under exceptional circumstances.
25
 Vis-à-vis the 
Kenyan, Ugandan and Ghanaian child justice framework, the principle of 
proportionality is properly and more expressly articulated in the CRA. While the 
identification of the reasons for this proportionality gap in the legal framework of 
these African countries may be a subject for separate research, the fact that 
proportionality was not expressly mentioned in these laws does not in any case 
dispense with proportionality as one of the twin pillars of child justice.  
With pervasive poverty in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular, the 
external factors to be considered by the family courts in proportionately reacting to a 
child offense include but are not limited to the environment of the child offender, 
parental background, the nature of the injury to the victim and ultimately, the 
quantum of the punishment that is compliant with the developmental opportunities of 
the child offender.  
 
  6.3.2 Best Interests of the Child in the Child Rights Act 
As stated in chapter 5 of this thesis, the best interests of the child is the 
second pillar of child justice and fundamental in interpreting and applying child 
rights. In the particular context of child justice, it is a veritable juristic tool for 
balancing the weight of a court decision against its impact on a child offender. The 
normative foundation of the principle in Nigeria is Section 1 of the CRA which 
provides that:  
[I]n every action concerning a child, whether undertaken by an 
individual, public or private body, institutions of service, court of 
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 Juvenile Justice Act, 2003 (Act 653) 
25
 In the case of Ghana, in order to ensure that juveniles are given punishments which are not only in 
consonance with the offences they are proven beyond reasonable doubt to have committed or which 
they have pleaded guilty to, upon arraignment before a Juvenile Court for an offence, the Juvenile 
Court shall order a social enquiry report to be submitted to the court which shall be taken into account 
by the court in the making of an order. This report shall be prepared by a probation officer who shall 
visit the home of the juvenile. The report shall include particulars on the background of the juvenile, 
the present circumstances of the juvenile, the conditions under which the offence was committed and 
recommendations for sentence. In respect of minor offences, the social enquiry report may include a 
recommendation that the matter before the juvenile court be referred to a child panel established under 
the Children's Act, 1998 (Act 560).  The court shall ensure that the contents of the report are made 
known to the juvenile and a copy shall be made available to the juvenile or the legal representative of 
the juvenile. In terms of diversion, Section 27(c) and (e) of the Act requires that it must be appropriate 
according to the age and maturity of the juvenile and give useful skills to the juvenile where possible. 
According to Section 27 (b) and (d), diversion shall also not be exploitative, harmful or hazardous to 
the physical and mental health of the juvenile and must not interfere with their schooling. 
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law, or administrative or legislative authority, the best interests of 
the child shall be of paramount consideration. 
The provisions of the CRA are aligned to international best practice whereby, 
in the best interests of the child, the feebleness of infancy demands the continual 
protection of children by society.  The principle presupposes that in dealing with a 
child and particularly a child offender, his or her well-being should trigger the 
consideration of circumstantial and non-circumstantial factors connected with the 
child. Section 1 of the CRA also enumerates institutions, administrative authorities 
and legislative bodies that must hold fast to the best interests of the child as the 
primary consideration in all matters affecting children.  
It is therefore trite to say that no agency or organ of government or non-
governmental entity in Nigeria is insulated from the pervading observance of the best 
interests of the child in all actions and interventions. As formulated under the CRA, 
the principle applies to all children whether as a group or individually. This position 
accords with the concluding observations of the committee on the implementation of 
the CRC where it pointed out that the use of the plural ‘children’ as opposed to the 
singular ‘child’ in the CRC suggests the applicability of the principle to children as a 
group and not just to an individual child.
26
   
Section 1 of the CRA or any of its other 278 sections does not define or 
enumerate the ingredients of the principle of the best interests of the child. Arguably, 
the reason behind the non-definition of what clearly amounts to the best interests of 
the child may not be unrelated to the fact that the principle is best applied elastically 
and universally if it does not lend itself to any precise and regimented definition or 
description. Without stirring the unending debate for and against the precise 
definition of the principle of the best interests of the child, and the one-size-fits-all 
enumeration of its ingredients, the principle in the context of child justice aggregates 
all considerations which if applied when making decisions affecting children in 
conflict with the law would promote their survival, protection, rehabilitation and 
development.  
Outside the parameters of child justice and while incorporating fundamental 
human rights inherent in the constitution, Section 7(2) of the CRA provides for the 
observance of the best interests of the child by guardians in directing the child’s 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion in line with the child’s evolving 
capacities. Another aspect of the best interests of the child guaranteed under the 
CRA relates to parental care and protection. Section 44 mandates a specialized police 
unit into whose custody a child may be placed to ensure that in the best interests of 
the child, contact must be established between the child and parents or anybody who 
has such responsibility from the very first time the child comes into contact with the 
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 Michael Freeman, The Best Interests of the Child: A Commentary on the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) 46 
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officers of the law. Further predicating all actions on the reasonability test and in the 
best interests of the child, the CRA contemplates that all necessary assistance must 
be rendered to a child at each point a decision affecting him or her is about to be 
taken by judicial or other authorities.  
The CRA also captures aptly the spirit of the child justice administration as 
evidenced in the CRC, ACRWC as well as other international human rights 
instruments and laws relating to children. The vision mutually evident in the CRA, 
CRA and ACRWC is that the aim of the child justice system is not to investigate, 
prosecute, convict and punish children, but rather, it is to salvage, rehabilitate and 
reintegrate them into their family, community and the larger society. As mentioned 
earlier, there is no academic literature that discusses and situates the principle of the 
best interests of the child into the deontological or consequentialist philosophical 
schools.
27
 However, and as aforesaid, the deontological connotation will be ascribed 
to the principle of the best interests of the child. The deontological inclination of the 
principle of the best interests of the child under the CRA is also evident in the fact 
that it provides a self-sustaining tool for analyzing and ensuring that children in 
conflict with the law receive equitable and fair justice. Drawing extensively from 
Article 3 of the CRC and Articles 3 and 4 of the ACRWC, the deontological slant of 
the best interests principle is manifest in Section 1 of the CRA because it focuses on 
a just outcome and moral appropriateness of any intervention against children.  
In terms of child justice, Sections 159 and 215(1) of the CRA provides that 
every institution or agency in the child justice administration has a legal duty to 
ensure that the best interests of the child are safeguarded. It mandates family courts 
to ensure that proceedings are conducive to the best interests of the child and are 
conducted in an atmosphere of understanding which allows children to participate 
and express themselves freely. In further promoting the best interests of the child in 
the context of child justice, Section 89(1) of the CRA provides that family courts 
may for the purpose of specified proceedings, appoint a guardian ad litem for the 
child, unless it is satisfied that it is not necessary to do so. Where appointed, the 
guardian ad litem is under a duty to safeguard the interests of the child in the manner 
required by the rules of the court.
28
  
As can be deduced from the above analysis of the CRA, the elasticity of the 
principle of the best interests of the child in the CRA accords with the normative 
standard set by the CRC. Compared to the best interests provision of the ACRWC 
which merely reaffirmed adherence to the principles of the rights and welfare of the 
child, the scope of the best interests of the child principle in the CRA surpasses the 
ACRWC template due to the fact that the principle was not expressly mentioned in 
the child justice provisions of the ACRWC. 
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 See chapter 5(4) 
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 Section 89(4)(c) Child Rights Act 2003 
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Comparatively, the Kenyan Children’s Act No. 8 of 2001 interchangeably 
uses the ‘best interests’ and ‘welfare’ phrases to underscore that the best interests of 
the child are to be taken into account by any judicial institution seeking to determine 
the criminal responsibility of a child. The Kenyan Act No. 8 establishes a special 
court that exclusively deals with cases relating to children and mandates the courts to 
take into account the best interests of the child.
29
 In Uganda, the Children’s Act Cap 
59 does not use the ‘best interests’ terminology, rather it resorts to the ‘child welfare’ 
phrase which to all intents and purposes seeks to achieve the best interests 
requirement. The first schedule to the Ugandan Children Act lays down guiding 
principles for its implementation and provides that whenever the state, a court, a 
local authority or any person determines any question with respect to the upbringing 
of the child, the child’s welfare shall be of paramount consideration.30   
In the case of Ghana, the Juvenile Justice Act provides that in deciding on or 
dealing with any matter concerning a child, his or her best interests shall be 
paramount and shall be the primary consideration by a child court, institution or 
other body.
31
 The Ghanaian Act further provides that where a child court is not 
constituted for a place, district or area concerned, any court of summary jurisdiction 
may, in the interests of the child, assume jurisdiction to hear such cases.
32
 In dealing 
with the best interests of the child, Section 3 of the Ghanaian Act seeks to protect 
children from public identification through the maintenance of their privacy and 
confidentiality. This extends to the right to privacy during arrest, investigation of an 
offense, trial for the offense, and at any other stage of the cause or matter.  
In Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Ghana respectively, the important role of the 
principle of the best interests of the child in the administration of child justice is 
adequately appreciated and legislatively guaranteed. In these four countries, the 
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 Section 188 Children’s Act No. 8 of 2001. According to this principle and in keeping with the 
adherence to the best interests of the child principle and more so with due regard to the conservation 
and promotion of the welfare of the child, the Act shields the child from the mental anxiety related to 
formal court sentencing procedure and effects that may arise there from. It ensures that the words 
‘conviction’ and ‘sentence’ shall not be used in relation to a child dealt with by the Children’s Court. 
See also Section 189 of the Children’s Act No. 8 of 2001 
30
 The Ugandan Children’s Act also sets out the principle of the best interests of the child as the 
paramount consideration in any decisions concerning treatment, trial and custody of children. 
Principle 3 of the Children’s Act of Uganda while underlining the need to protect the best interests of 
the child further provides that in determining any question relating to circumstances set out in 
Principle 1, the court shall have regard in particular to the child’s physical, emotional and educational 
needs and the likely effects of any changes in the child’s circumstances. Equally, to ensure that 
welfare needs of children are considered in sentencing, section 20(2) of the Ugandan Children Act 
requires the probation and social welfare officer to prepare a welfare report before the hearing of 
every juvenile case. The social welfare report includes the background information on the child which 
in the best interests of the child is taken into account before making an order or sentence.  
31
 Section 2 Juvenile Justice Act 2003 (Act 653) 
32
 Section 17(2) Juvenile Justice Act 2003 (Act 653) 
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articulation of the principle in the child rights frameworks and particularly in the 
child justice provisions of the respective laws is in tandem with the normative 
standard established by the CRC and surpasses the regional standard set by the 
ACRWC. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter calibrated the extent to which the twin pillars of child justice are 
legislatively accommodated in the Child Rights Act. It found that the twin pillars of 
child justice are adequately legislated in the CRA in accordance with CRC and other 
international child rights instruments and conventions, and higher than the regional 
standard of ACRWC. Regardless of the controversies and eventual trade-offs 
surrounding its adoption, this chapter noted that the CRA is the most comprehensive 
child rights instrument in the history of Nigeria. Compared to some select common 
law countries in Africa, this chapter found that the articulation of the twin pillars of 
child justice in the CRA is stronger than in most of the countries examined.  
Having noted that the twin pillars of child justice are legislatively articulated 
in the CRA, and appreciating their mutually reinforcing roles in ensuring that 
punishment meted out to children in conflict with the law is not only proportionate to 
the offense committed, but also in his or her best interests, the next chapter examines 
how family courts apply the twin pillars of child justice when determining issues 
involving children in conflict with the law. 
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Chapter Seven  
Application of the Twin Pillars of Child Justice by Family Courts 
 
7.1 Introduction  
Having found that the twin pillars of child justice are adequately legislated in 
the CRA, this chapter examines to what extent family courts integrate these twin 
pillars in the treatment of children in conflict with the law, and to what degree the 
internationally compliant legislative success of the CRA translates in the protection 
of child rights. As alluded to when setting out the limitations of this thesis in chapter 
one, this chapter takes cognizance of the dearth of academic literature in Nigeria or 
elsewhere specifically examining the extent to which the twin pillars of child justice 
are legislatively articulated in the CRA.  
This chapter also underlines the seemingly acute absence of academic 
literature and case law jurisprudence that explicitly examines the extent to which 
these twin pillars of child justice are applied by the family courts in arriving at 
decisions relating to children in conflict with the law. As such, this chapter will 
seldom make reference to academic literature to buttress or rebut its findings as to 
how these twin pillars of child justice are implemented by family courts in Nigeria.
1
   
The chapter argues that while the child justice framework of the CRA may 
not have fallen short of international normative standards and thus adequately 
articulates the principles of proportionality and the best interests of the child as the 
twin pillars of child justice, there are numerous institutional and legislative obstacles 
negating the application of these principles by family courts established pursuant to 
the CRA. This chapter argues that irrespective of the integration of proportionality 
and best interests of the child in the CRA, children in conflict with the law in Nigeria 
still fall outside the protective shield of the twin pillars of child justice.   
 
7.2 Establishment and Functioning of Enablers  
There are several institutions enumerated under the CRA that seek to ensure 
that child rights in general and child justice in particular are promoted and protected 
through the application of the twin pillars of child justice.
2
 Specifically, Sections 215 
and 217 of the CRA provide guidance for the treatment of children in conflict with 
the law. Also, Section 203 provides that a child who is accused of committing an 
offense envisaged under Section 209 of the CRA shall be tried in a distinct way by a 
designated institution composed uniquely of specialist personnel.  
                                                          
1
 As stated earlier and as a mitigatory measure, this chapter will rely on interviews conducted with 
five court registrars, ten magistrates and ten barristers practicing in ten states of the federation; See 
chapter 1(2) on methodology 
2
 Yemi Akinseye-George, Juvenile Justice in Nigeria: A Study of the Laws and Practices Relating to 
Juvenile Justice in Nigeria with Special Focus on the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, Kano, Lagos, 
Plateau and River States (Center for Socio-Legal Studies 2009) 31 
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In compliance with Section 230 of the CRA, such institutions must ensure 
that the proceeding is conducted in an atmosphere of understanding and conducive to 
the best interests of the child. Such institutions must also ensure that any decision or 
orders issued in the process with respect to the child must be proportionate not only 
to the circumstance and gravity of the offense but also to the circumstances and 
needs of the society.
3
  
 
7.2.1 Family Courts 
One of the institutions created under the CRA for the integration of the twin 
pillars of child justice in the treatment of children in conflict with the law is the 
family court. For the purpose of hearing and deciding on matters of children in 
conflict with the law, the CRA provides for the establishment of family courts in 
each state of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. The family 
courts envisioned under Section 149 of the CRA are granted exclusive jurisdiction to 
hear matters of children in conflict with the law and must be composed of designated 
and specialist trained officers with proficiency in child rights.
4
   
A review of judicial divisions of most states of the federation, unstructured 
interviews with magistrates hearing cases of children in conflict with the law and 
interaction with legal practitioners and court users all point to the non-establishment 
and non-functionality of the family courts in the Federal Capital Territory and some 
states of the federation. In Imo State for instance, which is one of the states in South 
East Nigeria to have adopted the CRA into state law,
5
 family courts contemplated 
under the CRA to apply the twin pillars of child justice in the treatment of children in 
conflict with the law have not been established in any of the magisterial divisions of 
the state.
6
  
Consequently, children in conflict with the law in Imo State despite the 
safeguard provided in the CRA and international and regional child rights 
instruments and laws, are still being processed by regular magistrates courts and high 
courts devoid of all the inbuilt safeguards and protection envisaged by the CRA.
7
 In 
Abia State which is also in the South-East, family courts have not been established. 
As such, conventional magistrate courts are designated once a week to hear matters 
pertaining to children in conflict with the law. Although this situation is still not in 
                                                          
3
 Okoye, Uzoma Odera, ‘Knowledge and Awareness of the Child’s Rights Act among Residents of a 
University Town in Enugu State Nigeria’ (2011) 2 Educational Research 159 
4
 Sections 149 – 154 Child Rights Act 2003 
5
 The Childs Right Law of Imo State of Nigeria No. 6 2004.  This law provides for the rights and 
responsibilities of a child in Imo State of Nigeria and a system of child justice administration and 
matters connected therewith. It also provides that the best interests of the child shall be the primary 
consideration in all actions concerning them 
6
 Interviews with registrars, magistrates and barristers practicing in Imo State on 14 January 2013  
7
 Interviews conducted with magistrates and barristers practicing in Imo State between 14 to 18 
January 2013 
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tune with the expectations of the CRA, it is nevertheless an improvement on the 
situation in the other four South-East states of Nigeria.
8
  
While it may be conceded that Lagos State is the only state to establish and 
adopt the Rules of Procedure for the family courts as envisaged in Section 40(1) of 
the CRA and certainly advanced in the implementation of the CRA, the child justice 
framework even in Lagos State still falls short of the envisioned standards of the 
CRA.
9
 Comparing the extent to which family courts pursuant to the CRA integrate 
the twin pillars of child justice in the treatment of children in conflict with the law in 
Imo and Lagos States respectively, the treatment of children in conflict with the law 
through the assimilation of the twin pillars of child justice is relatively improved in 
Lagos State vis-à-vis Imo State. Findings from the interviews indicate that while 
Lagos State domesticated the CRA in 2008 four years after Imo State, it has taken 
several steps ahead of Imo State in formally constituting the family courts as 
contemplated under the CRA.   
The impact of the non-establishment of family courts in most states of the 
federation and the Federal Capital Territory eleven years after the entry into force of 
the CRA is that children in conflict with the law in Nigeria are still tried by 
conventional magistrate courts or high courts granted such powers under the partially 
repealed CYPA. Not being the specific family courts designated under the CRA, the 
hearing of cases of children in conflict with the law by non-family courts impacts 
negatively on the child justice bedrock and the meaningful integration of the 
principles of proportionality and the best interests of the child in the treatment of 
children in conflict with the law in Nigeria. These non-family courts are usually not 
attuned to the peculiar sensitivities required for the treatment of children in conflict 
with the law and seldom make recourse to the twin pillars of child justice in the 
determination of cases involving children.
10
   
Irrespective of the foregoing institutional gaps that permeate most states of 
the federation, it is essential to underline the fact that assuming that the family courts 
are physically established pursuant to the CRA, it is nonetheless important to note 
that it would not entirely be insulated from obvious challenges faced by other justice 
institutions in Nigeria. The family courts like other arms of the judiciary, when 
established would certainly depend on the interplay of different justice institutions 
such as the police, the prosecutor’s office, and social works department amongst 
                                                          
8
 Interviews conducted with registrars, magistrates and barristers practicing in Abia State between 21 
to 25 January 2013 
9
 Interviews conducted with registrars, magistrates and barristers practicing in Lagos between 28 to 31 
January 2013; See also  Yemi Akinseye-George, Juvenile Justice in Nigeria: A Study of the Laws and 
Practices Relating to Juvenile Justice in Nigeria with Special Focus on the Federal Capital Territory 
Abuja, Kano, Lagos, Plateau and River States (Center for Socio-Legal Studies 2009) 55 
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 Interviews conducted with registrars, magistrates and barristers practicing in Bauchi, Enugu, 
Kaduna, Kano and Niger States respectively  between March and April 2013 
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others. As such, a holistic overhaul of justice institutions is required for effective and 
efficient administration of child justice through the family courts.  
On the other hand and in line with the indivisibility and interdependence of 
human rights, if child rights in Nigeria are to be realized through the intervention of 
family courts, equal emphasis must be given to the effective implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights provided for in Chapter II of the 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
11
 It is only through an all-inclusive 
promotion and protection of all rights that the implementation of the twin pillars of 
child justice could be effectively and efficiently applied in the treatment of children 
in conflict with the law in Nigeria.  
In the same vein, with paternalistic perceptions and interpretations of child 
rights vis-à-vis the socio-economic and political realities in Nigeria, it is only by 
awareness, appreciation and application of the twin pillars of child justice by the 
specialist family courts entrusted with the administration of child justice that the 
spirit and letters of the twin pillars of child justice could be provided to children in 
conflict with the law.
 
 
Examining a few common law countries in the continent, it can be seen that 
the situational hiccups experienced in the functioning of the CRA are not exclusive 
to Nigeria but extend to other countries in the continent. For instance, four years and 
nine years respectively after the enactment of the Kenyan and Ugandan Children’s 
Law, the provision of these two pieces of legislation regarding the establishment of 
child specialist courts and processes is yet to be realized.
12
 
 
7.2.2 Composition and Competence of Family Courts 
Section 152 of the CRA provides for the composition of the family courts 
both at the high court and the magistrate court levels. At the high court level, the 
family courts shall consist of a judge and two assessors one of whom must be 
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 Report on Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through a Better Understanding 
of Traditional Values of Humankind: Best Practices, Mandated by Human Rights Council Resolution 
A/HRC/RES/21/3. This report states that best practice in the promotion of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms requires encouraging understanding and acceptance of those very principles 
that inform developing human rights framework - the universality and indivisibility of rights, non- 
discrimination in the enjoyment of rights, and fairness and equality in efforts to ensure and implement 
those rights < http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/HRValues/JointSubmissionII.pdf> accessed 
30 October 2013; See also  
UN Commission on Human Rights, Effects on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights of the Economic 
Adjustment Policies Arising from Foreign Debt and, in Particular, on the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Right to Development, 22 February 1921, E/CN.4/RES/1991/13 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f0d5c.html> accessed 18 April 2014 
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 Odongo Godfrey Odhiambo, ‘The Domestication of International Law Standards on the Rights of 
the Child with Specific Reference to Juvenile Justice in the African Context’ (Phd Thesis University 
Western Cape South Africa 2005) 65 
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proficient in dealing with children and incidental matters preferably in the area of 
child psychology; and the other shall be an officer not below the rank of chief child 
development officer. For the family courts at the magisterial level, it shall consist of 
a magistrate not below the rank of chief magistrate and assessors one of whom shall 
be an officer not below the rank of senior child development officer; and the other a 
woman who has attributes in dealing with children and matters relating to them.  
Section 206 of the CRA clearly laid out the competence, training and 
professionalism of all magistrates and judges designated to deal with children in 
conflict with the law, including officers of the specialized children police and child 
development office. The CRA also stipulates the professional education, in-service 
training, refresher courses and other appropriate courses to strengthen the capacity of 
these child justice personnel and ensure effective integration of the twin pillars of 
child justice in the treatment of children in conflict with the law.  
Despite the clarity of the CRA regarding the composition and competence of 
family courts both at the high court and magistrate court levels, the composition and 
competence criteria for judicial officers dealing with children in conflict with the law 
in the Federal Capital Territory where the CRA is exclusively enforceable fall below 
the CRA threshold.
13
 Apart from the fact that the Federal Capital Territory is 
working on the Rule of Procedures for the CRA, its judicial officers dealing with 
children in conflict with the law are bereft of prerequisite competence, not 
appropriated composed and most importantly seldom conversant with the pivotal 
role of the twin pillars of child justice.  
Interviews conducted with stakeholders in Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Imo, Abia, 
Rivers and Plateau states in January and February 2013 indicate that most of the 
judicial officers dealing with issues of children in conflict with the law in these states 
are yet to receive the professional training and acquire the competence prescribed in 
the CRA.
14
  Also, the recruitment of personnel in the child justice system that will 
reflect the diversity of children who come into contact with the system as stipulated 
under the CRA has also been observed more in breach in the Federal Capital 
Territory and most of the states.
15
  
On the other hand, a majority of the existing judicial officers operating in 
conventional magistrate courts and high courts have not had the opportunity through 
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further training to familiarize themselves with the provisions of the CRA principles 
relating to the twin pillars of child justice.
16
 The seeming lack of knowledge and 
sensitivity on the provisions of the CRA generally and the twin pillars of child 
justice more particularly, prevalent amongst child justice personnel, is not just 
limited to the Federal Capital Territory but is a widespread phenomenon in most 
states of the federation.
17
  
In majority states of Nigeria, the presiding magistrate and all other 
functionaries of the family courts as contemplated under the CRA are yet to be 
equipped with the prerequisite skill set and do not sit in a panel of three experts 
including a female knowledgeable in child psychology.
18
 The ostensible lack of 
appreciation of the twin pillars of child justice by judicial officers is averse to the 
dictates of the CRC and the ACRWC enjoining state parties to undertake measures to 
make the principles and provisions of these instruments widely known and applied 
by appropriate and active means. 
On the other hand, an inquiry into some states of the federation yet to adopt 
the CRA into state law also presents a more daunting scenario. Recalling that most 
states of Northern Nigeria have not yet adopted the CRA into state law and as such 
are yet to establish appropriate child rights friendly institutions and mechanisms 
anticipated for the treatment of children in conflict with the law, the prevailing 
capacity and competence of judicial officers in those states fall short of the 
prescription of the CRA.
19
 In that case, child justice personnel in most Northern 
states of Nigeria appointed without the skills, qualification, competence and quorum 
stipulated under the CRA do not possess the requisite and specialized skills for 
determining proportionate and the best interests treatment of children in conflict with 
the law.  
Jjudicial officers in those states of the federation that are yet to adopt the 
CRA into state law do not sit in a gender-balanced panel envisioned under the 
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CRA.
20
 Similarly, in Enugu State, which incidentally is the only Christian-majority 
state that is yet to adopt the CRA into state law, and whereby the treatment of 
children in conflict with the law is regulated by the CYPA, magistrates hearing cases 
of children in conflict with the law are seldom aware of the importance and existence 
of the twin pillars of child justice.
21
 Equally, in Bauchi, Enugu, Kaduna, Kano and 
Niger states which are yet to adopt the CRA into state law, child courts are 
expectedly manned by regular magistrates without the requisite skill set and structure 
envisaged under the CRA.
22
 
In the absence of the establishment of family courts coupled with the dearth 
of requisite skills of such officers, the gains of the CRA and essentially the 
integration of the twin pillars of child justice in the treatment of children in conflict 
with the law remain a far-fetched dream in most of the states of the federation and 
the Federal Capital Territory. Also, the lack of case law authorities on CRA in 
general and on the twin pillars of child justice in particular after more than ten years 
of entry into force of the CRA is certainly related to the non-recruitment of expert 
personnel anticipated under the Act. 
 Whilst advocating the training and sensitization of child justice 
functionaries, it should be borne in mind that although the capacity building of these 
officers is necessary, it is not sufficient on its own to guarantee committed 
implementation of the twin pillars of child justice contained in the CRA. A holistic 
and multifaceted intervention must be tailored to deal with the establishment, 
functionality and capacity of the family courts in order to ensure that such a 
capacity-building process benefits the child justice system in the short and long run. 
 
7.2.3 Child Rights Implementation Committee 
To facilitate the realization of rights granted to children in conflict with the 
law, the CRA created the child rights implementation committee at the federal, state 
and local government levels. These implementation committees are charged with 
initiating actions that shall ensure the observance and popularization of the rights and 
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welfare of a child as provided for in the CRA and other regional and international 
human rights instruments and laws.
23
  
By extension, the three-tier implementation committees of the CRA are 
expected to ensure that the twin pillars of child justice are integrated in the treatment 
of children in conflict with the law. They are also charged with continuous review of 
the implementation of the CRA and to make recommendations to the national, state 
and local government on specific programs and projects that shall enhance the 
implementation of child rights. The implementation committees are also mandated to 
oversee the collection and documentation of all matters relating to children.  
Despite the above laudable and essential roles of the child rights 
implementation committees created under the CRA, these committees envisaged at 
the national, state and local government levels have not, except for Lagos State, been 
established eleven years after the entry into force of the CRA.  While the reasons for 
the non-establishment of the child rights implementation committee are outside the 
scope of this thesis, it does represent a setback to the enjoyment of child rights in 
general and child justice in particular.  
The logical inference that could be made for the non-establishment of the 
child rights implementation committees and other structural enablers envisaged 
under the CRA is that child rights in general and particularly the proportionate and 
the best interests treatment of children in conflict with the law apparently do not 
enjoy financial priority by most states of the federations. In that vein, the possible 
claim of lack of resources by states and the federal government is not very cogent 
because those states that have adopted the CRA into state laws and the Federal 
Capital Territory willingly committed to the CRA knowing well the incidental 
financial implications.  
With the non-establishment of the three-tier child rights implementation 
committee envisaged under the CRA, jurisprudence akin to those developed by the 
committee on the implementation of the CRC and the committee on the 
implementation of the ACRWC is non-existent with regard to the CRA in Nigeria.
24
 
In addition, the absence of the child rights implementation committee established to 
monitor the execution of the CRA accounts for amongst other things the lackluster 
treatment of children in conflict with the law despite the protection contained in the 
twin pillars of child justice. The practical realization of the goals of child justice 
administration depends in part on the establishment of the implementation committee 
to monitor and supervise the implementation of the CRA. Otherwise the protective 
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shields of the twin pillars of child justice would not be extended to children in 
conflict with the law in Nigeria.  
 
7.2.4 Funding of the Child Justice System  
As part of the overall justice system in Nigeria, the child justice envisioned 
under the CRA is impacted by the socio-economic issues plaguing judicial and non-
judicial institutions in Nigeria.
25
 Key amongst the challenges facing judicial 
institutions in Nigeria is the relatively poor funding that has perennially weakened 
the Nigerian justice system and systemically undermined the efficiency of justice 
delivery in the country.
26
 Like most other developing countries, many Nigerians, 
particularly children, subsist below the poverty line.
27
  
Lending his voice to the debate on the interrelationship between the 
enjoyment of human rights and socio-economic status, Aguda argues that the 
practical actualization of most of the fundamental rights cannot be achieved in a 
country where millions are living below starvation level and where the fundamental 
rights provisions enshrined in the constitution are meaningless to all those people 
living below the poverty line or just at starvation level.
28
  
Although the CRA created a separate and independent child justice system to 
ensure proper and effective administration of child justice, this commendable 
initiative on paper has not been translated into action through the physical 
establishment and adequate funding of necessary enablers. The integrated resource 
support to several justice institutions, particularly those that work in the area of child 
justice needs to be improved. Hammad aptly argues that achieving child rights in the 
                                                          
25
 Yemi Akinseye-George, Juvenile Justice in Nigeria: A Study of the Laws and Practices Relating to 
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full sense of the word would necessitate a number of parallel strategies and 
resources.
29
  
Similarly and on the nexus between resources and the enjoyment of human 
rights, Oputa recognizes the problem which the condition of under-development 
poses to the realization of human rights. He states that one of the best tests of the 
efficacy of the fundamental rights provisions of the Nigerian constitution should be 
whether the rights enshrined therein are accorded to the poor, the unemployed, the 
weak, the oppressed or the defenseless. While the Constitution aspires to promote the 
welfare of all persons on the principles of freedom, equality and justice, Oputa holds 
the view that in actual practice, ‘it is often the powerful, the rich and the dominant 
class that seem to have all the rights, while the only right left to the poor, the weak 
and the down-trodden seems to be their rights to suffer in silence, to be patient and 
wait for their reward in heaven’.30  
The combined implications of Aguda and Oputa’s arguments as outlined 
above are very strong validation of the premise that in view of the inter-dependence, 
indivisibility and inter-relatedness of all human rights, the socio-economic and 
resource challenges in Nigeria directly or indirectly impact on the overall treatment 
of children in general and the extension of the protective shields of the twin pillars of 
child justice to those in conflict with the law. Writing on how minimized government 
support is to child justice, Yemi Akinseye-George argues that although the justice 
system is generally not well funded, the child justice system is the most neglected 
aspect of the justice system in Nigeria. The neglect is prevalent at both the state and 
federal levels and thus accounts for why the budget of the Federal Ministry of Justice 
in the last three years had no budget line specifically for child justice.
31
  
In a developing country such as Nigeria, commitment of the executive arm of 
government and the availability or otherwise of financial resources to implement a 
legislative aspiration inevitably assumes a fundamental and prominent role. The 
Federal Capital Territory and those states that have domesticated the CRA have 
overlooked the critical need to secure the necessary commitment from the executive 
arm of governments. In the absence of a proactive buy-in by the executive and a 
commitment on its part to institute the enabling socio-economic climate for the 
implementation of the CRA, the goals and aspirations of the twin pillars of child 
justice will be oblivious to children in conflict with the law. 
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The political goodwill on the part of the executive as the implementing arm 
of government is therefore critical as an enabler of child justice in Nigeria. As was 
argued by Skelton, lawmakers should be free to come up with highly innovative 
legislation to address problems facing children. However, legislators should make 
sure that they develop such legislative strategies with realistic expectations, since 
empty promises whether echoing the provisions of the CRC or the ACRWC will 
certainly not protect children unless the prerequisite physical and financial enablers 
are simultaneously instituted.
32
  
While it may be argued that the CRA could not have come into force without 
presidential assent, in which case it is invariable that the executive arm of 
government participated in its promulgation, the fact still remains that in the 
circumstance of the promulgation of the CRA, the Executive arms of both the 
national and state governments were merely involved at the point of assenting to the 
Bill and not in the cost-benefit analysis that ought to characterize its promulgation 
debates.  
Unlike the promulgation history of the South African Child Justice Bill that 
was subjected to a costing process and involved preparation of estimates of the 
potential cost of implementing the provisions of the Bill, or the promulgation history 
of the Ugandan 1996 Children Statute that involved preparatory work on the 
situational analysis and affordability of the proposals in the statute, neither the CRA 
nor the domesticated versions by respective states were promulgated based on a clear 
understanding of the cost implication of its implementation.  
As shown by the foregoing analysis, efforts invested in the promulgation of 
the CRA as a mechanism for the domestication of the CRC and the ACRWC have 
yielded little or no results for children in conflict with the law because the resources 
to support the establishment of prerequisite enablers have not been mobilized. The 
resource chasm between the vision of the CRA on the one hand and the 
establishment of implementation enablers including the family courts by the 
executive arm of government on the other is comparable to the situation that 
challenged the Namibian Child Justice Bill which has been described as too 
ambitious and requiring structural re-adjustment of government spending.
33
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7.3  Effects of the 1999 Constitution on Child Rights Act  
The enactment of the CRA under Section 299(a) of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution represents a drawback to the nationwide application and enjoyment of 
the protective shields of the twin pillars of child justice by children in conflict with 
the law. As has been noted in chapter one, the 1999 Constitution allocates legislative 
functions and autonomy in certain areas of legislative operations between the 
National Assembly and House of Assembly of states.
34
 Also pointed out earlier was 
that the exclusive legislative list of the constitution itemizes those subject matters for 
which the federal government has exclusive competence to legislate upon, and the 
concurrent legislative list enumerates the shared competence for both the federal and 
state governments.
35
  
Bearing in mind that the issues of children in most common law countries in 
Africa are considered welfare issues,
36
 this may have been the reason why the 
drafters of the 1999 Constitution and other constitutions before it may have 
perceived child rights as synonymous with welfare issues which are best situated 
within the subsidiary basket of the residual legislative list devolved to state 
legislative competence. Assuming, but not conceding that the rationale for situating 
child rights as welfare issues suitable for the residual legislative list of the 1999 
Constitution is tenable, what was the logic used by the drafters of the constitution in 
also omitting legislating for human rights from the priority exclusive legislative list 
and at the very least the concurrent legislative list?  
Even if there is a justification behind the omission of child rights in particular 
and human rights in general from the exclusive legislative list reserved for the 
National Assembly, exploring the legitimacy of this reason is beyond the remit of 
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this thesis. Certainly, such a practice of de-emphasizing human rights issues in 
general and child rights in particular is inconsonant with the priority status that ought 
to be placed on human rights and by extension child rights.
37
  The present blanket 
classification of matters of child rights as welfare issues that are arbitrarily relegated 
to the third-class residual legislative list is certainly untenable. This is because child 
rights and by extension child justice, are human rights issues extracted from and 
predicated on fair hearing guarantees enshrined in international, regional and 
national human rights instruments and laws, especially the 1999 Constitution.  
Nkoyo acknowledges the tension inherent in the process of negotiating 
among plural legal possibilities and she argues that state houses of assembly are 
seized with the remit of child protection because the constitution did not put the 
matter under the exclusive or concurrent legislative lists.
38
 Her argument is certainly 
contestable. She did not advance any reason why a matter as important as child rights 
should not be included in the first class exclusive legislative list nor did she adduce 
any reason why child rights is best suited for the residual legislative list.  
Regardless of whatever logic supports allocating the setting of child rights 
standards to the residual legislative list, the preferred inclination is that legislating for 
a matter as important as child rights should have been made the prerogative of the 
Federal Government of Nigeria, in which case such legislative powers ought to have 
been allocated to the exclusive legislative list. 
 
7.3.1  Legislating Subject to Section 12(3) of 1999 Constitution 
For the purposes of domesticating a treaty, Section 12(2) of the 1999 
Constitution authorizes the National Assembly to make laws for the federation or 
any part thereof with respect to matters not included in the exclusive legislative list. 
Limiting the scope of Section 12(2) and Section 12(3) of the 1999 Constitution 
provides a further caveat that a law passed by the National Assembly outside matters 
enumerated on the exclusive legislative list shall not be enacted into law unless it is 
ratified by a majority of all the House of Assembly of states of the federation.  
The condition precedent to Section 12(3) of the 1999 Constitution is that the 
National Assembly requires two-thirds of the state houses of assembly to promulgate 
legislation on a matter outside the exclusive legislative list. Realizing that issues 
relating to child rights are outside the legislative competence of the National 
Assembly because it is not enumerated on the exclusive legislative list, and 
cognizant of the unlikelihood of securing the constitutionally required two-thirds of 
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the state houses of assembly if the CRA was to be applicable throughout the 
federation, the National Assembly enacted the CRA pursuant to Section 299(a) of the 
1999 Constitution.
39
  
Thus the restrictive scope of the CRA to only the Federal Capital Territory 
because it was promulgated under Section 299(a) of the 1999 Constitution has 
created the opportunity for states to disregard the CRA or at best adopt state versions 
which then permit them to take into consideration their respective cultural and 
religious sensitivities. The adoption of the CRA by the National Assembly under 
Section 299(a) is a minimalistic approach at domesticating international and regional 
child rights frameworks. While the CRA meets international and regional thresholds 
for the treatment of children in conflict with the law, the drawbacks relating to the 
limited scope of the CRA having been promulgated under Section 299(a) of the 1999 
Constitution severely impact the nationwide application of the twin pillars of child 
justice by family courts. This situation also allows states the liberty of not 
domesticating the Child Right Act into state law in which case children in conflict 
with the law are still processed under the CYPA which the CRA intended to repeal.  
The unintended effects of Section 12(3) of the Constitution are that it slows 
down the realization of the gains of the CRA. It also facilitates the possibility of 
state-specific standards that are not always in consonance with the national and 
international standards. The potential lack of uniformity in a state-centric child rights 
framework would likely breed discrepant standards that would lead to unequal 
enjoyment of human rights in general and child rights in particular.  
In such a situation that is unstandardized, children in conflict with the law in 
some states may possibly enjoy the protective shield of the twin pillars of child 
justice provided in the CRA, whereas in some other states, they would be vulnerable 
to the outdated and unfriendly framework of the CYPA. The ensuing inequity arising 
from the potential for discrepant laws and treatment of children in conflict with the 
law amongst states of the federation may not augur well for Nigerian children and 
defeats the child justice standards established by the CRC, the ACRWC and 
ultimately the CRA.  
The simultaneous application of the CRA and CYPA at the same time in 
Nigeria constitutes an obstacle to achieving nation-wide, the child justice objectives 
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of the CRC and ACRWC domesticated through the CRA.
40
 Since its promulgation in 
2003, most of the states that adopted the CRA into state law did so within the first 
five years of its entry into force. Bearing in mind the lull in the adoption of the CRA 
over the last six years, it may be inferred that the states, particularly the Muslim 
Northern states, that are yet to adopt the CRA into state law may not be doing so any 
time soon. On a positive note, it is pertinent to note that the states that have adopted 
the CRA into state law did not make any substantial modification to the provisions 
relating to the twin pillars of child justice. 
In that sense and in order to ensure that children in conflict with the law 
receive humane treatment irrespective of state of domicile, the CRA ought to be 
applicable to the entire federation or at least adopted by all the 36 states of the 
federation into a state law. The reason why the National Assembly settled for the 
promulgation of the CRA under Section 299(a) of the 1999 Constitution and not 
under Section 12(3) appears to be a quick fix that is not necessarily a durable fix. If 
the processes enumerated in Section 12(3) of the 1999 Constitution requiring 
ratification by the majority of the state houses of assembly were followed 
successfully, the CRA would have been automatically applicable throughout the 
entire country and the present situation which requires express adoption of the CRA 
into state laws by state houses of assembly would have been avoided.
41
  
 
7.4 Multiplicity of Legal Systems in Nigeria 
Despite the lack of manpower and institutional structures for the 
implementation of the twin pillars of child justice, another impediment to the 
implementation of the CRA in general and its child justice framework in particular is 
the fact that there are three concurrent and most times conflicting legal systems 
applicable in Nigeria. As was stated in chapter one, the three legal systems with 
equal force in Nigeria are the statutory law applicable throughout Nigeria, the 
Islamic law mostly applicable in the Muslim-majority states of Northern Nigeria and 
the customary law applicable in Christian majority states of Southern Nigeria.
42
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While there may be simmering tensions arising from the cohabitation of 
statutory law and customary law in Nigeria,
43
 the gulf between Islamic law and 
statutory law, particularly in the case of child rights is much more pronounced.
44
 
While most of these tensions relate to issues such as child marriages, child adoption 
and the custody rights of parents,
45
 the conflict of law tension between the provisions 
of Islamic law and the CRA include the unlimited jurisdiction of Sharia courts over 
Muslim children vis-à-vis the exclusive jurisdiction granted to family courts under 
the CRA.
46
   
Under the CRA, family courts are created and granted exclusive jurisdiction 
at the high court and magistrate court levels over issues relating to children in 
conflict with the law. They have unlimited jurisdiction to hear and determine civil 
proceedings in which the existence of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, 
interest, obligation or claim of a child is in issue. They also have jurisdiction over 
criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or 
other liability in respect to an offense committed by a child, in the interests of a child 
or against a child.
47
     
Furthermore, the CRA entrusts family courts with exclusive jurisdiction by 
providing that no other court except the family courts shall exercise jurisdiction in 
any matter relating to children. Providing for the child justice administration to 
replace the juvenile justice administration of the CYPA, the CRA prohibits the 
subjection of any child to the criminal justice process. It also guarantees that due 
process be accorded to any child subjected to the child justice system, at all stages of 
the child justice process, including investigation, adjudication and disposition of any 
case against such a child.  
The foregoing powers exercisable by family courts under the CRA are 
contradictory to the unlimited jurisdiction equally granted to the Sharia court over all 
other issues including children in conflict with the law.
48
 The Zamfara State Sharia 
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 Nmehielle, Vincent Obisienunwo Orlu, ‘Sharia Law in the Northern states of Nigeria: To 
Implement or Not to Implement, The Constitutionality is The Question’ (2004) 26 Human Rights 
Quarterly 730 
44
 Ojielo, M. Ozonnia, ‘Human Rights and Sharia'h Justice in Nigeria’ (2003) 9 Annual Survey of 
International and Comparative Law  135 
45
 Shabnam Ishaque, ‘Islamic Principles On Adoption: Examining The Impact Of Illegitimacy And 
Inheritance Related Concerns In Context Of A Child's Right To An Identity’ (2008) 22 International 
Journal of Law, Policy and Family 393  
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 Sharia Court of Jigawa State Law No. 7 of 2002; See also Sharia Courts in Zamfara State Law No. 
5 1999 
47
 Sections 149 and 150 of the Child Rights Act 2003; See also M.U Abubakar, ‘Childs Rights Act: 
Critical Analysis from the Islamic Perspective’ a paper presented at the 7th Annual Scientific 
Conference of the Islamic Medical Association of Nigeria (On File) 
48
 Pavani Thagirisa, ‘Historical Perspective of the Sharia Project: A Cross-Cultural and Self-
Determination Approach to Resolving the Sharia Project in Nigeria’ (2004) 29 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 459; Ubaka Iwobi, ‘Tiptoeing Through a Constitutional Minefield: The Great 
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law, like most other Northern States of Nigeria that have adopted Islamic law, 
provides for the establishment of Sharia courts to exercise exclusive civil and 
criminal jurisdictions including over issues relating to children.
49
 Assuming that the 
CRA is to be adopted into state law in the Sharia Northern states of Nigeria, there is 
no guarantee that in view of the exclusive jurisdiction already granted to Sharia 
courts under the prevailing Islamic laws, the state versions of the CRA in the Sharia-
implementing Northern states of Nigeria would create and grant family courts 
unlimited jurisdiction envisaged in the CRA.  
While it may be possible that strands of proportionality and the best interests 
of the child could be evident in Sharia jurisprudence such as the Sharia Court Law of 
Jigawa State and the Sharia Court Law in Zamfara State etc, the twin pillars of child 
justice are not articulated under the Islamic laws applicable in Northern Nigeria in 
the same elastic manner as the CRA. Similarly, the implementation of the twin 
pillars of child justice in Islamic-majority states in Northern Nigeria will 
nevertheless be watered down by the premium Islamic law places on the obligation 
of a child and on parental authority over a child. The twin pillars of child justice in 
the Sharia Northern States will also be confronted with challenges, including 
questions of its compatibility with Islamic tenets and the fact that it conglomerates 
personal and public law issues. Also, the fact that the jurisdiction of family courts 
may have ousted the constitutional jurisdiction of the Sharia Court of Appeal is also 
a point of tension.
50
 
While Islamic law is applicable with statutory law in Northern Nigeria, 
customary law is in force alongside statutory law in Southern Nigeria. Akin to the 
situation in Northern Nigeria, the impact of plural legal systems on the application of 
the twin pillars of child justice with children in conflict with the law in Southern 
Nigeria is equally obstructed. As is the case with most of the Islamic states of 
Northern Nigeria that are yet to adopt a state version of the CRA, some other states 
in the Christian-dominated Southern Nigeria are equally yet to domesticate the CRA 
into state law. For instance, Enugu State, like the Sharia Northern states is yet to 
adopt the CRA into a state law and thus children in conflict with the law in Enugu 
State are processed under the six-decade-long CYPA.
51
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Although the reluctance to pass the CRA into state law in the Muslim-
majority Northern states in Nigeria may be related to Sharia considerations, there is 
no clear presumption as to why Enugu State has not adopted the CRA into state law. 
The possible inference to be made is that successive governments in Enugu State and 
particularly successive houses of assembly in the state have not prioritized the need 
to legislate for child rights in general and child justice in particular. 
 
7.5 Conclusion  
The chapter found that despite the inclusion of the twin pillars of child justice 
in the child justice framework of Nigeria, the situation is that children across the 
country are still being tried as adults outside the child-friendly and child-specific 
family courts established pursuant to the CRA. It observed that since regular courts 
are ill-disposed to apply the twin pillars of child justice, it also found that the time 
and energy invested in the domestication of the CRC and the ACRWC through the 
promulgation of the CRA are not yielding optimal results due to the fact that in most 
cases, the upstream and downstream enablers required for the integration of the twin 
pillars of child justice in Nigeria have not been established.  
The chapter found that one of the setbacks to the application of the twin 
pillars of child justice is that conventional non-family courts are still hearing cases of 
children in conflict with law a decade after that function was arguably legislated out 
of their jurisdiction. These non-family courts do not ordinarily possess the skill set 
and are not best suited with the sensitivity to make a determination as to what would 
be proportionate or in the best interests of the child. It argued that to be able to 
effectively and efficiently apply the twin pillars of child justice in the treatment of 
children in conflict with the law, all the enablers envisaged under the CRA must be 
established. The chapter also found that the allocation of legislative functions 
between the federal and state governments, and the plurality of laws in Nigeria 
impacts negatively on the nationwide child rights framework.  
On the basis of the findings of this chapter, the next and final chapter of this 
thesis will set out the general conclusions and recommendations with the aim of 
improving the child justice system generally, and in Nigeria in particular. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Capacity. See also Enugu State Judiciary Plan of Action for Strengthening Justice Sector Integrity and 
Capacity (2008 – 2010)  < 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/nigeria//publications/Actionplans0810/Enugu_Judiciary_Action_P
lan_2008_201011.pdf> accessed 13 December 2013 
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Chapter Eight 
General Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
8.1 Research Summary and Findings 
This thesis was prompted by long standing concern about the extent to which 
judicial treatment of children in conflict with the law in Nigeria is proportionate to 
their offenses and is also in consonance with their best interests. In a bid to 
contextualize child justice within the sphere of child rights, and ultimately within the 
broader parameter of human rights, this thesis investigated the philosophical and 
normative foundation of human rights, as well as an overview of the prevailing 
international and regional child rights normative framework. It found that child 
justice is an integral component of child rights because it is codified as such in 
international and regional human rights instruments and laws.  
It was found also that the philosophical foundation of child rights is situated 
at the interface of natural law and positive law referred to in this thesis as inclusive 
legal positivism. The rationale behind placing the philosophical foundation of child 
rights on inclusive legal positivism is due to the fact that while child rights could 
exist in isolation of the law and be inherent in human beings without specific 
legislation, they still need to be couched within legislation to be enforceable. 
Furthermore, the thesis found that child justice, as an integral component of child 
rights, congregates both the welfare and justice philosophies into a paradigm of 
restorative justice.  
This thesis observed that the philosophy of child justice is grounded on the 
notion that children in conflict with the law may be blameworthy for their offense. 
However, their culpability should not be on the same degree as an adult who 
commits the same offense, and as such, they should not be made to receive the same 
reprehension as an adult offender. Noting that child justice is an integral component 
of child rights and provides a specific and protective framework for children in 
conflict with the law, this thesis found that despite those human rights accruable to 
children by virtue of their humanity, children and particularly those in conflict with 
the law deserve special human rights due to their age and vulnerability. This thesis 
posited that the rights of children in conflict with the law can be protected only if 
their reduced culpability is taken into consideration when arriving at a judicial 
decision affecting them.  
To ensure that the reduced culpability of children in conflict with the law 
becomes the overarching framework for any judicial intervention against them, this 
thesis developed what it called the twin pillars of child justice. It found that the twin 
pillars of child justice are cardinal to child rights because both principles jointly 
encapsulate all other principles of child justice in particular, and child rights in 
general. Arguing that the twin pillars form the bedrock of child justice, it declassified 
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the twin pillars of child justice as the principles of proportionality and the best 
interests of the child.  
Considering that proportionality is a tool in the adjudication of the rights of 
children in conflict with the law and a tool to ensure that punishment fits the crime 
and the culpability of the offender, this thesis found that proportionality is one of the 
twin pillars of child justice. It argued that in the interest of justice, children in 
conflict with the law should not be held to the same evaluative standards by which 
adult culpability and punishment are judged.  
This thesis identified that the second pillar of child justice is the principle of 
the best interests of the child. Confirming that this principle is amply enunciated in 
regional and international child rights instruments and laws, it found that in the 
context of child justice, all actions concerning children must be guided by what is in 
their best interests. Having elevated the principles of proportionality and the best 
interests of the child as the twin pillars of child justice, this thesis discredited the 
claim that these two principles of child justice are not clearly defined, uniformly 
applicable and open-ended in nature.  
This thesis rationalized the flexible manner in which the principles of 
proportionality and the best interests of the child are couched and argued that such 
inherent flexibility makes them suitable tools in a multiplicity of child justice 
scenarios. It noted that while there may not be one-size-fits-all universal criteria for 
determining a judicial intervention that is proportionate and in the best interests of 
the child, this thesis argued that a universal principle such as the best interests of the 
child need not be defined rigidly. Rather, it posited that the flexibility in the 
definition and application of both principles is their elasticity in responding to the 
multiplicity of child cases and scenarios. 
Having provided content and context to the twin pillars of child justice, the 
thesis argued that the twin pillars of child justice are deontological because amongst 
other rationale, human rights in general and child rights in particular are by their very 
nature deontological. It adduced that since the overriding aim of child justice is to 
protect the best interests of the children in conflict with the law to the extent that 
they do not receive disproportionate punishment for their offense and culpability, the 
twin pillars of child justice in their deontological perspectives reinforce one another, 
particularly in the treatment of children in conflict with the law.  
The thesis postulated that the normative foundation of child rights is not 
domiciled in a single legal instrument, but rather traceable across several 
international and regional human rights instruments and laws. They include the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, the International Bill of Rights and particularly 
to the CRC and the ACRWC. In examining the normative foundation of child rights, 
this thesis conceded that the debate on the universality and relativity of human rights 
is also applicable to child rights. It noted that while child rights accommodate 
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relative sensitivities, the twin pillars of child justice are immutable and their 
standards ought to be interpreted internationally regardless of the religious and 
cultural differences of respective countries.   
Having confirmed that the principles of proportionality and the best interests 
of the child are mutually reinforcing and complementary, and together form the twin 
pillars of child justice, this thesis calibrated to what degree the twin pillars of child 
justice are legislated in the CRA. It found that the CRA is an improvement on the 
CYPA, and when compared to the CRC and the ACRWC, the articulation of the twin 
pillars of child justice in the CRA is stronger than the regional and international 
framework. Also, comparing the CRA with the child rights legislation of other 
common law countries in Africa, the 2003 CRA provides stronger protection for 
children in conflict with the law.  
Having validated the argument that the CRA effectively adopts the twin 
pillars of child justice, this thesis examined the extent to which the twin pillars as 
legislated in the CRA are applied by family courts in the treatment of children in 
conflict with the law. It found that despite the sufficient legal framework for the 
promotion and protection of child rights in Nigeria through the incorporation of the 
principles of proportionality and the best interests of the child as the twin pillars of 
child justice, children in conflict with the law in Nigeria are not availed the 
protection envisaged under the CRA.  
Analyzing why the twin pillars of child justice are not applied in the 
treatment of children in conflict with the law, this thesis found that family courts 
envisaged under the CRA have not been established and that the designated judicial 
personnel with specialist skills equally enumerated under the CRA have not been 
recruited or trained. It found that the present situation in Nigeria is such that children 
across the country are still processed in adult regular courts which are not sensitive 
to the twin pillars of child justice, and do not have at their disposal the specific skills 
and personnel envisioned for family courts under the CRA. It observed also that in 
conjunction with the challenges of a plural legal system, adequate financial resources 
have not been provided for the implementation of the child justice provisions of the 
CRA.  
This thesis noted that the application of the twin pillars of child justice in the 
treatment of child offenders in Nigeria is ineffective because of the non-
establishment of the downstream and upstream enablers enumerated under the CRA. 
As a setback to the implementation of the CRA, the thesis found that magistrate and 
high courts presently hearing cases of children in conflict with the law in the absence 
of family courts do not possess the required skill set and are not best suited in the 
absence of necessary training to make a determination as to what would be 
proportionate or in the best interests of the child. This thesis found that to be able to 
effectively and efficiently apply the twin pillars of child justice in the treatment of 
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children in conflict with the law, family courts with the appropriate personnel 
enumerated under the CRA must be established.   
This thesis noted that the competence to legislate on human rights issues in 
general and child rights in particular is not in the exclusive legislative lists earmarked 
for the legislative competence of the federal government. The competence is also not 
listed in the concurrent legislative lists where both the state and federal governments 
share competence. Rather, it is relegated to the residual legislative lists allocated to 
the state houses of assembly. On the basis of this constitutional structure, this thesis 
pointed out that the present constitutional allocation of legislative functions between 
the federal and state governments impinge on the nationwide enforcement of the 
twin pillars of child justice adequately legislated in the CRA.  
This thesis buttressed the fact that the National Assembly promulgated the 
CRA under Section 299(a) of the constitution, in which case its scope is limited to 
the jurisdiction of the Federal Capital Territory. It found that the effects of adopting 
the CRA under Section 299(a) of the constitution impede the nationwide impact of 
the twin pillars of child justice in the treatment of children in conflict with the law. 
This is so because in the absence of a nationwide application of the CRA, not all the 
states of the federation have adopted it into state law. As such, children in conflict 
with the law in some states of the federation are processed under the CYPA of 1945 
as amended.   
 
8.2 Implication of Research on Child Justice Globally 
Although this thesis is situated in Nigeria and within the framework of the 
CRA, its global implication resonates with the fact that it demonstrated that child 
justice is an integral component of child rights, and that the philosophical foundation 
of child justice is tied to the philosophical foundation of child rights. As an original 
contribution to knowledge and fresh input to the international debate on child rights 
in general and child justice in particular, this thesis enunciated and elevated the 
principles of proportionality and the best interests of the child as the twin pillars of 
child justice. It classified them as a universal standard for evaluating not just the 
child justice system of Nigeria but any other child justice system. 
It noted that the twin pillars of child justice is the key mechanism in ensuring 
the mitigated culpability of child offenders and moves sentencing consideration from 
the traditional focus on the ‘offense’ to a paradigm of considering also the ‘offender’ 
and the ‘victim’. The thesis also highlighted the fact that the global quest for a 
humane child justice system is only achievable if the twin pillars of child justice are 
applied to mitigate the culpability of children in conflict with the law. The thesis 
suggested that on the dictates of the twin pillars of child justice, proportionate and 
the best interests treatment of children in conflict with the law is a right that inheres 
in children in conflict with the law. 
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This thesis also bridged the gap between child justice and child rights through 
the instrumentality of international and regional norms. It recalled that the CRC 
enjoins states parties to undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative and other 
measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the convention.
1
 It noted 
also that the ACRWC calls on member states to recognize the rights, freedoms and 
duties enshrined in the charter and take necessary steps to adopt such legislative or 
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the charter.
2
 
On the basis of these provisions of the CRC and ACRWC, this thesis emphasized 
that appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the 
implementation of the rights of children in conflict with the law are captured in the 
twin pillars of child justice. 
 
8.3 Implication of Research on Child Justice in Nigeria 
This thesis examined the child justice system in Nigeria using the standard of 
the twin pillars of child justice. It highlighted the child rights neutrality of the bill of 
rights provisions of the 1999 constitution, mirrored the strength of the CRA vis-à-vis 
these twin pillars, and pointed out inherent obstacles to the realization of the rights of 
children in conflict with the law. This thesis corroborated that the intrinsic 
weaknesses of the CYPA of 1945 was the basis for the promulgation of the CRA in 
2003. Examining the legislative history of the CRA, this thesis also disputed the 
prevailing assumption that once the CRA is adopted, children in general and those in 
conflict with the law will begin to enjoy all the rights and protection recognized in 
international and regional human rights instruments and laws. While making some 
exceptions, it impinged on the assumption that once a law is passed, it is 
automatically implemented, particularly in a country like Nigeria with abundant 
instances of non-implementation of laws and policies. 
Examining the extent to which the CRA incorporated the twin pillars of child 
justice, this thesis found that the twin pillars of child justice are robustly guaranteed 
in the CRA. However, it noted that while this legislative stride is important in order 
to protect the rights of children in conflict with the law, it is not sufficient if the 
legislative framework is not supported by infrastructural, institutional and necessary 
manpower to translate the gains of the CRA into real and improved experiences for 
children in conflict with the law. Apart from the promulgation of the CRA in 2003 
and its eventual domestication by some states of the federation, this thesis found that 
not much has happened in terms of its implementation and subsequent enjoyment of 
the rights guaranteed therein by children in conflict with the law.  
                                                          
1
 Article 4 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989 
2
 Article 1 Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child, 11 July 1990 
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As a reality check for policy makers and legislators, the thesis pointed out 
that in spite of the legislative progress in the promotion and protection of child, the 
full enjoyment of the twin pillars of child justice by children in conflict with the law 
is an illusion that requires several non-legislative measures to make it effective. It 
found that children in conflict with the law even after the promulgation of the CRA 
and its state versions are not in any way treated proportionately or their best interests 
better protected than those in conflict with the law before 2003 when the CRA was 
adopted.  
Given the laudable gains made through the adoption of the CRA, this thesis 
underlined the need for urgent development of the CRA implementation strategy in 
order to stimulate, guide and effectuate the rights guaranteed therein. Such strategy 
will also ensure that children in conflict with the law receive from family courts 
proportionate punishments that take into consideration the individual and collective 
best interests of child offenders.  
The finding of this thesis also highlighted the fact that the same degree of 
advocacy and lobby invested by national and international civil society groups and 
development partners in the period leading to the adoption of the CRA should be 
repeated and adopted as a deliberate strategy in order to ensure that both the federal 
and state governments put all the necessary measures in place to implement the 
CRA.  A decade since the adoption of the CRA, public education and public debates 
on obstacles to the implementation of the CRA similar to those hosted by various 
stakeholders during the advocacy stages leading to the passage of the CRA, would 
potentially facilitate government sensitivity to the allocation of the necessary human 
and material resources for the implementation of the CRA. 
While commending the efforts of the CRA to address child rights in general 
and child justice in particular, this thesis elucidated the fact that the goals and 
aspirations of the CRA including its twin pillars of child justice will remain elusive 
to children in conflict with the law if the enabling environment for the full 
implementation of the CRA is not put in place. As an impact of this thesis to the 
child justice system in Nigeria, it highlighted the need to educate legal practitioners 
representing children in conflict with the law on the role of the twin pillars of child 
justice as a culpability mitigating tool. It also underlined the urgency to sensitize 
judges and magistrates hearing child cases of children in conflict with the law on the 
role of the twin pillars of child justice as a lenient sentencing tool. 
This thesis recalled that Article 40 (3) of CRC calls on states parties to seek 
to promote the establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and institutions 
specifically applicable to children in conflict with the law. It therefore becomes 
inevitable that in order to ensure the full implementation of the principles of 
proportionality and the best interests of the child elaborated in the CRA, the Federal 
Capital Territory and all states of the federation should as a matter of urgency 
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establish the family courts and all other institutions with requisite competences 
envisaged in the CRA.  
Also, to accord children in conflict with the law with the proportionate and 
the best interests treatment, this thesis emphasized the need for those states of the 
federation that are yet to domesticate the CRA into state law to do so urgently and in 
such a manner that would not water down the twin pillars of child justice robustly 
guaranteed in the 2003 CRA. This thesis validated the claim that while the 
government of Nigeria has taken the appropriate legislative step in the promulgation 
of the CRA in accordance with the CRC and ACRWC, it has failed to take 
appropriate administrative and other measures for the implementation of the rights 
recognized in these regional and international instruments and law.  
 
8.4 Recommendations  
   This thesis aims at improving child justice more broadly but with particular 
focus on the CRA. As such, it makes the following recommendations for the 
improvement of child justice in Nigeria. 
 
  8.4.1 Establishment of Appropriate Institutions  
The key institutions envisaged for the implementation of the CRA have not 
been established. Noting that it is not sufficient to merely domesticate international 
human rights norms into a national human rights standard, further efforts in terms of 
practical commitment and action towards the realization of the enshrined rights 
should be undertaken as a matter of necessity. It is on that basis that this thesis 
recommends the immediate establishment without further delay of conciliatory-
oriented family courts envisaged under the CRA at both the high court and 
magistrate court levels, and within the Federal Capital Territory and all the states of 
the federation that have adopted the CRA into state law.  
The establishment of family courts is very important in order to interpret 
elaborately the human rights content of the CRA in such a way that it robustly gives 
children in conflict with the law the full measure of the twin pillars of child justice. 
Without the immediate establishment of the family courts that are properly 
composed of personnel with the requisite skills and that are gender balanced, 
children in conflict with the law in Nigeria will still be subject to the jurisdiction of 
regular courts under the CYPA juvenile justice framework that is devoid of the 
inbuilt child rights sensitivities of the child justice system. 
In addition to the need for immediate establishment of the family courts, the 
CRA also envisaged and created a formidable role for the child rights 
implementation committee as an oversight authority to monitor the implementation 
of the rights guaranteed under the CRA. Since these committees have not been 
created in the Federal Capital Territory and most states of the federation that have 
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domesticated the CRA, this thesis calls for the immediate establishment of the CRA 
implementation committee composed of representatives of non-governmental 
organizations and the national human rights commission.  
It also underlines the critical advocacy and monitoring role of the CRA 
implementation committee specifically in respect to child justice apart from its 
general child rights monitoring role. It is recommended that the monitoring role of 
the CRA implementation committee should not be limited to non-compliance with 
the provisions of the CRA, but should extend to the adequacy of budgetary and 
manpower allocation to child justice administration in Nigeria. 
 
  8.4.2 Recruitment, Training and Sensitization of Personnel 
This thesis notes that the implementation of the CRA requires specialist 
personnel with specific competences, and that legislation alone cannot produce well-
trained, committed and motivated personnel. Consequently, it recommends that as an 
important element in the implementation of the CRA, there is an urgent need for the 
recruitment and training of professionals charged with the administration of child 
justice in Nigeria. While this thesis emphatically recommends the immediate training 
and sensitization of all actors in the child justice system, it is however mindful of the 
fact that generic capacity building of child justice actors alone is not sufficient to 
guarantee a holistic implementation of CRA.  
To ensure that such a capacity-building process benefits the child justice 
system in the short and long run, this thesis proposes the further encouragement of 
the specialization and technical expertise articulated under the CRA for all the 
judicial officers, probation officers, police and prosecutors involved in the 
administration of child justice. Bearing in mind the discretional powers of family 
courts in interpreting and applying the principles of proportionality and the best 
interests of the child, the specialized training of magistrates and judges to effectively 
apply these principles is indispensable.   
On the other hand, this thesis recommends that the terms of reference for 
these judicial officers dealing with children should be clearly set out bearing in mind 
the sensitivities and peculiarities of child justice, and most importantly those officers 
should be rewarded with competitive remuneration that could retain them in the child 
justice system. Furthermore, this thesis recognizes the fact that there is bound to be 
unavoidable turnover of personnel working in the child justice system with the 
resultant effect that moving staff may be most likely replaced by new, untested and 
untrained hands. This thesis recommends that a constant mechanism of training and 
retraining of staff be instituted to ensure that the goals and objectives of the child 
justice system envisaged in the CRA are adequately met.  
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  8.4.3 Creation of Public Awareness and Social Mobilization 
Eleven years after the promulgation of the CRA, its existence and provisions 
are not well known by the citizenry including legal practitioners. In line with CRC’s 
call on state parties to undertake making the principles and provisions of the 
convention widely known by appropriate and active means,
3
 there is a strong need to 
create public awareness of the CRA. This is to ensure that the lack of awareness of 
the child- centered provisions of the CRA does not hinder its realization. As was 
stated by Odhiambo,
4
 the need for creating such awareness is because of the 
prevalent paternalistic perceptions and interpretations of child rights against the 
socio-economic and political backgrounds within the African context.  
If children and adults alike are not aware of the protections inherent in the 
CRA, there is the likelihood that they will not be able to make appropriate demands 
on duty bearers. In that case, this thesis calls for the strengthening of the capacity of 
right holders to demand the rights guaranteed in the CRA. While the demand side of 
this recommendation focuses on appropriate institutional strengthening of right 
holders, it is also not oblivious of the need for public awareness and social 
mobilization on the supply side of the equation. This involves strengthening the 
capacity of duty bearers to perform their obligation.  
In that sense, this thesis recommends that a concerted effort be undertaken to 
create awareness and public enlightenment of the provisions of the CRA amongst the 
citizenry and child justice actors in particular. This is with a view to promoting a 
better understanding and appreciation of the fundamental and mitigating effects of 
the principles of proportionality and the best interests of the child as twin pillars of 
child justice.    
   
8.4.4 Improved Funding of the Child Rights Act 
The implementation of the foregoing recommendations is not budget neutral 
but rather requires the allocation of adequate human and financial resources. As 
such, in a resource constrained country such as Nigeria, the availability or otherwise 
of resources to implement the humane child justice system envisaged in the CRA is 
of utmost importance. Generally, the importance of resources in the implementation 
of a legislative aspiration has been emphasized by the committee on the 
implementation of the CRC.
5
  
                                                          
3
 Article 42 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989  
4
 Odongo Godfrey Odhiambo, ‘The Domestication of International Law Standards on the Rights of 
the Child with Specific Reference to Juvenile Justice in the African Context’ (Phd Thesis University 
Western Cape South Africa 2005) 65 
5
 See also Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 5 General Measures of the 
Implementation for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC/GC/2003/5 Adopted at the 34
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and human resources at a government’s disposal, both domestic and external 
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It should be noted that legislation such as the CRA domesticating and 
echoing the laudable provisions of the CRC and ACRWC will not protect children in 
conflict with the law or further the promotion of their rights unless legislators 
commit themselves to aspirations that the executive arm of government can 
realistically finance. Regarding the prevailing socio-economic situation in the 
country and on the premise that the socio-economic situation in Nigeria is vibrant 
enough to fund the effective implementation of the CRA, this thesis recommends 
that the federal and state governments should provide adequate resources for its 
implementation. This includes the immediate establishment of the family courts with 
expert skills for proportionate and the best interests treatment of children in conflict 
with the law.   
Although Nigeria is a developing country, it is certainly better endowed than 
most African countries and as such should be doing better in child rights in general 
and child justice in particular. This thesis concludes that the prevailing inadequate 
funding of the child justice system in Nigeria shows insensitivity and the low 
prioritization of issues of children in general and child rights in particular. Since 
children are disadvantaged in respect of promoting their own interest, the 
government should prioritize and allocate required resources to the implementation 
of child rights in Nigeria.  
While the federal and state ministries of justice may in principle be sensitive 
and sympathetic of child justice, the absence of specific legislative or policy 
framework that designates specific percentage of the budget of the ministry to child 
justice results in the discretionary use of funds which is inclined against child justice. 
To actualize one of the CRA’s goals in respect of a humane child justice system in 
Nigeria, both resources and political commitment are required by governments at all 
levels to turn the CRA’s loadable provisions into concrete benefits for children. With 
a strong political will, additional resources for this venture could be saved by 
minimizing corruption, and the effective and efficient use of scarce resources.  
Despite the fact that a critical performance assessment of the Nigerian child 
justice system vis-a-vis other African countries is not the focus of this thesis, suffice 
it to state that compared to the abundant resources of Nigeria, its child rights record 
lags behind reasonable expectations. This thesis reminds national and state 
legislators that they have an inherent duty in the exercise of their law-making powers 
to ensure that the laws that they make have the best possible chance of being 
properly implemented through amongst other things appropriate funding by the 
executive.
6
 
As stated earlier in chapter seven, unlike the South African Child Justice Bill 
that was subjected to a costing process that involved preparation of brief estimates of 
                                                          
6
 Ibid A Skelton, ‘The Child Justice Bill: Implementing the UN Convention Through the Process of 
Law-Making  
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the cost of implementing the bill or the Ugandan law reform process that involved 
preparatory work on the situational analysis and affordability of the proposals in the 
1996 Children Statute,
7
 the same cannot be said of the CRA. As such, this thesis 
recommends that any other legislation in Nigeria should as a precondition to its 
adoption be subjected to cost analysis of the implementation of such laws. It is 
viewed that promulgating legislation in Nigeria with an idea of the possibility or 
otherwise of funds for its implementation will help forestall such cash-trap situation 
inherent with the CRA.  
The family courts, the child rights implementation committees and other 
enabling institutions envisioned under the child justice framework of the CRA are 
not stand-alone institutions that are insulated from other broader substantive and 
support institutions of the broader justice system. As such, this thesis proposes that 
for proper functioning of the child justice system, an integrated and inter-sectoral 
approach between governmental institutions that work within the remit of child 
justice needs to be harmonized and coordinated. This thesis notes that the child 
justice system envisaged in the CRA is obviously dependent on the interplay of 
different governmental institutions such as the police, the prosecutor’s office, social 
works department and judiciary amongst others.  
As part of the overall justice system of Nigeria, the child justice system under 
the CRA is certainly impacted by perennial challenges that are undermining the 
efficiency of justice delivery in the country. As such, it recommended that the child 
justice sector reform in Nigeria takes a holistic view of the justice sector coupled the 
support and ancillary roles of related institutions. As Hammad aptly puts it, 
achieving child rights in the full sense of the word often necessitates a number of 
parallel strategies.
8
 
 
8.4.5 Amendment of Section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution 
This thesis recommends the amendment of the 1999 Constitution by 
excluding treaties relating to human rights in general and child rights in particular 
from the ambit of Section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution. This section reinforces in 
Nigeria the notion of legal dualism that is traditional to common law countries. It 
provides that treaties between the federation and any other country shall have the 
force of law to the extent to which such treaty has been enacted into law by the 
National Assembly.  
This thesis notes the importance of child rights as an instrument of good 
governance and that the treaty domestication process of the National Assembly is 
further impinged by the division of legislative functions between the federal and 
                                                          
7
 C Barberton and J Stuart, ‘Costing the Implementation of the Child Justice Bill: A Scenario 
Analysis’ (1999) Research Monograph No. 14 Applied Fiscal Research Center (AFReC) 21 
8
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state governments. It thus recommended that treaties relating to human rights in 
general and child rights in particular adopted between the federation and any other 
country or the international community should not be subjected to this second layer 
of domestication by the National Assembly and endorsement by state houses of 
assembly where the matter is not listed on the exclusive legislative list.  
This proposition is based on the fact that the dichotomy between international 
human rights law and national human rights law is becoming more fluid by the day 
to the extent that international human rights treaties adopted by countries are 
automatically beginning to have the force of law nationally. For instance, in the 
context of Kenya which is also a common law country, the 2010 Kenya Constitution 
supports this recommendation. Article 2(5) of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution 
provides that the general rules of international law shall form part of the law of 
Kenya.  
Sub-section 2(6) provides further that any treaty or convention ratified by 
Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under its constitution. Also Article 21(1) 
of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution makes it a fundamental duty of the state and every 
state organ to observe, respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the Bill of Rights and to take legislative, policy and other measures, 
including the setting of standards, to achieve the progressive realization of the rights 
guaranteed under the constitution. Equally, Article 21(4) enjoins the state to enact 
and implement legislation to fulfil its international obligations in respect of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.  
This thesis recommends express incorporation of Nigeria’s international and 
regional human rights obligations into applicable national laws and devoid of the 
need for domestication. The ongoing constitutional amendment process in Nigeria is 
a veritable opportunity to institute this type of constitutional arrangement thereby 
dismantling the age-long dualist legal systems in place in the country. On the other 
hand, this constitutional amendment would exclude child rights from the provisions 
of Section 12(1) of the 1999 which requires the National Assembly to expressly 
domesticate treaties to which Nigeria is a party into law before they become binding 
and enforceable.    
On the strength of this recommendation, any international or regional child 
rights instrument to which Nigeria is a party will automatically be binding and 
enforceable without the necessity of the same being enacted into law by the National 
Assembly. By this argument and on the basis of pacta sunt servanda, Nigeria will be 
bound by all human rights instruments and laws it ratifies including the CRC and the 
ACRWC. From a comparative perspective, if a provision similar to Article 2(6) of 
the 2010 Kenyan Constitution is introduced into the draft amendment of the 1999 
Constitution of Nigeria and eventually adopted, the existing discrepancy between 
international human rights standards of the country and its national human rights 
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framework would be reconciled in favor of the former. Also, if this amendment was 
to happen, the politicized, religious and culturally influenced debates that 
overshadowed the debates leading to the domestication of the CRC through the CRA 
and which obviously weakened the applicability and spread of the CRA would be 
avoided.  
 
8.4.6 Other Constitutional Amendments  
Another Section of the constitution that impinges on child rights and was 
proposed for amendment by this thesis is Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution which 
vests the legislative powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the National 
Assembly consisting of the Senate and House of Representatives and the House of 
Assembly of the 36 states of the federation. By virtue of Section 4, the National 
Assembly and House of Assembly of the 36 states of the federations shall have 
powers to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the federation or 
any part thereof with respect to the distribution of powers under the exclusive and 
concurrent legislative lists. 
This thesis does not question the rationale behind the allocation of legislative 
powers between both tiers of government in Nigeria. Rather it points out that the 
powers to legislate for human rights generally and child rights particularly in 
accordance with the prevailing international framework are neither enumerated in 
Part I nor Part II of the second schedule to the constitution itemizing matters under 
the exclusive and concurrent legislative lists respectively. In view of this 
constitutional structure, legislating and the setting of important normative standards 
such as human rights in general and child rights in particular are presently relegated 
to less prioritized and residual lists somewhat reserved for the legislative competence 
of the state houses of assembly.  
While there may be cogent justifications why the drafters of the 1999 
Constitution and other previous constitutions before it chose to allocate legislating 
for human rights outside the purview of the first class exclusive legislative list and 
the second class concurrent legislative lists, this thesis also notes that the justification 
for this allocation of legislative functions has seldom been canvassed academically 
and is certainly outside its purview. However, this thesis criticizes the existing state 
of affairs emphasizes the imperativeness to conduct research to further highlight the 
drawbacks or otherwise of assigning legislative competence on human rights and 
child rights to the residual legislative list earmarked solely for state houses of 
assembly.  
The ongoing opportunity for constitutional reform in Nigeria is a viable 
platform to add legislating to set human rights and child rights standards in the long 
list of issues on the highly rated exclusive legislative list. This thesis notes the strong 
call for the downward review of the legislative list of the 1999 Constitution so as to 
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devolve to the state houses of assembly many of the powers presently concentrated 
on the National Assembly. However, it recommends that legislating for human rights 
and child rights in particular should be introduced to the exclusive legislative list so 
as to ensure that the National Assembly can exclusively legislate on human rights 
and as such any law made towards domesticating an international human rights 
obligation would automatically be applicable to the entire country.  
With the opportunity presented by the ongoing constitutional reform in 
Nigeria, the domestication of international human rights treaties, enacting laws for 
the fulfillment and implementation of international human rights obligations 
subscribed to by Nigeria and ultimately the setting of national human rights 
standards should not be subject to Section 12 (1) of the 1999 Constitution requiring 
the concurrence of the majority of the state houses of assembly before the National 
Assembly would enact such a treaty into law.  
Ultimately, if legislating for human rights and child rights were within the 
remit of the exclusive legislative list, the CRA as promulgated by the National 
Assembly should have automatically had the force of law in all the states of the 
federation. It is expedient to amend the 1999 Constitution by adding a section in 
tandem with Article 21(4) of the 2010 Kenya Constitution that empowers the state to 
enact and implement legislation to fulfil its international obligations in respect of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
There is strength in the argument in favor of allocating law-making 
responsibility on issues relating to human rights in general and child rights in 
particular to the exclusive domain of the National Assembly applicable throughout 
the entire country. This is based on the premise that since the National Assembly is 
bicameral with equal representation of the thirty-six states at the level of the Senate 
and staggered representation of every state in the House of Representative, 
depending on the population of the state, religious and cultural sensitivities of 
various ethnic divides within the states of the federation are bound to be reflected in 
such human rights standards articulated and legislated upon by the National 
Assembly.
9
  
 
8.4.7 Enhanced Child Rights Sensitivities of the Constitution 
The 1999 Constitution guarantees expansive fundamental human rights 
which are equally applicable to children. However, these bill of rights provisions of 
the 1999 Constitution do not expressly mention children as distinct rights holders 
outside the generic fundamental human rights applicable to all. This constitutional 
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the 36 states of the federation with the Federal Capital Territory electing only one senator. The House 
of Representatives has a total of 360 members distributed according to the population of the 
respective states. 
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position does not support the effective prioritization and enforcement of child rights 
by state institutions and authorities and may have accounted for the lackluster 
implementation of the CRA. This position is also not in consonance with the 
contemporary trend of mainstreaming child rights through express mention in the bill 
of rights provisions of the constitution.  
The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, which is the most recent constitution of a 
common law African country, makes it a fundamental duty of the state and every 
state organ to observe, respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the bill of rights. It also entrusts on all state organs and all public 
officers, the duty to address the needs of vulnerable groups within society, including 
women, older members of society, persons with disabilities, children, youth, 
members of minority or marginalized communities, and members of particular 
ethnic, religious or cultural communities.
10
  
The constitution also enjoins the state to enact and implement legislation to 
fulfil its international obligations in respect of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.
11
 Bearing in mind the hierarchy of the constitution vis-à-vis other national 
laws in Nigeria, express mention of child rights in the bill of rights provisions of the 
1999 Constitution portends inherent advantages. As such, this thesis recommends on 
the basis of the veritable opportunity presented through the ongoing amendment of 
the 1999 Constitution, the introduction into the Nigerian constitutional framework of 
a provision similar to Article 21 of the Kenyan Constitution. 
 
8.4.8 Child Rights Enforcement Mechanism of the Constitution 
As noted earlier, despite providing for human rights in Chapter IV of the 
1999 Constitution, there is no other provision of the constitution that urges state 
institutions and other authorities to ensure the creation of an enabling environment 
for the enforcement of the child rights in particular and human rights in general.  The 
nearest to calling for the proactive enforcement of the bill of rights provisions of the 
constitution is chapter VII which establishes the judicature. Compared to the 2010 
Constitution of Kenya, the 1999 Nigerian Constitution is weak in terms of urging 
executive, legislative and judicial institutions to enforce fundamental human rights in 
general and child rights in particular. This thesis therefore recommends that the 
opportunity for constitutional amendment in Nigeria be explored to the fullest 
through amongst other things, the introduction of provisions similar to Article 21 of 
the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. 
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   8.4.9 Amendment of the CRA 
This thesis is not immediately advocating for the amendment of the CRA 
because it holds the view that the CRA should be made applicable to the entire 
federation, or at a minimum be adopted into a state law by those states that are yet to 
do so. However, it is pertinent to note that for purpose of further research, the CRA 
should be scrutinized so as to identify its weaknesses. In the context of child justice, 
the downside of the CRA amongst other things is that it did not expressly provide the 
minimum age of criminal responsibility and also did not provide for the enforcement 
mechanisms of orders of its family courts. While it is recommend that the lacuna in 
child justice provisions of the CRA be amended by those states that have adopted the 
CRA into a state law, this thesis calls on those other states that are yet to adopt the 
CRA to take these and other factors into consideration as they legislate the CRA into 
a state law. 
 
8.5 Concluding Remarks 
The promotion and protection of child rights in particular and human rights in 
general have assumed global appeal and also gained remarkable attention. Both are 
topical discourses globally and in the African continent through the instrumentality 
of several international and regional child rights and human rights instruments and 
laws. As a member of the United Nations and the African Union, Nigeria has 
subscribed to virtually all international and regional child rights instruments and 
laws.  
With increasing interest globally and regionally in improving child rights in 
general and child justice in particular, the CRA domesticated these international and 
regional child rights standards and provided the legislative framework for addressing 
the practical constraints and deficiencies of the CYPA. While contemporary 
international and regional child rights legal frameworks have been ratified and 
domesticated in Nigeria through the promulgation of the CRA in 2003, violations of 
child rights in general and of children in conflict with the law in particular are still 
prevalent. 
The political will demonstrated by the government in promulgating the CRA 
in compliance with international and regional human rights standards, although 
belated and procrastinated, is commendable. However, the position of children in 
conflict with the law is such that the non-establishment of the institutions and other 
enablers envisaged under the CRA and charged with the implementation of the CRA 
impedes the realization of the gains of both the CRA and other international 
instruments and laws which the CRA sought to domesticate. 
At present, one of the major challenges confronting the child justice system 
in Nigeria is to move beyond enactment of legislation to practical measures towards 
the implementation of the reforms proposed in the CRA. It is against this background 
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that one can best appreciate the apparent contradiction between provisions in a legal 
instrument and actual enjoyment of the rights by the citizenry. The findings of this 
thesis allude to the empirical hypothesis that domesticating an international human 
rights instrument in developing and transition countries would not necessarily 
improve the enjoyment of human rights by the citizens of the country unless 
adequate and effective implementation and enforcement mechanisms are instituted 
and functional.  
Without subjecting the child rights bill and others to a costing process, 
situational analysis and affordability of the incidental cost of implementing the bill, 
aspirations captured legislatively might remain elusive and out of reality. Suffice it to 
conclude that without adequate funding, the plethora of child rights guaranteed in the 
CRA will not be enjoyed, particularly by children in conflict with the law.  As such, 
further research should be focused on the relationship between law and its 
implementation mechanism in Nigeria. Further research could also analyze the 
effectiveness of legislative intervention vis-à-vis oscillating political will in 
promoting and protecting child rights in a country with resource constraints. The 
findings of this thesis corroborate the need to decipher alternative ways of creating a 
culture of respecting human rights that is cost-neutral. 
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